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Thesis Title: An examination of how the methods employed by the Criminal Assets 
Bureau move Ireland in a new direction of crime control.  
 
This work examines how the concept and operational outcomes achieved by the 
Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) reflect a new model of crime control that has emerged 
and developed to a stage where it is a significant contributor to crime control in 
Ireland.  The approach developed and implemented by CAB is not designed to produce 
a socially engineered solution to make the deviant better by correctionalist 
intervention and normalisation. Rather it is an actuarial approach to criminal 
wrongdoing, one which employs civil, administrative and regulatory mechanisms.  
The instruments employed by CAB attempt to permanently alter the criminogenic 
networks that exist around the individual and thereby neutralise the criminal threat. 
Following a doctrinal and socio-legal methodology this thesis examines the 
framework and conceptual underpinnings that lead to the establishment of CAB 
dealing with the long and short causal factors that lead to a refocusing of the overall 
approach to criminality.   It adopts an operation analysis approach to consider the tri-
part elements of forfeiture, revenue powers and social welfare powers that form the 
central tenants of the civil approach that CAB adopts.  In highlighting the operational 
approach and actual outcomes achieved by CAB it provides a case study of a modern 
criminological tool of disruption and discontinuity that operates against the financial 
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The nature of criminal law processes and attempts at crime control have 
changed dramatically over the past number of years.  Ireland has, in part, 
moved away from the traditional model of evidence gathering leading to 
criminal prosecution, with the ultimate aim of punishing the soul, towards one 
that is results orientated and concerned with threat neutralisation rather than 
retribution or rehabilitation.  In supporting such an opening assertion it can 
be contended that this modern re-focus is exemplified through a variety of 
means including greater use of revenue and welfare audits and the 
confiscation of the proceeds of crime. These three elements are applied, both 
individually and collectively, by the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) and 
moreover form the central operating plank and were the key establishment 
features of that body.  The original raison d’etre of CAB was to combat 
organised crime by denying profits that derived or were suspected to derive 
from criminality. Given the public concern with such criminality and its 
centrality in political and media discourse this may be part of the reason that 
dramatic changes were, in the main, accepted by society.   
 
The Bureau was established on a statutory basis under the Criminal Assets 
Bureau Act, 1996.  Its objective is set out in section 4 of the Act and 
summarised in the Bureau’s annual reports as using ‘all the available 
remedies and sanctions at its disposal in identifying, depriving and denying 
persons suspected of criminal activity and their associates of the benefit of 
that activity.’1  It can achieve this without the need for any criminal conviction 
and operates on the civil balance of probabilities standard.  It is a multi-
agency body consisting of members An Garda Síochána, officials of the 
Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Employment Affairs and 
                                                          
1 Criminal Assets Bureau (2001) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2000, Stationary 




Social Protection together with a Legal Officer and administrative and 
technical staff.  The composition of the Bureau ensures that in addition to 
specific statutes the totality of legislation under which all the comprising 
agencies act is brought to bear, by a single co-ordinated and focussed entity, 
on those engaged in criminal activity.  The original focus of the Bureau was 
on targeting those involved in drug trafficking but it now also applies its remit 
to the wider criminal field.   
 
The bureau became of age in 2017 and in those 21 years has enshrined itself 
a key operating partner and moreover leader in the fight against criminality 
in Ireland.  In addition to identified target individuals and specific issues 
arising in society it now targets areas of criminal cash flows from both crime 
and wealth transfer.  The former would include tax evasion, burglary/theft, 
drug dealing, bribery/corruption, money laundering, regulatory crime and 
white collar crime.  Whilst the latter includes matters such as cash, loans, 
cars/jewellery, banking transaction, property transactions, cryptocurrencies 
and bloodstock/livestock.2  It has sought to implement assertive authoritarian 
dominance in its operating sphere by its actions, communication and feedback 
to the public at large.  It meets regularly with regional joint policing 
committees to discuss its role in dealing with criminality at all operating 
levels.  In asserting moral dominance it has assured the public that any reports 
of unexplained opulent wealth without a visible source of income to match 
the lifestyle being maintained will be treated in confidence and investigated 
independent of the anonymous report.  In order to generate such reports and 
in response to any public concerns about criminality operating in their 
individual locality it has distilled its investigative process down to simple, but 
dogmatic, phrases such as: 
 
                                                          
2 CAB @criminalassets, 3 Jul 2018, “Pat Clavin, CBO of CAB, explained the role of CAB 
in denying and depriving people of the proceeds of criminal conduct at todays Financial 
Crime Prevention Symposium organised by @jibsevents” available at 
https://twitter.com/criminalassets/status/1014188533513375745 (Last accessed July 5th 
2018).  
In recent times the bureau has established its own website, however its main direct methods 




 “They flaunt it … 
 You report it … 
 CAB takes it”3 
and  
“Do you suspect that someone's lifestyle is funded by crime? 
Contact CAB today so we can make them pay and take it away.” 4     
 
Whilst this represents a vast over-simplification of the process and procedure 
carried out by the Bureau in reaching its statutory remit, it none-the-less does 
reflect the non-conviction civil standard model of governance that has been 
employed by the Bureau to target modern criminality and the attract-ability 
of such a model to communities concerned by crime and criminal actors with 
unexplained wealth.  There was a conception that such wealth was being held 
by individuals that were operating at a level beyond which the traditional 
concepts and parameters of criminal law were able to penetrate.  The above 
take it away simplification is made possible through the use of proceeds of 
crime legislation which allows for seizure and forfeiture of assets believed to 
be the proceeds of crime.  Importantly it is the respondent to any such action 
(ie the original holder of the disputed asset) that must demonstrate that the 
asset in question does not represent the proceeds of crime.  Furthermore the 
actuarial based revenue and social welfare approach employed by the bureau 
allows then to further target the financial base and essential cash flow of 




                                                          
3 CAB @criminalassets, 14 Nov. 2017, “CAB brochure launched at today's Dublin City 
Joint Policing Committee”. Available at 
https://twitter.com/criminalassets/status/930507209385168896 (Last accessed July 5th 
2018). 
4 CAB @criminalassets, 12 Nov. 2017, “Do you suspect that someone's lifestyle is funded 
by crime? Contact CAB today so we can make them pay and take it away”. Available at 





Research Question and Thesis Structure.   
 
The Bureau strives to deliver a value for money service and whilst it does 
regularly communicate income derived results – again assisting in 
accountability and acceptance in the public psyche – it is not formally bound 
by any financial targets in the form of any requirement to generate particular 
amounts of revenue in any given accounting period.  As a result it has 
significant flexibility in its approach and choice of operational direction.  
Resultantly the bureau is now operating at a wide level and is targeting many 
and varied elements of criminal activity.  In so doing it has both established 
itself as a key player in Irish crime control and has been given continuing 
support from a public who were faced with a crisis of hegemony and aspects 
of moral panic in the period immediately preceding the establishment of 
CAB.   It does this whilst being ever cognisant of its own remit and, moreover, 
as a result of challenges to its authority has had its operational boundaries 
clarified and approved by the courts. 
 
In that respect this work will consider how CAB is different in its approach 
to crime control as it rejects the model of catching, deterring and 
rehabilitating the criminal in favour of a system that doesn’t punish the 
offender in the traditional way of the criminal law, but rather applies civil 
sanctions aimed, as noted, at threat neutralisation. In essence the bureau may 
be seen to be operating in an apersonal way where the focus of crime control 
is on the asset rather than on establishing any mens rea pertaining to the 
individual.  Thus the central research question is to examine how the concept 
and operational outcomes achieved by the bureau – through the use of new 
techniques, approaches and strategies – reflects a new model of crime control.  
This will allow for a framework of understanding, through a practical 
consideration lens, of this new realm with respect to the outputs and actual 
outcomes – in terms of the proceeds of crime denied to criminality – of the 





Thesis Layout.  
 
To address this question the thesis will be divided into three parts.   The first 
part will deal with the conceptual framework under which CAB operates.  The 
second part will go on to consider the nature and concept of both criminal law 
and forfeiture and the establishment of CAB itself in that context.  Finally the 
third part will establish, analysis and contextualise the forfeiture, revenue and 
social welfare approach and outcomes achieved by the Bureau.   
Part One.  
 
In the first part of this thesis consideration is given to the structural and 
conceptual framework that forms the foundational structure upon which the 
model of crime control executed by CAB is built upon.  By considering the 
four key pillars of this model we can establish the theoretical basis for this 
new model of governance.  Such a conceptual model allows for the proper 
framing of the research question and its application to the remainder of the 
thesis.   The nature of governance generally has altered considerable over the 
last century and we have now witnessed the emergence of many and varied 
agencies that whilst focussed primarily on compliance have the option of 
issuing criminal proceedings.   As a result elements of criminal law have 
become much more regulatory in nature.  CAB has emerged and developed 
as a body that, unlike many of the compliance focused agencies, is not 
concerned with regulation but rather is focused on neutralisation.  It achieves 
this by bringing together here to fore unconnected bodies to work together 
towards an agreed common goal.     
Such goals are primarily achieved by virtue of the fact that the bureau does 
not rely on or indeed require a criminal conviction in order to operate.  Rather 
it adopts civil mechanisms enforced with authoritative criminal law authority 
and provides anonymity protection for public staff civilians who might 
otherwise be potential retaliation targets from criminal actors.  The almost 
side-lining of the individual and the focus instead on the disputed asset is 




considerable powers in the civil realm.  Much of the approach taken may be 
considered regulatory and administrative in nature with the focus not on any 
question of guilt but rather on unexplained wealth. 
This type of approach to crime control which takes account of the overall 
systemic risk is reflective of a business-like approach to control.  It asserts 
dominance without having any regard to aetiological factors.  Thus these 
pillars of governance, adopting civil standards, taking a de-individualised 
approach and focusing on the systemic risk form a solid theoretical 
foundation for the current framework that is built upon in the following two 
parts.  
Part two.  
 
The second part of this work is sub-divided into three chapters.   In order to 
contextualise the emergence of CAB and its place on the crime control 
continuum this part will commence with an analysis of the expanding and 
contracting boundaries of criminal law. This will be followed by an analysis 
of a key feature that is used by CAB – namely forfeiture.  The final chapter 
of this part will then consider the concept and establishment of CAB and its 
key operating components.  
The distinction between civil and criminal law is of critical importance as the 
standard of proof required between the two main cleavages in Irish law is 
fundamentally different in nature with criminal law requiring the much higher 
threshold.  Furthermore civil law is less expressive in nature and operates 
under much lower procedural safeguards.  Notwithstanding such key and 
critical differentiators, and the implications arising therefrom for the subject 
of the law, the distinguishing line between the systems is not pre-determined 
or even indeed a clear line.  Thus due consideration will be given to 
jurisprudential marking posts that assist in reaching a determination of where 
a particular issue should properly be housed.   
In establishing the various indicia that influence the determination of an 
applicable residence for a particular matter due consideration will also be 




Maters that fall into the administrative category would then be considered as 
part of the civil law regime.  The application of such definitional guidelines 
to modern issues such as white collar crime will be discussed on the basis that 
law does not develop or evolve in neat linear stages.  In some instances both 
criminal and non-criminal sanctions may be appropriate depending on the 
placement of the issue on the definitional yardstick.  This marks a drift to 
what may be considered as a middle ground system of justice – a ground that 
in the current context provides ample holding space for the civil model of 
criminal justice operated by CAB.  
In having established such boundaries and their applicability to CAB we will 
then turn to a key feature of CABs work – namely the concept of seizure and 
forfeiture of assets.  The use of forfeiture was not a novel element in common 
law.  The original concept of forfeiture was centred on the belief that where 
something did wrong then it was that particular thing or item that must be 
blamed and held accountable – normally by being forfeited to the crown.  This 
approach of focussing on the property rather than the person – or in rem 
forfeiture – was recognised in common law as an efficient and effective 
mechanism for dealing with wrongs as the property (for example, a ship) was 
often more easily identified and apprehended that an individual.   
The use of forfeiture as an instrument found its way into Irish legislation – 
however it was normally only an option post-conviction.  None the less in 
order to deal with particular issues it was a viable legal option that could be 
enshrined through legislative enactments.  The concept was expanded for use 
in the absence of a conviction with the introduction of the Offences Against 
the State (Amendment) Act 1985.  This was a very specific piece of legislation 
that was enacted to deal with a single issue in the extra-ordinary criminal 
realm.  Notwithstanding such specificity it was later cited as a clear model for 
modern forfeiture that could be enacted for use as an instrument by CAB.  
Further support for the introduction of this type of feature was found in the 
use of policy adoption from the United States.  Finally as a result of both 
European Union and international influences the concept of forfeiture was a 




prior to the establishment of CAB.  Whilst it will be contended that there was 
key tipping points for the establishment of CAB the above aspects will be 
used to demonstrate the long and short causal factors that lead to the 
introduction of non-conviction forfeiture of assets and thus such analysis 
provides jurisprudential grounding for the work of CAB.  
The very concept of CAB was a novel departure for the Irish system.  
Traditionally different agencies and bodies did not exhibit any level of inter-
agency co-operation but preferred to discharge their individual remits on an 
individual basis.  The nature of the bureau is to adopt the remit of its 
constituent parts and apply them in a pro-active and targeted manner in order 
to target the proceeds of crime howsoever generated.  As traditional methods 
were not deemed to be suitable to meet the requirements of modern crime 
control there was a felt need to devise and implement new measures.  The 
bureau is empowered to take all action necessary to identify and deprive any 
proceeds of crime.  Bureau members are seconded from the constituent bodies 
of its makeup and retain the powers that they originally held in their pre-
secondment position.   In addition given the nature of the work involved in 
being a bureau officer non garda members operate under anonymity 
provisions in order to protect their safety.   
As noted above a key aspect of the bureau’s approach is possible because of 
the proceeds of crime legislation.  This allows for civil forfeiture of the 
proceeds of crime – once objective evidence can be established – and 
importantly does not require that particular proceeds are linked to a particular 
crime.  The operational results and outcomes of this approach to dealing with 
the proceeds of crime in considered in the third part of this work.  
 
 Part Three. 
 
The third, and final, part of this work will again take a tri-part approach 
building on the framework and conceptual approach established in the earlier 




analysing the operational outcomes of the bureau’s activities.  The forfeiture 
approach is now deployed on a macro and micro level and is often regarded 
as the mainstay of the bureau’s approach.  However the revenue activities, 
which operate primarily on an administrative basis, are also a key element to 
the bureau discharging its remit.  Finally, whilst the social welfare elements 
of the bureau’s work did not originally generate the same level of financial 
deprivation for the criminal actor it nonetheless contributes individually and 
collectively to the crime control methods and is used to deny criminality a 
source of income.   
The operational approach of the bureau is neatly capture by the statement that 
it is ‘relentless’5 in the pursuit of the proceeds of crime at all strata.  It now 
has a presence in all garda divisions by virtue of trained divisional criminal 
asset profilers.  The numbers of such profilers has expanded considerably and 
they receive training in each of the three core areas of operation of the bureau.  
This has allowed the bureau to act on local knowledge and to engage with 
communities at a local level – a factor it deems important in its overall 
success.  Concomitantly with such a local approach it engages with garda 
units, and international law enforcement agencies, and has undertaken 
specialised and professional training where appropriate.  The combined effect 
of this overall approach has meant that CAB has returned significant returns 
to the Irish exchequer.  These returns have, in part, been made possible by the 
judicial acceptance that the bureau’s work falls on the civil side of the 
criminal/civil divide.  
A crucial feature of the bureau’s approach to crime control it the multi-agency 
nature of implementation at its disposal.  The application of taxation measure 
to income generated is a normal feature of most societies.  It traditionally 
operates as an administrative function and is accepted by most in society as a 
functional requirement in order for an executive to discharge its remit in terms 
of running a particular state.  Whilst originally in Ireland it was considered 
immoral to share in the proceeds of crime by taxing it that position has now 
evolved to a more pragmatic one where all income regardless of source may 
                                                          




be subject to the normal taxation rules.  CAB may now operate as a tax 
inspector and issue tax demands.  This represents a considerable power as 
once the demand is issued it is considered final and must be paid in full prior 
to any appeal against the validity of the assessment.  The bureau does not 
have unlimited authority and is subject to judicial scrutiny.  However, as will 
be demonstrated, much of the scrutiny arises from a procedural standpoint as 
opposed to any concerns with the use of revenue powers – of all types 
including excise duties and vehicle registration tax – as an element of the new 
model of crime control.    
In terms of such a crime control model bringing together the operational focus 
of various agencies an important feature is the assimilation of data on targeted 
individuals.  As previously noted, the bureau regularly targets individuals that 
appear to have wealth without a visible source of income.  In order to give a 
façade of legitimacy to such lifestyles those involved often claimed social 
welfare benefits.  Indeed from the criminal perspective to not do so would be 
a clear indication that they had alternative sources of undeclared income.  The 
structure of the bureau allows it to target any such fraudulent claims, stop 
them and demand repayment of any overpayments.  Further, such social 
welfare investigations are used as part of the collective approach in 
combination with revenue and forfeiture powers.  Additionally CAB has been 
an influencer in the development of debt recovery legislation where the debt 
arises from social welfare overpayments.  Finally, its approach is being 
mirrored in non CAB cases – reflecting the prevailing influence that bureau 
has had at many different aspects of law and crime control in Ireland.   
Methodology. 
 
In adopting this structure it is possible to properly address the research 
question.  As CAB is a creature of statute and uses the authority from various 
other statutes as a key tool an appropriate methodology to adopt is a doctrinal 
one.  This will allow for an examination of the various positivist legal rules 
underpinning the changing nature of crime control exemplified by CAB.  
Other supporting methodology will be employed to counteract any lacuna 




will be employed to enrich the doctrinal analysis.  Finally aspects of a 
comparative methodology will be employed to contextualise developments 
but will not be a central methodology of this work.  This pluralist approach 
allows for an appropriate examination of how CAB has taken Ireland down a 
new route of crime control.     
The nature of doctrinal analysis is ‘complex, multi-layered and distinctive’6 
whilst nonetheless difficult to reduce into descriptive terms as it is routinely 
and sub-consciously engrained in the law student during their under-graduate 
careers.  However as the ‘working method of the judiciary’7 in the Irish 
common law system it carries 
“both a scholarly and practical currency.  It has a long and established 
history.  Its epistemic outlook emphasises the logic of law and value 
of reasoning; the normative character of rules; institutional coherency; 
technocracy; internalism and self-referential validation; the limiting 
tendencies associated with rule determination; the ‘last authoritative 
voice’ position of law; its extensive potential range; legal craft; and 
the importance of being part of ‘an interpretive community.’”8    
 
Such legal reasoning reflects an internal viewpoint that can be analysed in the 
current work by parsing the theoretical framework and the legislative 
authority of CAB and the legislation it employs.  Furthermore given that CAB 
is still a relatively new entity, without a direct historical comparator, the 
synthesis of judgments handed down from the Irish superior courts is an 
important factor in addressing the research question.  In this manner whilst 
this methodology assumes the normative order of law it is also a 
comprehensive approach that is authoritative as law is the final arbiter of 
establishing the operational boundaries of CAB.  Adopting this approach 
requires ‘rigour’9 and resultantly provides ‘a coherent detailed and nuanced 
                                                          
6 Kennedy, R. ‘Doctrinal Analysis: The Real ‘Law in Action’ ’ in Cahillane, L and 
Schweppe. J. (eds) (2015) Legal Research Methods: Principles and Practicalities, Clarus 
Press: Dublin at 21.   
7 Ibid.  
8 Kilcommins, S. ‘Doctrinal Legal Method (Black-Letterism): Assumptions, Commitment 
and Shortcomings’ in Cahillane, L and Schweppe. J. (eds) (2015) Legal Research Methods: 
Principles and Practicalities, Clarus Press: Dublin at 18 – 19.    




picture of what the law is’10 in relation to the concept and operational 
approach of CAB.  Thus the approach adopted presents a ‘technical 
commentary upon and systematic exposition’11 of the law as it pertains to this 
particular area and method of crime control.   
Thus it may be concluded that adopting a doctrinal approach offers significant 
benefit and clarity to the current research.  In order to adequately address the 
research question it has been adopted as the basis and guiding tenant.  
However as it is a hermitically sealed approach that represents the internal 
viewpoint it is necessary, on this occasion, to supplement it with other 
methodologies.  Given the structure outlined above it is clear that various 
factors influenced both the establishment of CAB and its results achieved to 
date.  Whilst the doctrinal approach represents the internal viewpoint the 
external is represented by the ‘law in practice, of legal institutions at work in 
society rather than legal rules existing in a social, economic, and political 
vacuum.’12  Taken together the internal doctrinal approach may be seen as a 
solid basis for the external socio-legal approach 13 that allows us to view the 
operations of CAB in both its legal and operational context.  According to 
Allot: 
“Law seems to have special status among social phenomena by reason 
of its forms, its rituals, its specialised language, its special rationality 
even, and its specific social effects.  But on the other hand law is 
clearly embedded in the totality of the social process which is its 
cause, and on which it has a substantial determinative effect, not least 
in providing the continuing structure of society, its hard 
programme.”14    
 
                                                          
10 Stancil, P (2011) ‘The Legal Academy as Dinner Party: A (short) Manifesto on the 
Necessity of Inter-Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship’, University of Illinois Law Review 
1577 at 1584 as quoted in Kennedy supra n.6 at 23.   
11 Salter, M. and Mason, J. (2007) Writing Law Dissertations: An Introduction and Guide 
to the Conduct of Legal Research, Pearson Education: Harlow at 49.   
12 Ibbetson, D. ‘Historical Research in Law’ in Cane P. and Tushnet, M. (2003) (eds), 
Oxford Handbook of Legal Studies, Oxford University Press: Oxford at 864. 
13Cownie, F. (2004) Legal Academics: Culture and Identities, Hart Publishing: Oxford at 
54 – 55.   
14 Allot, P. (2002) The Health of Nations: Society and Law Beyond the State, Cambridge 




Thereby whilst supporting the doctrinal analysis the socio-legal methodology 
will also enhance it by informing the analysis.  This is achieved, in practical 
terms, through consideration of contemporary media reports, Dáil, Seanad 
and select committee reports, and the annual reports of CAB itself.  The later 
provide the main source of operational information and whilst given the 
secretive nature of much of the bureau’s work the reports provide a vein of 
knowledge and are of significant value in analyzing the penological changes 
that have occurred in society in response to the systemic risk generated by 
modern criminality.  The approach combines the distinction between what 
has long been referred to as ‘law in action and law in books’15 and by 
presenting the internal coherence and the external societal construction16 it 
avoids any false closure which might occur were a purely doctrinal approach 
adopted in this particular instance.  Additional support for addressing the 
research question will be garnished from comparative sources without 
specifically adopting an overall comparative methodology.  Whilst forfeiture 
and the use of taxation powers to target proceeds of crime were known to 
other common law jurisdictions that concept of CAB itself is a novel one 
without direct comparators and Ireland has taken the lead in developing this 
type of approach to crime control.  Thereby any comparative elements used 
are merely supporting in nature of the deconstructed components used to 
address the research question.  
In adopting this approach, to the current research question, is it important to 
acknowledge that the traditional model of crime control is post hoc and 
reactive in nature.  It follows the event and, indeed, that event having actually 
occurred is the key formation point for the commencement of a criminal 
investigation which, may, in certain circumstances, lead to a prosecution and 
punishment of the individual found guilty by the criminal system.  It is 
contended, within this thesis, that CAB marks a new departure on the crime 
control continuum just outlined. It (CAB) may be seen as a totally new model 
of crime control.  This is due to the fact that it seeks to control the level of 
                                                          
15 Pound, R. (1910) ‘Law in Books and Law in Action’, 44 American Law Review 12.  
16 McCrudden, C. (2006) ‘Legal Research and the Social Sciences’, Law Quarterly Review 




crime within society through a system that employs a risk management and 
governance17 approach that employs regulatory and actuarial justice in order 
to pre-emptively target and neutralise – as opposed to reactively convict and 
punish.     
From a methodological perspective these aspects will be merely introduced 
from a conceptual viewpoint at this juncture and, then, the application in the 
overall context of the current work will be explored in the methodologically 
based conceptual foundation section that is chapter one and resultantly will 
be a theme running throughout the remainder of the thesis. In this regard it 
should be noted that the concept of risk management is not new with its 
origins forming the entire basis of the insurance law model18 that has operated 
over the last two centuries.  In the context of the current work the prevention 
of crime is often seen as a form of risk management.  Rose considers this from 
a broad viewpoint and notes that:  
“[c]ontrol workers … thus have a new administrative function – the 
administration of the marginalia, ensuring community protection the 
the identification of the riskiness of individuals, actions forms of life 
and territories. Hence the increasing emphasis on case conferences, 
multidisciplinary teams, sharing information, keeping records, 
making plans, setting targets, establishing networks for the 
surveillance and documentation of the potentially risky individual on 
the territory of the community.”19  
The methodology employed by the Bureau finds credence and grounding with 
this type of risk management. As will be duly parsed it is a multi-agency body 
that is legally required to share information that is pre-emptive in focusing on 
targeted individuals that have been deemed a risk to the safety and security of 
the community at a local, national and international level.  This approach to 
risk management has a focus on ‘bringing possible future undesired events 
into calculations in the present, making their avoidance the central object of 
                                                          
17 On the nature of governance see chapter 1 at text around n.2.  
18 O’Malley, P. (2010) Crime and Risk, Sage Publications: London at 12.  




decision making processes, and administering individuals, institutions, 
expertise and resources in the service of that ambition.  Understood in this 
way, risk management has become central to the management of exclusion in 
post welfare strategies of control.’20  These various threads underpinning such 
an operational approach will form the central flow of the current work.  
Moreover, it will be contended that the framework   employed by CAB, in the 
execution of its statutory remit, is based upon this type of an approach which 
is actuarial in nature that targets regulatory crime.  
The concept of actuarial justice was considered by Feeley and Simon and 
those authors noted that it was ‘replacement of a moral or clinical description 
of the individual with the actuarial language of probabilistic calculations and 
statistical distributions applied to populations.’21  Other authors noted that the 
actual application of such an approach is less nuanced or statistically based in 
reality.22  The process ‘involves a transition to mores where there is no longer 
so much concern with justice as with community defence and protection 
where the cause of crime and deviance are not seen as the vital clue to the 
solution to the problem of crime. The actuarial stance is calculative of risk; it 
is wary and probabilistic; it is not concerned with causes but with 
probabilities, not with justice but with harm minimization. It does not seek a 
world free of crime but rather one where the best practices of damage 
limitation have been put in place; not a utopia but a series of gated havens in 
a hostile world.’23   Thus, the central theme of the actuarial approach, and one 
that is key to the model of crime control used by CAB, is that it is not 
concerned with the conditions of the offender but rather treats him as a 
rational choice actor who may be controlled by economic based sanctions.24  
The employment and outcomes of those sanctions will be considered in parts 
                                                          
20 Ibid at 332.  
21 Feeley, M.  & Simon, J.  ‘Actuarial Justice: the Emerging New Criminal Law’ in Nelken 
D.  (ed.)(1994), The Futures of Criminology, Sage: London.   The same authors 
contribution to an analysis of what is referred to as a ‘new penology’ is explored in chapter 
one at text around n. 62. 
22 Supra n.19. 
23 Young, J. (1999). ‘Cannibalism and Bulimia: Patterns of Social Control in Late 
Modernity.’ Theoretical Criminology, 3(4), 387 at 391.  





two and three of this particular work.   The central thesis of actuarial 
criminology also reflects a move towards a ‘bureaucratic and management of 
crime’25 method of crime control and thus its importance, in the current 
context, of its place in the crime control continuum.       
This type of approach to dealing with ‘risky populations’26 will be 
conceptually considered in chapter one and then, again, used as a basis for 
operational analysis within the thesis.  The traditional distinction between 
crimes that were considered ordinary and regulatory was that the former was 
consider mala prohibita and the later mala in se and thus ‘an instrumental 
means-ends term[s].’27  However the concept of moral repugnance is a 
difficult one in the modern era and just because a matter was not historically 
considered criminal does not mean it cannot now be consider ‘true’ crime.28  
In this regard and of specific relevance in the current work is that the 
development of a more regulatory approach29 to crime control has led to 
hybrid enforcement mechanisms and to suggestions of a ‘blurring of the legal 
forms’30 arising from such developments.  CAB targets mala prohibita 
criminality through the use and application of mala in se regulatory 
mechanisms and enforcement procedures to neutralise the financial base of 
crime.  Thus in addressing an underpinning operational research question this 
thesis will, by necessity, employ an operational methodology to the regulatory 
approach of CAB.  The requirement of compliance with administrative based 
law is thus the overarching link that brings such aforementioned 
criminological terms to the operational sphere methodology.   
                                                          
25 Harcourt, B. (2003) ‘The Shaping of Chance: Actuarial Models and Criminal Profiling at 
the Turn of the Twenty-First Century’ 70 The University of Chicago Law Review 105 at 
106.  
26 Supra n.24.  
27 Lacey, N. ‘Criminalisation as Regulation: the role of the Criminal Law’ in Parker, C. (et 
al) (eds) (2004) Regulating Law, Oxford University Press: Oxford at 145.  See also 
McAuley, F & McCutcheon, J.P. (2000) Criminal Liability: A Grammar, Dublin: 
Roundhall, Sweet and Maxwell at 341.  
28 Wells, C. (2001) Corporation and Criminal Responsibility, Oxford University Press: 
Oxford at 7.   
29 See generally Scott, C. ‘Regulatory Crime: History, Functions, Problems, Solutions’ in 
Kilcommins, S. and Kilkelly, U. (eds) (2010) Regulatory Crime in Ireland, First Law: 
Dublin and Butler, M. (2011) (ed) Criminal Litigation, Law Society of Ireland: Dublin at 
15 – 33.  




Contribution to Knowledge.  
 
Axiomatically the nature of criminal law is to focus on criminal matters with 
an overarching concern and focus on establishing mens rea, actus reus, the 
requirements of the offence and any possible defenses that may be raised in 
relevant circumstances.  This approach is reflected and followed in the 
standard works on Irish criminal law.31  CAB operates to target criminality 
but does so in the civil realm and thus there is, understandably, scant 
consideration given to either the establishment act or the proceeds of crime 
legislation.  The approach to crime control adopted by CAB employs 
regulatory and administrative sanctions and operates outside the traditional 
paradigmatic criminal law.  Criminology has long been considered an 
‘absentee discipline’32 in Ireland, however, from the operational perspective, 
in recent times there has been a marked development in the use of regulatory 
strategies.  Whilst the lack of a criminological research tradition will take an 
epoch to change there is now growing and detailed research on the concept 
and use of a regulatory approach to control in this jurisdiction.33  However 
much of the regulatory approach is concerned with compliance and 
enforcement of standards with the option for a criminal prosecution in the 
event of a default.  
The model adopted and implemented by CAB stands apart from these 
approaches – it operates exclusively in the civil domain with the sole 
objective of threat neutralization as opposed to any compliance or 
rehabilitative ideals.  When CAB was established there was a number of 
                                                          
31 See generally - McIntyre, T., McMullan, S. and O’Toghda S. (2012) Criminal Law, 
Roundhall: Dublin.  Campbell, L., Kilcommins, S. and O’Sullivan, C. (2010) Criminal Law 
in Ireland: Cases and Commentary, Clarus Press: Dublin.  Hanly, C. (2015) An 
Introduction to Irish Criminal Law, Gill and McMillan: Dublin 
32 Kilcommins, S., O’Donnell, I, O’Sullivan, E. and Vaughan B. (2004), Crime, 
Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland, IPA: Dublin at vii.  
33 See generally - Connery, N. and Hodnett, D. (2009) Regulatory Crime in Ireland, Tottel 
Publishing: Dublin.  Kilcommins, S. and Kilkelly, U. (eds) (2010) Regulatory Crime in 
Ireland, First Law: Dublin.  McGrath, J. (2015) Corporate and White Collar Crime in 
Ireland: A New Architecture of Regulatory Enforcement, Manchester University Press: 
Manchester.  Scott, C. (2012) ‘Regulating Everything: From Mega- to Meta-regulation’ 60 
Administration 57. Vaughan, B. (2009) ‘The Maginot Line of Irish Criminology: The rise 




academic based articles on the concept34 and later substantial work was 
completed, by Campbell in placing the model used by the bureau in a 
theoretical setting.35   
In particular she has focussed on placing one aspect of the bureau’s work – 
namely forfeiture – in a theoretical setting.  She has considered whether the 
proceeds of crime forfeiture approach implemented by the bureau is in fact 
‘an ersatz civil proceeding’36 by adopting a comparative approach to 
jurisprudence from the United States of America.  Furthermore she analyses 
whether the development of this model of asset forfeiture in Ireland reflects a 
movement from due process to crime control by applying the thesis of various 
theorists to the issue and concludes that ‘the growing use of forfeiture may be 
categorised as a paradigm shift’37 in the context of Irish crime control. 
Similarly King has focussed on the issue of non-conviction based forfeiture 
and the concept of middle ground justice.38  He raises and discusses the 
normative question of ought the concept of asset forfeiture be rightly 
considered a civil matter and expressed the viewed that ‘the Irish Judiciary 
have been overly deferential (acquiescent even) to the legislative intent’39 
                                                          
34 See generally - McCutcheon, P. and Walsh, D. (1999) ‘Seizure of Criminal Assets: An 
Overview’ 9 Irish Criminal Law Journal 127.  Murphy, S. (1999) ‘Tracing the Proceeds of 
Crime: Legal and Constitutional Implications’ 9(2) Irish Criminal Law Journal 160.  
Murphy, F. and Galvin, B. (1999) ‘Targeting the Financial Wealth of Criminals in Ireland: 
The Law and Practice’ (1999) 9 Irish Criminal Law Journal 133.  Jaipaul, S. (1999) ‘Asset 
Forfeiture in the United States’ (1999) 9 Irish Criminal Law Journal 191.  Meade, J. 
‘Organised Crime, Moral Panic and Law Reform: the Irish Adoption of Civil Forfeiture’ 
(2000) 10 (1) Irish Criminal Law Journal 11.  Meade, J. (2000) ‘The Disguise of Civility: 
Civil Forfeiture of the Proceeds of Crime and the Presumption of Innocence in Irish Law’ 1 
Hibernian Law Journal 1.   
35 Campbell, L.  (2007) ‘Theorising asset forfeiture in Ireland’, 71 Journal of Criminal 
Law 441. See also Campbell, L. (2010) ‘The Recovery of "Criminal" Assets in New 
Zealand, Ireland and England: Fighting Organised and Serious Crime in the Civil Realm’ 
41(1) Victoria University of Wellington Law Review 15. 
36 Ibid at 445. 
37 Ibid at 459.  
38 See King, C. (2012) ‘Using Civil Processes In Pursuit of Criminal Law Objectives: A 
Case Study of Non-Conviction Based Asset Forfeiture’6(4) International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 337-363; King, C. ‘Hitting Back’ at Organised Crime: The Adoption of 
Civil Forfeiture in Ireland’ in King, C. and Walker, K. (2014) (eds) Dirty Assets: Emerging 
Issues in the Regulation of Criminal and Terrorist Assets, Ashgate: Farnham, at 141-164, 
and King, C. (2017) ‘Civil Forfeiture in Ireland – Two Decades of the Proceeds of Crime 
Act and the Criminal Assets Bureau’ in Ligeti, K. and Simonato, M. (2017)  (eds), Chasing 
Criminal Money in the EU, Hart Publishing: London at 77-99. 




underpinning the proceeds of crime legislation.  Indeed he concurs with 
Campbell’s view that the adoption of civil forfeiture marks a ‘realignment of 
the approach adopted by the agents of the State in the fight against organised 
crime, and demonstrate a preference for the needs of the State over the 
individual's right to due process.’  King contends that such policies are 
regressive given the ‘inadequate knowledge base concerning organised crime 
in Ireland.’40   
Thus, it is submitted that the conceptual and ought question in relation to 
forfeiture has already been well scrutinised and this work does not seek to 
recover such ground.  Rather, it will build upon, but stand apart from, the 
existing knowledge base by taking a completely alternative standpoint that is 
pragmatic in nature.  Resultantly it will be accepted that CAB and non-
conviction based forfeiture are now part of the Irish criminal justice landscape 
and will examine how this arose and the operational approach of such a 
development.  
This will be achieved by examining the origins of change through a critique 
of a perfect storm of societal events that culminated in the establishment of 
CAB and the adoption of civil asset forfeiture.  Additionally this work will 
go a step further in that it is not just concerned with forfeiture but rather the 
tri-part interactive armoury of the operational concept and outcomes of 
forfeiture, revenue powers and social welfare powers as one cohesive and 
comprehensive unit of approach and thereby research.  In addition to the 
above mentioned forfeiture research Campbell has discussed the revenue 
side41 of the bureau’s work from a conceptual standpoint.  The current new 
research builds upon that to bring it up-to-date but again from the alternative 
operational and longitudinal based outcomes perspective.  Finally, and 
importantly, hit heretofore there has been scant research on the social welfare 
aspects of the bureau’s work.  As a significant element on the tri-part 
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approach of financial neutralisation this work will document its importance 
from an individual and collective standpoint.   
At times of a criminal crisis in Ireland there has been calls for the 
establishment of ‘mini CAB’s’42 to be established.  Furthermore on the 
presumption that the model adopted was successful the minimum amount that 
may be seized under proceeds of crime legislation has been reduced from 
€13,000 to €5,000.43  Therefore it may be extrapolated that there was a 
legislative desire to widen the scope of the Bureau.  Additionally the bureau 
originally needed a court order to seize assets but now may now initially seize 
assets in the absence of any such order.44      
 Despite such developments and assumptions and the prevailing influence of 
the bureau in its role as part of the Irish crime control model there has not 
been comprehensive research on CAB and its operational approach and the 
actual results that it has achieved to date by following this approach.  The 
work strives to fill that gap in Irish criminological research.  It does this by 
firstly considering the concept and its place on the crime control continuum 
and then provides comprehensive research and analysis of the tri-part 
approach of using forfeiture, revenue and social welfare powers combined to 
target criminality at all levels.  Such an approach will provide a new 
contribution to the current literature by providing an origins grounding with 
a pragmatic outcomes and outputs based case study of CAB from its 
inception. In this manner it provides an interesting case study of a crime 
control model where Ireland was the leader in its adoption and resultantly it 
is hoped that the research will have a wide interest and add to the body of 
knowledge in this arena.   
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Chapter 1.  




In recent years in Ireland we have witnessed a clear movement away from the 
monopolist position of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) as the 
augmenter of assessed transgressions into the criminal sanction arena using 
the traditional police – prosecution – punishment model.   It is common to 
now have multiple agencies involved in regulation, control and risk 
management and these have the potential for both investigating and initiating 
criminal sanctions.  These type of agencies also have a compliance remit.  
Whilst they rely on the State for authority they primarily pursue their own 
goals and objectives and whilst having considerable success in this (limited) 
arena can often be post hoc focused and not necessarily integrated as part of 
overall bigger picture of achieving targeted success.   In addition to multiple 
agencies we also have the development of multi-agencies.    
 
The Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) is the leading example and template for 
such an agency and it has a unique and specific remit to target the proceeds 
of crime and is not concerned with adherence to regulatory standards.  It both 
complies with and detracts from a model of disaggregated justice in that it 
operates outside traditional criminal boundaries and safeguards and does not 
require a criminal conviction but rather operates criminal justice within the 
civil realm to civil standards.   Due to its singular and thus co-ordinated multi-
agency (as opposed to multiple) approach is both cognisant of and an 
influencer of the strategic plans of its individual members and thus presents a 
co-ordinated approach in the areas in which it is focussed.  It operates as a 
leader and influencer of strategy for criminal justice goals and legislative 
enactments and is a finder of legal operational boundaries beneficial to both 





The question remains whether we are on the on the precipice of a brave new 
world or a new element of the continuum1 in the evolution of policing and 
enforcement of regulation in the Irish State.  The present chapter provides a 
structural and conceptual foundation of the four pillars that form the 
theoretical basis for a restructuring in Irish criminal justice – namely the 
model adopted, developed, defined and refined by CAB.  Such a foundation 
will allow us to consider, in the remainder of the thesis, this model and its 
operation by the bureau.  
 
The first pillar that will be developed is that of governance.  The nature and 
expectation of governance has changed, developed and been refined over the 
past number of centuries.   Moving from an era of little but harsh governance 
by the State to an era of criminal law refinement and modern, but primarily 
non-intrusive,  specialised and professional regulation, by multiple agencies, 
in all aspects of daily life ranging from gun control to levels of lighting in 
office blocks.  Many of these agencies have at their discretion the option to 
issue criminal proceedings for non-compliance and in the modern era 
criminality became to be seen as a solution for all problems arising in society.   
Resultantly and by concomitant necessity criminal law has become much 
more regulatory in nature and the traditional criminal footings of mens rea, 
actus reus and establishment in formalised court proceedings of guilt beyond 
all reasonable doubt is, in some areas, becoming  a measure of last resort and 
in others not an applicable measure in any circumstances.  Many regulatory 
crimes are often considered as instrumental in nature that are ‘decentred’ and 
‘at a distance’ and thus different to paradigmatic criminal law.  CAB may be 
considered as a hybrid model that is not concerned with either compliance or 
prosecution but rather threat neutralisation through the development and use 
of civil, administrative and regulatory mechanisms.  It brings together 
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heretofore unconnected agencies and applies the collective authority to 
targeted individuals at both a national and international level. 
 
This is achieved via a de-centred approach that avoids the structures and 
inherent protections of the criminal law by operating within the civil realm 
and it is this key factor that forms the second pillar of our conceptual 
framework.  The adoption of civil mechanisms by the bureau allows it to 
conduct non-conviction forfeiture and civil application of revenue and social 
welfare laws as a tri-part procedural mechanism to target the proceeds of 
crime and achieve threat neutralisation.  The bureau has a wide remit to 
achieve this target and constitutional protection for such an approach based 
on the overall common good.  Following a targeted approach on assets by the 
bureau the individual holding such assets is left with very little options 
provided that the bureau can prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
asset constitutes the proceeds of crime.  Indeed once this is proven the 
individual is generally left bereft of any rights notwithstanding the absence of 
a criminal conviction.  
 
The reason for such a situation is the basis of our third pillar in that the bureau 
is not concerned with either the individual per se or his or her guilt and 
potential punishment.  Rather the model adopted is concerned with the assets 
held by that individual and thus it is a framework of justice that is apersonal, 
non-moral, regulatory and administrative in nature.  In essence the bureau is 
focussed on the financial wealth of the criminal actor rather than the person.  
This involves specialised investigation, not using traditional policing methods 
but rather utilising accountancy and administrative tools to discover and 
follow financial trails and wealth holdings. This information based approach 
allows for a focus on the systemic risk that may exist.  
 
The bureau adopts an actuarial approach to identify and classify levels of 
danger that exist with society and does not concern itself with any aetiological 
factors that may be causing such dangers to exist and regenerate.  Rather it 




proceeds of crime and deliver those proceeds of crime to the benefit of the 
exchequer to be expended as the relevant executive deems appropriate. It does 
not seek to normalise the targeted criminal actor either pre or post application 
of its powers.  It has taken a role in reasserting moral authority over 
criminality and has begun to become more mainstream and taken a role in 
shaping the overall landscape by taking part in joint policing initiatives and 
briefings at various levels in the criminal justice field.        
Governance.  
 
The nature of how a democratic society is governed or regulated may be 
considered as a reflection of the standards and demands operating in that 
particular society.  Various events may cause a rupture in the development of 
such governance and serves to highlight the maxim that law does not develop 
in neat linear evolutions or straight line precedents and is thus a feature of a 
society rather than fixed constant.  Whilst the overall operating model may 
remain relatively static in its approach the above mentioned ruptures might 
be more correctly viewed as societal evolutionary developments that require 
matching regulation to meet the required demands and standards.  This 
regulation, in turn, may necessitate a departure from the norm.  In considering 
such governance in the specific Irish sense it is necessary to briefly outline 
the development of criminal regulation and control.   Whilst such analysis is 
of necessity broad and sweeping it nonetheless provides a suitable and 
applicable context for establishing the first foundation pillar of the modern 
system of governance that is operated by CAB.   
 
It is acknowledged that by the mid-19th century the state had begun, at least, 
to monopolise the prosecution and policing function2 in terms of serious 
crimes.  Concomitantly what was also evolving was a different approach to 
general and commercial regulation with the emergence of many and varied 
specialised regulatory bodies.   Indeed Braithwaite notes that: 
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“From the mid-19th century, factories inspectorates, mines 
inspectorates, liquor licencing boards, weights and measures 
inspectorates, health and sanitation, food inspectorates and countless 
others were created to fill the vacuum left by constables now 
concentrating only on crime.  Business regulation became variegated 
into many specialist regulatory branches.”3 
 
This may be seen, it is submitted, as the initial and very tentative emergence 
and development of specialism and professionalism4 in the regulatory arena.  
Furthermore it provided an orderly environment for commerce to operate and 
for society to be protected via consistent standards leading to expected 
outcomes and moreover a familiarity and acceptability of regulatory 
authority.  Whilst this reflected an emerging and evolving form of regulation 
is was confined to specific areas and, taking a chronological jump, the power 
to prosecute serious criminal transgressions remained with the Director of 
Public Prosecutions (DPP) or her predecessor in title.5  However in modern 
times it is now apparent that the DPP, whilst still the main prosecuting body 
for criminal breaches, no longer holds a monopolistic position in the area.  
Over time agencies have been established that – in contrast to the above solely 
regulatory bodies – have the option of using prosecution powers.  These 
agencies operate in areas such as Competition law, Health and Safety law, 
Environmental law; and Corporate compliance.  
 
Importantly, in the current context, in addition to the aforementioned criminal 
powers – which are considered a last resort strategy – these bodies are often 
seen as support, compliance and general enforcement agencies over and 
above being prosecution bodies.  Thus the power to guide, support and 
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negotiate is similar to the earlier business regulation model of specialised 
regulatory agencies – but with a final prosecution option available.  A 
distinction is sometimes made between such regulatory instrumental 
approaches and the expressive6 nature of traditional criminal law.  The former 
has been considered a ‘quasi administrative matter’7 that did not stigmatise 
those convicted.  In addition to these multiple regulatory bodies with their 
own unique competences in particular areas of expertise8 we have also 
witnessed the development of multi (as opposed to multiple) agencies and 
CAB is the prime exemplar of such an approach to governance. 
 
As with the departure in the mid-19th century for the regulation of business 
CAB is now focussed on the business of crime and how it can be governed 
and controlled – as opposed to regulated and manged vis-à-vis traditional 
business.  Here control based regulation is still focussed on cash flow, profit 
and (illegal) earnings generated.  CAB may be seen as a hybrid model that 
departs from both the regulatory and criminal prosecution model in the 
following ways: 
It is not concerned with enforcement, compliance or prosecution but rather 
targeting and neutralisation.  It departs from the police-prosecution-prison 
model to the regulation of the criminal business (as opposed to the criminal) 
where the control is not through post hoc conviction based sanctions but 
rather through threat neutralisation achieved through a non-conviction based 
model of enforcement (and enhancement) of the various individual powers of 
its member agencies applied collectively through the auspices of its multi-
agency approach.   
Its multi approach generates a situation whereby the sum of its parts is greater 
than the individually attainable success of its constituent parts whilst its 
operational force is attained from the specialised nature of its staff. This 
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marks a significant departure from the prosecution model of criminal law 
enforcement and its centralised tendencies.  This ‘decentred’ approach is 
reflective of a networked governance strategy9 that is founded upon civil, 
administrative and regulatory mechanisms.10  It is a system whereby: 
“Centres of political deliberation and calculation have to act through 
the actions of a whole range of other authorities, and through complex 
technologies, if they are to intervene upon the conduct of persons, 
activities, spaces and objects far flung in space and time … Such 
‘action at a distance’ inescapably depends on a whole variety of 
alliances and lash-ups between diverse and competing bodies of 
expertise, criteria of judgement and technical devices that are far 
removed from the ‘political apparatus’ as traditionally conceived.  
This generates an intrinsic heterogeneity, contestability and mobility 
in practices for the government of conduct.”11  
  
CAB in many respects is the embodiment of this particular type of 
governance.  It acts through the authorities and lash-ups of heretofore 
unconnected and   non-co-operating agencies enforcing existing and new civil 
based remedies in a traditional criminal sphere.  It intervenes not through 
fixed surveillance techniques but rather through targeting (it currently has 
approximately 700 targets12) that arises from networks of information 
generated from divisional asset profilers13  and governs conduct through such 
mobility of practice.  As noted by Rose on such governance generally: 
“The securitization of identity is dispersed and disorganised.  
Problems of the individualization of the citizen have formed in a 
whole variety of sites and practices of – of consumption, of finance, 
of police, of health, of insurance – to which securitization of identity 
can appear a solution.  Does this person have sufficient funds to make 
                                                          
9 See generally Braithwaite, J. (2000)  ‘The New Regulatory State and the Transformation 
of Criminology’  40 British Journal of Criminology 225 and Rose, N. (2000) Supra n.1  
10 Friel, R. & Kilcommins, S. ‘Taxing Crime: a new power to control’   in C King, C 
Walker, and J Gurule (eds) (2017) The Palgrave Handbook of Criminal and Terrorism 
Financing Law, Palgrave: London: at 690.  
11 Supra n. 1 at 323.  Also see generally Rose, N. (2003) ‘Government, Authority and 
Expertise in Advanced Liberalism’ 22(3) Economy and Society 283-299 
12 CAB @criminalassets Tweet 23rd March 2018 available at 
https://twitter.com/criminalassets?lang=en (last accessed May 2nd 2018.) 
13 On the nature, role and operational importance of divisional asset profilers see chapter 5 




this purchase; … is this person a potential suspect in a criminal case; 
… Control is [better] understood as operating through conditional 
access to circuits of consumption and civility: constant scrutiny of the 
right of individuals to access certain kinds of flows of consumption 
goods; recurrent switch points to be passed in order to access the 
benefits of liberty.”14  
 
Thus CAB in executing this approach to discharge its remit is reflective of a 
model whereby governance ‘flows through a network of open circuits.’15  The 
reach for effectiveness of actions is wider, greater and more fluid than 
traditional models of governance. 
“They overcome the barriers of space and time involved in physical 
surveillance; they are not labour intensive; they are of low visibility; 
they are of high durability; they are of high transferability across 
domains; they are largely involuntary or participated in as an 
uncalculated side effect of some other action”16 
 
The manner in which CAB operates is reflected in its extra-territorial reach 
and moreover impact of its operational approach.  By virtue of the definition 
of “criminal conduct” and “property” in section 1317 of the Proceeds of Crime 
(Amendment) Act 2005 the bureau can exercise its authority to pursue 
proceeds of crime in this jurisdiction where the offence was committed 
aboard and can seize assets that are held in a different jurisdiction.  
Additionally as ‘a front line agency in the fight against criminality’ and ‘using 
a unique set of legal principles’ the bureau plays ‘an important role in the 
context of law enforcement at an international level.’18  It is the designated 
asset recovery office for Ireland.   The offices share information at a European 
level to assist in identifying and tracing criminal assets in member states.  It 
                                                          
14 Supra n.1 at 326. 
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is also the lead Irish agency in operations co-ordinated by Europol and it 
utilizes the assistance of Interpol.  The bureau was one of the co-hosts of a 
conference that lead to the establishment of the Camden Asset Recovery 
Inter-agency Network (CAIRN) which is an ‘informal network of contact and 
a co-operation group’ with the aim of ‘enhancing the effectiveness of 
efforts’19 to deprive criminality of its profit element.       
 
The specialised network is further enhanced by involvement with bodies such 
as the Association of Law Enforcement Forensic Accountants (ALEFA) of 
which the lead partner is An Garda Síochána but via the bureau.   This is a 
European funded project which assists in the development of ‘the quality and 
reach of forensic accountancy throughout law enforcement agencies.’20  
Individual bureau staff provide training at an international level, based on its 
core skills and success achieved in its operations.  Finally21 the bureau has 
established a ‘unique relationship’22 with the United Kingdom as the only 
country with which Ireland shares a land border.  In addition to planning and 
support via cross border conferences the UK government has recognised the 
‘specific and individual powers’23  of CAB and resultantly has specifically 
included and the Bureau in its legislation pertaining to the disclosure of 
revenue and customs information.24  The importance of this approach and 
‘acknowledgment of the Bureau’s international investigative function’25 was 
reflected by a joint agreement between the bureau and Her Majesty’s Revenue 
and Customs (HRMC) in 2016.  
 
Thus, as demonstrated, the nature of the governance model operated by CAB 
is not defined by the influence of criminal law.  It operates in contrast to 
general paradigmatic criminal law in favour of a regulatory framework that is 
                                                          
19 Ibid at 43.  
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not concerned with subjective culpability.26  As a result ‘the state is steering 
and regulating rather than rowing and providing.’27  The nature of this 
targeted approach adopted by CAB utilises ‘a multiplication of possibilities 
and strategies deployed around different problematisations in different sites 
and with different objectives.’28  This model is a clear movement away from 
the traditional safeguards enshrined in the rubric of traditional criminal law 
in favour of a flow to civil law and standards for enforcement of its raison 
d'être at, importantly, both a national and international level.   
Criminal Law safeguards and the flow to civil power.   
 
These due process safeguards are enshrined as central and controlling tenants 
of the rubric of criminal law.  The find their justification on the basis of an 
equality of arms framework and a system of justice that places criminal 
proceedings as ‘officially designated ceremonies of guilt determination.’29  
As a result of following such strict strictures and procedures and meeting the 
high criminal burden of proving – normally to a jury – guilty beyond 
reasonable doubt the State by complying with the golden thread of criminal 
law maintains the moral authority to exert sanctions for breaches of deemed 
public wrongs.  This ‘social contract’ was encapsulated by Garland where he 
notes that:  
“The offender is defined as a legal subject, a citizen inscribed with 
rights and duties, entitled to equal treatment before the law. The State 
which punishes does so by contractual right in accordance with the 
terms of a political agreement. Its power to punish has its source in 
the offender’s action - it is the agreed consequences of a contractual 
breach. The State has here no intrinsic or superior right. It meets the 
citizen on terms of equality and must not encroach upon his or her 
rights, person or liberty except in circumstances which are rigorously 
and politically determined in advance - nulla poena sine lege. In this 
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penal vision we meet the ideology of the minimal legal state, the 
liberal dream, guardian of the free market and the social contract.”30  
 
Whilst this post hoc police – prosecution – punishment model remains the 
system under which many crimes are dealt with there is also a ‘growing 
homogeneity between criminal and civil procedures.’31  There is not straight 
line distinctions determining which area of law should have primary 
governance for particular transgressions. 
“Rather than the traditional dichotomist perspective therefore, legal 
proceedings might better be seen as a continuum, with distinctly civil 
proceedings at one end and clearly criminal proceedings at the other.  
Between the two ends of the continuum is a range of possibilities, each 
of which may be more or less criminal or civil.”32 
 
The individual tipping points for change will be considered later in this work, 
however the framework for change is, in part, based on the fact that multiple 
strategies are now employed by law enforcement agencies.  One of these 
strategies is to employ civil mechanisms as a crime control strategy.  
Depending on the perspective taken this may be seen as a move away from 
the harsh consequences of criminalisation33 or a necessary move towards the 
civil realm due to the ‘perceived ineffectiveness of the criminal law 
mechanism.’34  In any event by adopting the civil strategy it is possible to 
avoid the due process protections of the criminal law.  The movement in 
Ireland is exemplified by the non-conviction forfeiture of assets and civil 
recovery mechanisms operated by CAB.  Moreover the bureau is not 
concerned with the conduct of the asset holder but rather threat neutralisation 
through deprivation of the ill-gotten gains.  The targeted use of such sanctions 
in the civil – as opposed to criminal – realm has received judicial imprimatur 
on a number of occasions.  In M. v. D. [1998] it was stated by Moriarty J. that:          
                                                          
30 Garland, D. (1985) Punishment and Welfare: A History of Penal Strategies, Aldershot: 
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32 Ibid at 9.  
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“I am clearly entitled to take notice of the international phenomenon, 
far from peculiar to Ireland, that significant numbers of persons who 
engage as principals in lucrative professional crime, particularly that 
referable to the illicit supply of controlled drugs, are alert and 
effectively able to insulate themselves against the risk of successful 
criminal prosecution through deployment of intermediaries, and that 
the Act of 1996 is designed to enable the lower probative requirements 
of civil law to be utilised in appropriate cases, not to achieve penal 
sanctions, but to effectively deprive such persons of such illicit 
financial fruits of their labours as can be shown to be proceeds of 
crime.”35 
 
Thus where significant wealth is being generated by criminality operating at 
a distance from the offence enforcement via criminal law mechanisms would 
be ‘inadequate to the meet the aim of overall deterrence’36 that is a feature of 
criminal sanctions.  Resultantly where non-traditional methods are employed 
it would appear to be constitutionally acceptable to depart from traditional 
criminal safeguards on the basis of a greater good and necessity argument and 
any due process concerns are answered by reference to the civil nature and 
standards of the process.  However as has been highlighted in a different 
context ‘merely redefine any measure which is claimed to be punishment as 
regulation and, magically, the Constitution no longer prohibits its 
imposition.’37 
 
A feature of this model of civil recovery is that in marked contrast to criminal 
prosecutions civil forfeiture is revenue generating.  Whilst CAB highlights its 
success38 with regard to income generated and thus denied to criminality it 
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does not benefit directly nor is its existence directly dependent upon any such 
financial results.39  By implementing its civil powers the bureau is in a 
position whereby it has the option to confiscate property in the absence of any 
criminal conviction or even charge.  Moreover following any such action by 
the bureau it is at the behest of the holder of the disputed property to prove 
that the asset is not the proceeds of crime.  If the holder of the asset asserts 
that the order seizing said property was made in breach of a constitutional 
right then the bureau must demonstrate, on the civil balance of probabilities, 
that:  
“(i) the asset was not seized in circumstances of unconstitutionality, 
or  
(ii) that, if it was, it is appropriate nonetheless to make the order 
sought.  
In the latter case it is for the Bureau to explain the basis upon 
which it contends that the order should be made, and to establish 
any facts necessary to justify such conclusion.”40 
  
However even if the bureau fails to discharge this burden they will already 
have seized the asset on the assertion that it constitutes the proceeds of crime.  
This assertion will have been considered by the Courts prior to the above 
constitutional rights test and in the event that a constitutional right has indeed 
been breached in would not automatically result in the ‘return of the asset to 
the respondent from whom it had been taken, any more than contraband such 
as firearms, drugs or manifestly stolen property is returned to an acquitted 
person after trial. There is … no constitutional or legal right to possession of 
such items.’41 
 
                                                          
39 The situation is similar in Scotland, however in England and Wales there is an 
incentivisation model used where agencies share elements of monies recovered.  See 
Collins, M. & King, C. (2013) ‘The disruption of crime in Scotland through non-conviction 
based asset forfeiture’, Journal of Money Laundering Control, 16 (4) 379-388 at 382 – 383.  
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Whilst bureau activities are undoubtedly carried out with the utmost of 
integrity this model does serve to highlight the efficiency of actions approach 
that is available to the bureau through the use of such civil sanctions and 
powers.  There has been some criticisms of the avoidance of criminal 
procedural safeguards by using the civil standard and realm.  However the 
former Head of the Northern Ireland Asset Recovery Agency has countered 
that there is a ‘moral imperative’ to deny the proceeds of crime to criminal 
actors.  He opinions that whilst civil sanctions might be more efficient a 
sovereign State should be allowed to choose the most efficient methods to 
meet its governance goals – provided that there is sufficient protection for the 
rights of the individual.42  The criminal law provides these protections as of 
right but without the easy of action, expediency and efficiency associated with 
non-conviction based forfeiture.  Kennedy notes that in the civil context 
personal liberty is not at risk and the need for protection is not as high.43  It 
should be noted that he was considering the overall UK legislation which 
provides a statutory hierarchy that provides for criminal proceedings where 
possible.   This is not the case in Ireland and whilst personal liberty is not at 
issue as above once the bureau has taken action the assed individual is left 
with few options and thus impecuniosity is a potential outcome.   
 
This may arise as in addition to forfeiture powers the bureau has, as will later 
be outlined, quite considerable revenue and social welfare powers.  In relation 
to the former it can fully apply all revenue legislation to the proceeds of crime 
and where an individual wishes to appeal a revenue assessment that has been 
issued he must first pay that assessment in full.  It may also apply all social 
welfare legislation and both stop payments and demand repayment of any 
over payments.  The combined power to apply all three actions to its targets 
may undoubtedly be seen as meeting the late modern justice goals of threat 
neutralisation.44  Such actions with the civil methodology allows the bureau 
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to meet its remit by focussing not on the individual actor per se but rather to 
adopt a non-individualised approach.   
 
The non-individualised approach.  
 
The traditions of criminal law are encapsulated by the theory and operational 
concept of mens rea – the logical conception that it is unacceptable to sanction 
those who did not intend to do any wrong.  This concept has evolved over 
time and an accused’s conduct may be assessed based on where it falls on the 
framework of intent ranging from deliberate to neglect.  Where the individual 
falls on the framework will determine the type of charge and, if proven, 
sanction that the State will apply to that citizen.  Those found guilty will then 
personally suffer the punishment with the perceived overall traditional 
criminal justice ideals of retribution, deterrence and rehabilitation being meet.  
Such an approach matched the penal welfarism ideal of the rehabilitation of 
the offender.   
 
The development of knowledge around the offender reflects a correctionalist 
criminology approach being adopted that ‘perceived crime as a social 
problem that manifested itself in the form of individual criminal acts.’45  Such 
acts were viewed as being symptomatic of ‘criminality’ and ‘delinquency’ 
that were to be found in ‘poorly socialised’46 individuals.  The correctionalist 
approach adopts a criminology of the self approach that allows treatment to 
be focussed on that individual and their particular needs. This is in stark 
contrast to a criminology of the other approach which employs a more 
pragmatic model and rather than view the criminal actor as different it views 
that person as an ‘illicit opportunistic consumer’47 who should not be allowed 
to reap the benefits of criminal endeavour.  The contrast between the two 
approaches is highlighted by Garland:  
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“One is invoked to routinize crime, to allay disproportionate fears and 
to promote preventive action. The other is concerned to demonize the 
criminal, to excite popular fear and hostilities, and to promote support 
for state punishment”48 
 
The third pillar of our framework for the model of justice operated by CAB 
departs from any such correctionalist ideals. ‘Because crime is seen as 
inevitable and because individualised interventions are viewed with 
scepticism as to their efficacy, the new penology seeks cost effective methods 
aimed at regulating groups as part of a strategy of managing and minimising 
danger.’49  Whilst non-conviction targeting may contain elements of the 
ideals of criminal law50 the model is primarily a non-moral and apersonal 
interdisciplinary regulatory and administrative approach that considers the 
common good over that of the individual.51  This is achieved by adopting the 
norms of regulatory law and departing from criminal investigative norms.  
The use of clear and consistent results based communication by the bureau 
has significant ‘symbolic effect’ in addition to instrumental goals – based on 
the assumption that collective society rejects the norm that criminals should 
be able to enjoy the fruit of their ill-gotten gains52.  The adoption of new 
norms is possible on the basis that ‘law is one of the primary ways in which 
a sustained effort is made to rationalise choices about which solution should 
be employed to manage social problems.’53  Thus the apersonal civil approach 
is a ‘strategic instrument’54 that focus on the ‘bull’s eye of organised crime – 
its economic power.’55  In employing such an approach the bureau is not 
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concerned with punishment of the soul but rather denial of viability of the 
environment in which that soul is a key player.56   
 
Its success is achieved by removing the traditional lines of demarcation 
against different agencies and in this regard the Disclosure of Certain 
Information Act 1996 provides for the sharing of relevant information 
between the different constituent member agencies of the bureau.  The new 
style of investigation is based around the financial status of the targeted 
individual and his or her visible sources of income.  It involves case 
management through the expertise of forensic accounting, desk based 
research and the use of professional assessors such as auditors and 
consultants57 over and above traditional observational methodology.  CAB, 
like a business, is not interested in the individuals per se, but rather 
‘dividuals’58 that occupy particular lifestyle templates.  It is primarily an 
information based approach that involves: 
“both public and private sector material, for example taxation records 
and bank-account information, which demonstrate money 
movements, together with any relevant information as to lifestyle. 
Any record that provides information concerning money may be 
significant. The investigator seeks to discover where money came 
from, who obtained it, when it was received and where it was stored, 
deposited, or transformed into other forms of property. Since, those 
who commit acquisitive crime continuously grow more sophisticated 
in their laundering activities, this requires investigators to acquire new 
and specialized financial investigation tools, designed to obtain and 
interpret information which criminals wish to hide.”59    
  
Devising, creating and following a model which adopts such an approach in 
conjunction with the fact that for a CAB investigation no conviction or 
charges are necessary has resulted in Ireland, and the bureau, being at the 
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forefront in Europe for this type of non-conviction targeting of the proceeds 
of crime.  The apersonal approach rejects the notion of normalisation in 
favour of destroying ‘the criminogenic structures that exist around the 
wrongdoer.’60  
Managing Systemic Risk.   
 
It is those structures which the basis of our fourth and final pillar of the current 
conceptual framework.  It is one which is both a support to the other 
constructs but also in many ways a self-supporting pillar.  In using this 
structure CAB adopts a model that is focussed on considering systemic risk 
with the offender as a rational actor and the system being indifferent to any 
aetiological factor.  In contrast to traditional aims it has been stated that this 
new penology ‘has a radically different orientation. It is actuarial. It is 
concerned with techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groups 
assorted by levels of dangerousness. It takes crime for granted. It accepts 
deviance as normal. It is sceptical that liberal interventionist crime control 
strategies do or can make a difference.’61  Feeley and Simon contend that this 
movement may be seen ‘as a new strategic formulation in the penal field.’62  
The same authors note elsewhere that what they are referring to as this new 
penology is a ‘belated application of risk management, actuarial thinking and 
systems analysis to the criminal process.’63  They highlight that what they are 
defining as the new penology is not ‘a major paradigm’ in criminology but 
the movement of well-established bureaucratic practices into the criminal 
process.64  In essence, and as exemplified by CAB, combating crime 
increasingly involves the adoption of business like techniques to deal with the 
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developing and sophisticated business of crime.  Given the traditional 
criminal law monopolistic position it had been ‘isolated’ from the 
administrative techniques of commerce. Increasingly techniques such 
‘profiling, auditing and screening’ have been developed in order to improve 
‘administrative knowledge and control over penal agents.’65 
 
Garland has noted that the administrative subsystem of this type of approach 
may sometimes be seen as somewhat contradictory in nature.  He states that: 
[T]here are two contrasting visions at work in contemporary criminal 
justice – the passionate, morally toned desire to punish and the 
administrative, rationalistic normalizing concern to manage.  These 
visions clash in many important respects but both are deeply 
embedded within the social practice of punishment.66   
 
Thus whilst the desired end result remained a constant the focus, under this 
model it moves away from reform of the individual and moves towards a risk 
management perspective.   
“No-one was much interested anymore in the motives and meanings 
of these people. Instead what was at issue was what they did, how to 
control them, and how to minimize the harms they generated. 
Offenders and their offences were coming to be reframed less as the 
pathological products of societal and psychological breakdowns who 
needed to be therapeutically reformed, and more as bundles of 
harmful behaviours and potentialities.”67 
 
This is not to suggest that an individual’s past behaviour was being totally 
disregarded, rather it can be used as a valuable source of information to assess 
risk and categorise offenders on the basis of calculated dangerousness.68  As 
a result of increasing industrialisation and globalisation the late twentieth 
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century witnessed the emergence of what has been called the risk society.69  
Originally this was used to calculate risk in areas medical and safety areas but 
it was now permeating into the criminal sphere70 as a result of concerns that 
existing penal practices were not containing crime in the manner that was 
being demanded.  The increased demands to contain crime resulted in a more 
politicised approach to the issue of dealing with criminality in society and 
indeed public protection became a key touch stone of risk orientated tactics.71  
The growth of risk management was becoming ‘a necessary moral 
technology, operationalizing liberalism’s twin concern to maximise freedom 
of action and to reduce that freedom’s harmful consequences.’72   
 
The challenge of law was to ultimately provide the same desired result – but 
it was being achieved in a different manner.  ‘It is a question not of imposing 
law on men, but of disposing things; that is to say of employing tactics rather 
than laws and even laws themselves as tactics – to arrange things in such a 
way that, through a certain number of means such and such ends may be 
achieved.’73   Thus the adopting of risk management techniques enhances 
other regulatory mechanisms and in turn ‘these are being moulded and 
adapted to fit within a risk focussed mentality.’74  As a result of this particular 
mentality it is possible to exclude from normal society certain categories of 
individual.    
 
Viewing such particular individuals as a risk that needs to be managed75 
serves to highlight the importance of the new penology for establishing the 
current framework. It is evident that the model operated by CAB does not 
focus on culpability, rehabilitation and re-integration of the offender – rather 
                                                          
69 Kemshall, H. (2003) Understanding Risk in Criminal Justice, Open University Press: 
Berkshire at 8 -11.   
70 Supra n. 67 at 2.  
71 Supra n. 45 at 12.  
72 Garland, D. (2003) ‘The Rise of Risk’ in Ericson R. and Doyle, A. (eds) Risk and 
Morality, University of Toronto Press: Toronto at 64.  
73 Burchell, G (et al) (1991) The Foucault Effect Studies in Governmentality, University of 
Chicago Press: Chicago at 95 
74 Shearing, Supra n.61 at 212. 




it categories and manages.76  In contrast to the disciplinary approach of 
altering behaviour the actuarial regime alters the physical and social 
structures within which individuals behave. ‘The movement from 
normalisation … to accommodation … increases the efficiency of power 
because changing people is difficult and expensive.’77 
 
CABs model of targeting with the aim of neutralisation is reflective of a focus 
on the career criminal that is at the core of the new penology.  Indeed Feeley 
and Simon consider this is one of its key features as it is agnostic about the 
causes of crime and places its concern on the incapacitation of offenders.78   
Through integration in the overall system as part of joint policing initiatives, 
involvement at local, regional and national levels and results based 
communication with the public at large it would appear that the public may 
be more accepting and welcoming of this approach than of the long process 
‘cluttered with ceremonious rituals’79 that are the bedrock of the traditional 
criminal process.   
 
Of course such rituals form the bedrock for very valid reasons and it is 
essential that the entire system does not depart from long held traditions in 
order to target but one aspect of criminality.  The approach taken by the 
bureau ensures compliance, attains measures of efficiency and effectiveness 
and resultantly meets demands for public authority through the traditional 
lens of vengeance.  Axiomatically it does mark a movement away from the 
societal safety measures established by legal liberalism80 and adopts measures 
such as information sharers at both a professional81 and community level.  
The bureau has a relatively wide remit and has in recent years has begun to 
depart from its original position of targeting those at the highest end of the 
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criminal chain.  In additional to the need to ensure procedural safeguards,82 
Ashworth has highlighted that where there is an over focus on risk based penal 
policies the underlying problem of the risk may not be targeted or solved.83  
In terms of focusing on and solving the underlying risk the work of CAB is 
solely to deny the proceeds of crime to criminal actors.  Without straying 
outside the bounds of the current work, whilst this approach does neutralise a 
particular element on the supply side it does not necessarily affect the demand 
side for illegal goods.  At the time of amendment of the proceeds of crime 
legislation the decision was made not to ‘ring fence’84 funds generated from 
CAB activities for communities most effected by the individuals targeted by 
the bureau.  To reverse that position simpliciter could be seen as introducing 
– by the back door – financial targets for the bureau.  Given the wide powers 
available to the bureau under this new penology and its widening and 
supporting role within the Irish criminal justice system it should be 
constrained to justifiable criminal targets as opposed to any refocus in order 




It is undoubted that elements of the criminal justice landscape in Ireland has 
refocussed, re-assessed and re-asserted itself over the past number of decades.  
This in not unlike the commercial world where businesses carry a similar 
exercise in order to regain dominance in a particular market sector. In terms 
of the criminal justice sector CAB has been to the forefront of focussing upon 
and reformulating how the system deals with criminality.  The connecting, 
interlocking and overlapping framework for this change forms the conceptual 
underpinning for considering the work and operational approach of the 
bureau.  By developing upon societal acceptance of regulatory bodies the 
bureau adopted an instrumental approach to criminality that allowed it to 
                                                          
82 See generally Considine, J. & Kilcommins, S. (2006) ‘The Importance of Safeguards on 
Revenue Powers: Another Perspective’ 19(6) Irish Tax Review 49 – 53.  
83 See generally Ashworth, A. (2004) Supra n. 33.  




focus on threat neutralisation by adopting a networked governance approach 
that operates at both a national and international level and gives it very broad 
sweeping tentacles of power. 
 
This considerable power attainment and authority was feasible by adopting 
civil – as opposed to criminal – strategies to meet its statutory remit.  By 
confining itself to the civil sphere it has been able to neatly side step all the 
due process requirement inherent in the criminal sphere.  Whilst is has judicial 
imprimatur to operate in this fashion it is primarily a self-controlling, self-
regulating body that given the nature of its work must operate with significant 
elements of secrecy, that totally refocuses the traditional equality of arms 
provisions and places all the advantages squarely on its own side.  
 
It adopts a business-like approach with legislative authority to target 
criminality via assets as opposed to individuals.  Such a big picture approach 
focuses not on culpability of the individual but rather takes a risk management 
approach that is focussed on control of the financial wealth of targeted 
individuals.  This is achieved through interaction with society and other 
bodies in addition to exercise of its own considerable powers.  Whilst this 
thesis will demonstrate the results that it has had to date in targeting organised 
criminality through the implementation of this approach it is a model whose 





















In having established the framework in the first part of this thesis we will now 
contextualise the underpinnings of CAB by considering its place on the crime control 
continuum.  The early development of common law concentrated on matters which 
were deemed to offend against the King of the time – by default matters that would 
now be considered as serious criminal issues. It was only later that formal legal 
mechanisms took control of issues that arose between private individual actors in 
society and moved such matters to a formalised legal and court structure enforced by 
the organs of the State.   This greater organisational structure emerging in law 
generally and an encompassing of then non-traditional matters (ie what is now called 
civil law) resulted in a concomitant cleavage developing between matters of criminal 
law and those of civil law.  The distinction emerged, as per Holdworth, in the medieval 
common law period.  At that juncture in history he notes that:  
“The crown has assumed jurisdiction over the more serious crimes – the 
felonies. … At the beginning of this period many of the smaller wrongs to 
person and property were dealt with in the local courts. At the end of this 
period the writs of trespass and deceit and their offshoots enabled the royal 
courts to offer better remedies for a varied and growing class of wrongs. 
Consequently new principles both of criminal and civil liability were being 
evolved.”1 
 
As with the entirety of common law the distinguishing lines were not predetermined 
but rather established in evolving jurisprudence in the reactive precedent based 
manner that reflects that system of law.  Over significant periods of time the 
prosecution of crimes in society moved from an unstructured victim initiated process 
                                                          




‘to a structured, adversarial state monopolised event.’2 As a result various protections 
evolved in the criminal law area due to the fact that very often a breach of such a law, 
at a minimum, denied the accused his personal liberty if found guilty.  Thus the 
framework that is criminal law is now characterised by its punitive purposes, rules of 
discovery, high burden of proof, high procedural barriers to conviction and harsh 
modalities of punishment in the event of a conviction.3   
 
This can be sharply contrasted with civil law mechanisms which are less expressive, 
often concerned with compensatory mechanism – over and above any 
blameworthiness – and have much lower procedural safeguards than operate within 
the bounds of the criminal law.4  Thus whether an issue is investigated and/or pursued 
under the umbrella of criminal or civil law has profound implications for how that 
particular matter will be treated within the legal system as a whole.   It is arguable then 
that there is a clear temptation for prosecutors – if they have an option – to pursue 
matters in the civil realm with its associated lower burdens of proof and protections 
for the accused.  Such an argument, by corollary, indicates that breaches of law are 
not always clearly delineated into neat criminal and civil structures.  Rather a decision 
must be made as to which realm is the most appropriate to use in particular 
circumstances.  There are, as we shall see, a number of factors that both individually 
and collectively influence and determine such decisions.  The very nature of common 
law means that approaches develop in a piecemeal structure with historical, political 
and media influences all contributing to the developing and defining of law.   Such 
influences can often be reactionary in nature and without some level of legislature 
restraint laws may be enacted without proper consideration of criminological and legal 
philosophical principles.  
 
In this chapter we will deconstruct into individual components the various factors 
which result in an ultimate determination that a matter is criminal or civil in nature.   
In so doing we will be mindful of the need to avoid a history of the present analysis or 
                                                          
2 Kilcommins, S. and Vaughan, B. (2008) Terrorism, Rights and the Rule of Law, Willan Publishing: 
Devon at 41. 
3 Mann, K. (1992) ‘Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal Law and Civil 
Law’ 101 (8) Yale Law Journal 1795 at 1799.  




suggestions that all law can neatly be labelled into structures that have evolved at an 
even and continuous pace.5  In accepting such provisos we will commence with an 
analysis of the various factors that are regarded as key marking posts on the route to 
determining what constitutes criminal law.  In particular we will consider key Irish 
cases that have established jurisprudential groundings in terms of indicators that the 
courts will use in determining if a mater rightly rests in the criminal domain.  This will 
be carried out by considering operational and procedural factors and furthermore from 
an abstract analysis perspective.  In the same vein we will progress to consider 
distinguishing features between criminal sanctions and administrative sanctions as in 
the event that a matter falls into the later it is not part of criminal law and as such 
criminal law may still be applied without concerns of double jeopardy.   
 
Much of the jurisprudence underpinning this guidance has developed from what might 
be regarded as traditional legal issues in society.  Thus in the next section we will 
move to consider how law has and should deal with emerging and developing issues 
in society such as regulatory and white collar crime.   This will be achieved by initially 
considering how society reacts to non-violent crime and the non-traditional (criminal) 
actors who perpetrate such activities.   The specific example of competition law will 
be used to analyse the legislative and judicial approach to dealing with this nuanced 
and evolving area of law.  
 
A logical procession from such specifics will allow us to introduce the concept of 
middleground systems of justice and query whether such systems operate in Ireland.  
This section both assists with the overall aim of the chapter in seeking to locate the 
boundaries of criminal law and introduces a concept that will have relevance in later 
chapters where greater consideration will be given to specific examples of modern 
criminal justice in operation in Ireland.  In this chapter we will acknowledge the 
theoretical underpinnings of such a system that takes from both the criminal and civil 
realm and set out examples in an operational setting.     
  
                                                          




What is Criminal Law?  
 
One of the leading writers on criminal law has claimed that in attempting to define 
criminal law it is only possible to offer a formal definition.  He states that ‘in short a 
crime is an act capable of being followed by criminal proceedings having a criminal 
outcome.’6  Such an internalised axiomatic approach by its very nature leaves many 
other definitional matters to be considered.  Such matters are important considerations 
by virtue of the fact that where a particular matter is deemed to fall within the rubric 
of law will determine what legal protections are afforded to an individual that is 
accused of transgressing the law.  In the criminal sphere leading such protections is 
Article 38 of the Irish Constitution which provides that a person may not be tried on a 
criminal charge except in due course of law. In applying such a requirement in practice 
a number of significant protections such as the presumption of innocence, the 
requirement of guilt beyond doubt and certain rights to silence have evolved as central 
tenets of a modern criminal trial.     
 
In Ireland, the first significant case to provide doctrinal guidelines with respect to the 
indicators that would determine a matter to be criminal or civil in nature was that of 
Melling v. O’Mathghamhna.7  The facts of this case are pertinent for current purposes 
in order to properly assess the framework of analysis for establishing the key 
determinative features of a crime that were established by the judgment.  The facts 
relate to charges against the plaintiff for smuggling goods into the State the 
importation of which was prohibited by section 24 of the Dairy Price (Price 
Stabilisation) Act 1935.   The charges themselves were brought under section 186 of 
the Custom Consolidation Act 1876 which provided that if a penalty under the Act was 
not paid then the trial judge must (my emphasis) commit the defendant to prison for a 
period of between 6 and 12 months.   The plaintiff in this case asserted that the 
proceedings in question were criminal in nature and were not minor and thus should 
not, as was the case, be brought before a sitting of the district court.   
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In judgment Kingsmill Moore J. took a somewhat abstract approach and raised the 
question: 
“What is a crime? The anomalies which still exist in the criminal law and 
the diversity of expression in statutes make a comprehensive definition 
almost impossible to frame. "The criminal quality of an act cannot be 
discerned by intuition; nor can it be discovered by reference to any 
standard but one: Is the act prohibited with penal consequences?" said 
Lord Atkin in Proprietary Articles Trade Association v. Attorney-General 
for Canada. A recent text-book, Cross and Jones, suggests as a definition: 
"A crime is a legal wrong the remedy for punishment of the offender at the 
instance of the State.  "Professor Kenny in the earlier editions of his 
Outlines of Criminal Law says that "crimes are wrongs whose sanction is 
punitive and is remissible by the Crown if remissible at all." If we regard 
the Revenue Commissioners as a branch of the executive acting for the 
State (and in discharging their functions under the Customs Acts I think 
they must be so regarded) an offence under s. 186 would fall within both 
those definitions.”8 
 
In this case counsel for the defence had contended that the question (what is a crime?) 
could be answered by considering, firstly in the abstract, the relevant sections of the 
act9 and secondly in the specifics of this instance by virtue of the fact that the 
legislation did not contain words of prohibition but rather that committing certain acts 
was punishable in a defined manner.  As mention whilst Kingsmill Moore J. was 
taking an abstract approach this may be contrasted with the more procedural approach 
espoused by Lavery, J.  In establishing the approach to be taken to the establishment 
of what constitutes a criminal offence he applied an approach that involved 
considering the nature and potential outcomes of procedures.   In dealing with the facts 
at bar he stated that a proceeding that involved detention, a charge under terms 
appropriate to a criminal offence, searching an individual and presenting a person 
before a District Court as a person in custody, the normal bail procedure and the 
possibility of imprisonment for non-payment of a fine were factors that had all the 
‘indicia of a criminal charge.’10  This would reflect the application of a traditional 
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police, prosecution and punishment type approach and where that approach applies 
then ipso facto it must be a criminal matter.  However if we take this approach in a 
wider setting (ie it was very particular to specifics of the issue under consideration) it 
is somewhat of a post facto rationalisation.  Whilst using these operational factors 
serve to indicate that the matter has the hallmarks of a criminal procedure Lavery J. 
did refer to indicia and it is these that are more beneficial in establishing currently 
sought boundaries.  
 
These indicia were a central tenet of the overall judgement and were succinctly set out 
by Kingsmill Moore J. They could be regarded as key indicia features of a crime in 
the context of a piece of legislation or common law under consideration and in turn 
can be been extrapolated from the specific and applied in the general context.  These 
indicia are:  
(i) “ offences against the community at large and not against an 
individual; 
(ii) the sanction is punitive and not merely a matter of fiscal 
reparation. …  Furthermore, failure to pay, even where the 
defendant cannot do so by reason of lack of means, involves him 
in imprisonment; 
(iii)  such offences require mens rea, for the act must be done 
knowingly and with intent to evade the prohibition or restriction 
… Mens rea is not an invariable ingredient of a criminal offence, 
and even in a civil action of debt for a penalty it may be necessary 
to show that there was mens rea where the act complained of is an 
offence "in the nature of a crime":  … but where mens rea is made 
an element of an offence it is generally an indication of 
criminality.” 11 
 
These features were applied in various different cases that assist in current context of 
establishing the mantle for a distinguishing cleavage between matters rightly 
considered as either civil or criminal.  Following on from the above indicia it is a basic 
premise of modern criminal law that criminal actions concern conduct against the 
community at large not just one individual  thus  enforcement is not left to the victim 
but to the State.12  On the other hand with civil law any breach of it is purely a matter 
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for the injured party and they have various options as to whether they wish to pursue 
a course of action.13  However with criminal law whether the prosecution of an accused 
is to go ahead (or not) is at the exclusive determination of the State.  The public interest 
in maintaining the integrity of the State is usually carried out by a public prosecutor, 
namely, in Ireland, the Director of Public Prosecutions. 
 
The requirement for mens rea – clearly set out above – has long been regarded as a 
keep requirement to justify a criminal action in a free society. Such a requirement 
means that the offence must be committed knowingly and with an intent to evade the 
prohibition or restriction.14  The absence of such intent normally15 indicates that an 
individual did not have a guilty mind and thus ought not be prosecuted for a criminal 
offence.  In the current context then the absence of mens rea would at least indicate 
that the matter is not one of a criminal nature.  
In considering the second indicia above it is important to be cognisant of the lead in 
statement to these indicia by Kingsmill Moore, J where he quoted a Canadian case: 
“The criminal quality of an act cannot be discerned by intuition; nor can it 
be discovered by reference to any standard but one: Is the act prohibited 
with penal consequences?”16 
 
Thus attracting punishment is only a generalist position however, provision of 
punishment does not automatically mean the offence is a crime.  This point was clearly 
established in Enright v. Ireland17 where Finlay Geoghegan, J. stated that ‘[I]t may 
therefore be considered that in order that a sanction  imposed by a statute on a person 
convicted of a crime be considered to be a penalty in the criminal sense, requires that 
it be punitive in nature.  However it is clear that the fact that the sanction be punitive 
does not of itself mean that it will be considered a criminal sanction.’18  This raises the 
question of what then does constitute criminal punishment and as result how might 
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16 Melling v. O Mathghamhna and the Attorney General [1962] IR 1 at 25 
17 Enright v. Ireland [2003] 2 IR 321  




such an approach be actually applied in the Irish sense.  In answering the first point a 
theoretical under-pinning was offered by Packer in stating that:  
“Criminal punishment means simply and particular disposition or the 
range of permissible dispositions that the law authorizes (or appears to 
authorize) in cases of persons who have been judged through the 
distinctive processes of the criminal law to be guilty of crimes.  Not all 
punishment is criminal punishment but all criminal punishment is 
punishment.”  
 
In addressing what then is a permissible disposition for criminal purposes we may turn 
to application of this area in the courts.  In McLoughlin v. Tuite & Ors19 the relevant 
facts for current purposes concerned section 500 of Income Tax Act 1967.  This 
imposed a fixed monetary penalty (£500 (Irish pounds)) for failure to comply to 
deliver documents and particulars to the Revenue Commissioners.  Furthermore 
section 508 (of the same Act) provided that Revenue could sue by civil proceedings 
for recovery of that penalty.  The plaintiff failed to deliver returns of income by the 
required time under the legislation and the Revenue Commissioners sought to recover 
the prescribed penalties.  In turn the plaintiff sought a declaration that s.500 was 
repugnant to Constitution in that it imposed a punitive criminal penalty other than in 
a manner provided for by the Constitution.  In essence the question of key importance 
in establishing the current thesis was whether section 500 penalties were criminal or 
civil in character.  
 
In reaching judgment Carrol, J. in the High Court applied the indicia as set out in the 
Melling case above.  The learned judge noted that there was an absence of criminal 
phraseology used in the section under consideration.20  The plaintiff’s argument had 
been that as there is a penalty then, by corollary, there must be an offence.  The learned 
judge reach the conclusion that where ‘an offence must of necessity be implied by 
reason of the existence of a penalty … it would be an offence against the community 
at large and not against an individual.’21  She went on to note and accept that the 
penalty was punitive; however in the absence of payment there was, in this specific 
instance, no provision for imprisonment.  Finally, in terms of the mens rea 
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requirement, as the liability for payment continued against ones estate after death then 
this key criminal element was absent.   
 
In conclusion Carroll, J. accepted ‘the argument that the Oireachtas intended in s. 500 
to create a non-criminal penalty recoverable in civil proceedings as shown by the clear 
power to sue in civil proceedings, the continuation of the liability for penalty after 
death, the absence of the vocabulary of the criminal law … It is also in contrast to s. 
94 of the Finance Act, 1983, which creates a criminal offence in respect of the same 
facts.’22  In reaching such a conclusion, in a Revenue based case, the court used 
legislative interpretation to identify mechanisms by which legislation might be 
regarded as properly falling into the civil as opposed to criminal realm and ipso facto 
identify factors that the Irish legislature should be cognisant of in future drafting of 
legislation which could be applied on a civil balance of probabilities scale rather than 
the criminal standard of beyond reasonable doubt.  Prior to further analysis we should 
note that the court put considerable emphasis on the actual vocabulary used in the 
legislation.   
 
This was also considered previously in the Melling case, in particular by O’Dalaigh, 
J. who first dealt with the matter in a generalist sense by stating that it is not ‘a feature 
of civil proceedings that the plaintiff can have the defendant detained in jail before the 
proceedings commence and keep him there unless he can obtain bail. Nor may be 
obtain a warrant to enter and search the defendant's house or shop and seize goods and 
if obstructed break open any door and force or remove any impediment to such search, 
entry or seizure ... Nor yet is it a feature of civil proceedings that a plaintiff can put 
the defendant in jail because he cannot pay the damages awarded.’23  In having thus 
established what were central distinguishing operational features and key elements of 
criminal procedure he went on to apply it in the specific sense of the facts at hand and 
again are relevant here by virtue of the fact of the type of legislation.  He outlined that: 
“The vocabulary of s. 186 of the Act of 1876 is the vocabulary of the 
criminal law; the preliminary detention in jail unless bail be found (s. 197) 
and the right to enter, search and seize goods in a defendant's house or 
premises (ss. 204 and 205) are, as yet, unfamiliar features of civil 
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litigation. In their initiation, conclusion and consequences proceedings 
under s. 186 have all the features of a criminal prosecution. Note that 
Parliament in inserting directions in the form of conviction (set out in 
Schedule C to the Act and directed by s. 223 of the Act to be used) speaks 
unequivocally: I quote –  
"Where the party has been convicted of an offence punishable by 
pecuniary penalty and imprisonment in default of payment." 
Finally, the mode of withdrawal of proceedings is the time-
honoured formula employed by the Attorney General in criminal 
charges – nolle prosequi.”24 
 
It is interesting to note that the court, in this instance, were clearly grounding their 
interpretation of the legislation in the positivistic intentions of the legislatures and the 
framework and language that they choose to use in drafting the legislation.  This giving 
effect to the linguistic intentions of the legislative framers over and above general 
policy considerations was also applied in Director of Public Prosecutions v. Boyle 
[1994].25  The pertinent facts of which related to a bookmaker falling to pay tax on 
bets under the relevant legislation.  Given the emphasis which is being placed on the 
exact wording of the legislation it is worth restating that actual wording here:  
Section 24, sub-s. 1 of the Finance Act, 1926, as amended by s. 64, sub-s. 
1 of the Finance Act, 1982, provides:— 
"Every person who fails or neglects to pay any sum payable by him 
in respect of the duty imposed by this section shall be guilty of an 
offence under this section and shall be liable on summary 
conviction thereof to an excise penalty of £800." 
Section 25, sub-s. 2 of the Act of 1926 as amended by s. 69, sub-s. 1 of the 
Act of 1982 provides:— 
"Every person who contravenes or fails to comply with a regulation 
made under this section shall be guilty of an offence under this 
section and shall be liable on summary conviction thereof to an 
excise penalty of £800." 
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In reaching judgement Murphy, J.  highlighted that the above sections are clearly 
obligatory in nature and the penalties described there in were indeed punitive in 
nature.26  Moreover he was very clear in his statement that ‘the crucial factors in the 
present case are the presence of the words "an offence" and "on summary 
conviction".’27 He went to consider that it was the absence of those words, or indeed 
appropriate expressions, in Melling and other income tax related cases that 
necessitated consideration as to whether the legislation was intended to be criminal or 
civil in nature. Indeed he highlighted that judges in those cases both considered both 
the absence of expressions in some sections and ‘adverted to contrasting sections in 
the same legislation and the particular words such as "fine", "offence" and "summary 
conviction" which, amongst others, would be appropriate to designate a criminal 
offence.’28  In adopting such strict literal interpretation it should be noted that there is 
tautological elements at play in that such an approach is based on treating an issue in 
the manner that it has already been treated rather than a consideration of the 
underpinnings of that actual issue.29   
Administrative Sanctions.  
 
Indeed, specifically on sanctions and their application in the sphere of what constitutes 
a criminal or civil matter it is necessary to give due consideration to the courts 
approach to matters deemed to be purely administrative in nature as opposed to 
punitive.  If falling into the previous then they should, rightly, be treated as part of the 
civil realm.  The matter was considered by the Irish courts in The Registrar of 
Companies v. District Judge David Anderson and System Partners Ltd.30 The pertinent 
facts for current purposes relate to the failure by the second named defendants, System 
Partners, to file annual returns on time – as required by s. 125 of the Companies Act, 
1963 (as amended by s.59 of the Company Law Enforcement Act 2001) – for the 
calendar years 2000 and 2001. As a result proceedings were issued against System 
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Partners.  However subsequent to the issuing of the summonses but prior to the matter 
coming before the District Court, the company filed its annual return in respect of each 
of the years in question.   As a result of the late filling they were required to pay a 
substantially higher fee than if the returns had originally been paid by the required 
dates. In the normal course of the events the relevant filing fee would have been €30, 
however arising from the late filling the company was subject to fees of €1,200.00 in 
respect of the year 2000 and €379.00 in respect of the year 2001.  When the matter 
came before the District Court attention was drawn to the fact that the company had 
now filled its annual returns and paid the above filing fees which were far in excess of 
the normal on-time applicable fees. Resultantly the District Judge then concluded that 
there was a risk that the prosecution before him involved a ‘double jeopardy’ for the 
company and therefore should be struck out. 
 
The pertinent sections of the legislation state:  
- Every company shall, once at least in every year, subject to s. 127, 
make a return to the Registrar of Companies, being its annual return, 
in the prescribed form.” 
- If a company fails to comply with this section, … the company and 
every officer of the company who is in default shall be guilty of an 
offence …”31 
 
Notwithstanding the specific use of the traditional criminal term “offence” in the 
relevant section the Registrar of Companies sought certiorari of the decision on the 
basis that the late filing fee was designed to ensure timely filing and as such was a 
civil or administrative sanction and not thereby a criminal penalty. The High Court 
refused to grant this order and the matter was then appealed to the Supreme Court 
where Murray C.J. noted that the companies’ office has ‘regulatory responsibility’ for 
all Irish companies which is a significant administrative task requiring efficient and 
effective administrative procedures to be in operation. He noted that there is nothing 
unusual in providing incentives for timely payment of fees generally and by extension 
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charging higher fees to those who do not comply with the required deadlines.   In 
relation to the specific application of the above quoted section he stated:          
“In this case the liability to pay higher fees is an automatic (my emphasis) 
consequence to the objective fact of a certain statutory deadline having 
passed. The amount or amounts are fixed and there is no discretion. It is a 
foreseeable, objective and automatic consequence for lateness in filing an 
annual return by any company. It is clearly designed to encourage timely 
filing and discourage the dilatory. That is something which is clearly in the 
interest of good and efficient administration.  
It is manifest that the statutory requirement to pay late filing fees is not in 
any sense something which involves a criminal process let alone a criminal 
prosecution. 
Therefore, from a formal point of view I have no hesitation in concluding 
that the obligation to pay extra fees for a later return of a company’s annual 
report is in form an administrative sanction. That is to say a sanction that 
does not have as its purpose the punishment of an offence but the 
achievement of a legitimate administrative objective.”32 
 
In reaching such conclusions as to the administrative nature of the sanction he did 
acknowledge that this was not an absolutist position but rather one that was appropriate 
to the given facts and circumstances in that it was an incentive for timely compliance 
rather than a punishment.  Where the sanction in question was an extreme measure 
that was completely disproportionate to the actual administrative goal that was been 
sought then such a measure might rightly be considered a criminal penalty.33  Whilst 
such an approach is to be welcomed it would appear to provide further guidance for 
the legislative framers were they to be inclined to create legislation dealing with quasi-
criminal matters and place them in the civil sphere. The learned judge also stated that 
were the sanction in question to be excessive then it is the legislation itself, rather than 
the sanction, that should be challenged as to whether it meets the due process of 
criminal law.34  In this particular case the outcome was based on the fact that the 
‘second respondent was not charged with any offence, no decision or judgment was 
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made by any person or body concerning the individual company, there was no trial of 
any issue and no conviction or acquittal.’35 
 
The issue of whether there was element of double jeopardy at play were dealt with by 
Geoghegan J. where he stated:   
“There is nothing wrong in calling a substantially increased fee for a late 
return a “penalty" provided that that word is not given the narrow 
connotation of punishment. It would seem perfectly obvious that the 
motivation behind imposing substantially increased fees for late filing is 
one of deterrent rather than punishment. Of course, again difficulty is 
encountered with terminology because in the criminal jurisdiction a 
sentence may have a deterrent aspect. Throughout the ordinary 
commercial world there may often be extra payments imposed for late 
documents but by no stretch of the imagination could the increased fee be 
regarded as a punishment for a criminal offence. The charges by their very 
nature and character are administrative whether they be standard charges 
or increased charges to deter late applications.  
It is true that a statutory summary offence may not require mens rea and 
may be punishable merely by a fine. But the formalities whereby the 
defendant is tried are obviously criminal in nature and there is a prison 
sentence in default of payment of the fine. I cannot see that there is any 
analogy between that and a perfectly sensible provision that as a deterrent 
against late filing of returns...”36 
 
In thus holding that the fine was a civil sanction and thereby double jeopardy did not 
apply the case was decided on its facts however it does not provide a significant 
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signpost as to when a sanction moves from deterring to punishment.37  Additionally 
this approach reflects a traditionalist viewpoint, historically tied to that enunciated in 
Melling, of punishment being a key definer of criminal matters. According to Hart it 
is not the punishment itself that distinguishes between the two traditional cleavages of 
legal enforcement; rather it is ‘the judgement of community condemnation which 
accompanies and justifies its imposition.’38  However it would be an over 
simplification to apply broad-brush strokes and to suggest that this is a reflection of a 
first principle of democratic law making – that of simply reflecting the peoples’ views 
in the laws of a particular state39 and to assume that such a principles applies to the 
enactment in all aspects of regulation.  The labelling of particular activities is much 
more nuanced and targeted.   Not dissimilar to the earlier argument of legislation being 
written in particular manner in order to ensure it application in a particular arena it has 
been contended that criminal law is overly focused on a particular type of deviant.  In 
this respect McCullagh has stated: 
“The law making process is the means through which the criminal label is 
distributed in society.  As it operates in Ireland, the process of law making 
distributes this level in an uneven manner.   It sanctions some kinds of 
socially harmful behaviour and ignores others.  It is aided and abetted by 
an enforcement system that devotes more resources to the pursuit of some 
kinds of law-breaking than others…  The end product of this system, is a 
criminal population which contains a disproportionate number of those 
who are poor, uneducated and unskilled.”40   
 
                                                          
37 McGrath, J. ‘The Colonisation of Real Crime in the Name of All Crime:  The Traditional Court 
Approach to the Definition of a Crime’ at 46 – 48 in Kilcommins, S. and Kilkelly, U. (eds) (2010) 
Regulatory Crime in Ireland, First Law: Dublin and McGrath, J. (2015) Corporate and White Collar 
Crime in Ireland: A New Architecture of Regulatory Enforcement, Manchester University Press: 
Manchester at 13 – 29.  
38 Hart, H. (1958) ‘The aims of the Criminal Law’ 23 Law and Contemporary Problems 401 at 404.  
39 It has been suggested by Foucault that “…it would be hypocritical or naïve to believe that the law 
was made for all in the name of all; that it would be more prudent to recognise that it was made for 
the few and that it was brought to bear upon others; that in principle it applies to all citizens, but that 
it is addressed principally to the most numerous and least enlightened classes; that in the courts 
society as a whole does not judge one of its members, but that a social category with an interest in 
order judges another that is dedicated to disorder: Visit the places where people are judged, 
imprisoned or executed  … One thing will strike you everywhere; everywhere you see two quite 
distinct classes of men, one of which always meets on the seats of accusers and judges, the other on 
the benches of the accused   … Law and justice do not hesitate to proclaim their necessary class 
dissymmetry.”   Foucault, M. (1991) Discipline and Punish: The birth of the Prison, Penguin: London 
at 276. 
40 McCullagh, C. (1995) ‘Getting the Criminals we want: the social production of the criminal 




The difficulties with labelling and seeking to identify the distinguishing line are clearly 
evident in the Anderson case and is reflective of why that case needed considerable 
restatement in the context of the establishment of the milieu of factors influencing 
modern criminal and civil enforcement mechanisms and the associated diving line.  
We may consider this issue from two primary factors.   Firstly, the Anderson case is 
reflective of the blurring of the criminal law as a monopoly mechanism for dealing 
with criminal matters.41 It reflects what has been referred to as the emergence and 
development in Ireland of criminal administration.42  In this respect a widening 
number of agencies and bodies which now have criminal enforcement capabilities.  In 
the international setting this is not novel and Kilcommins and Vaughan have 
highlighted that the current Irish approach is reminiscent of the approach in the early 
20th century in the common law jurisdictions of the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America in dealing with public welfare offences.43   Indeed in 1933 in the 
United States it was contended that the concept of criminality was moving from a 
focus of individual guilt to one of social danger44 - essentially side-stepping the need 
for mens rea.   
 
In the current Irish setting the Anderson case highlighted the criminal enforcement 
mechanisms that are available to the Revenue Commissioners.  There are also many 
other agencies that now included criminal mechanisms in their own suit of armour. 
These include the Environmental Protection Agency, the Competition Authority, the 
Registrar of Companies, the Food Safety Authority, the Health and Safety Authority 
and the National Consumer Agency.45  All of these serve as concrete evidence of the 
ending of the exclusivity formally operated by the Irish Director of Public 
Prosecutions (DPP).  However they also represent the fragmentation of enforcement 
from a single cohesive body to disparate bodies with differing views on the best 
methods of enforcement to ensure compliance with their unique and particular remit.46  
                                                          
41 Supra n.14 at 12.   
42 Kilcommins, S. and Vaughan, B.  (2006) ‘Reconfiguring State-accused relations in Ireland’ Irish 
Jurist 90-122.  
43 Ibid  
44 Sayre, F. (1933) ‘Public Welfare Offences’ 55 Columbia Law Review 35 
45 Clark, B. (2013) Contract Law in Ireland, Roundhall: Dublin at 265 -268.  
46 For the views of the competition authority and competition practitioners on suitable methods of 




Notwithstanding, they also, importantly, reflect a need to not only consider ‘crime in 
the streets’ but also ‘crime in the suites’47 – an issue that does not neatly fit into the 
Melling framework of defining a crime.      
 
Reconstituting real crime: the regulatory and white collar vortex.  
 
It is undoubted that Melling reflects the grounded traditional rubric of justice that is 
expressive and symbolic and is enforced by punishment that is reflective of a just 
deserts approach. Yet, it is contended that it struggles to encompass the regulatory, 
instrumental and utilitarian aspects that must be addressed as they are now a significant 
part of the Irish criminal justice system.  This is not to suggest a refocus away from 
the traditional crimes that are abhorred in society, rather to acknowledge that a first 
world modern economy faces (criminal) challenges to its structure and operation in 
areas that may need the same focus and treatment as traditional crimes.  In this respect, 
it has been claimed by Lucey et al, that it is ‘crucial to a proper understanding of 
criminal law to see that it has these two aspects, and the balance and interplay between 
them is a key to its historical development and contemporary social significance.’48    
That balance has not always been struck as the focus of lawyers, criminologists49 and 
academic instructors50 is often consumed by the strict contours of ‘real crime’ such as 
homicides, assaults and sexual offences as established though the building blocks of 
mens rea and actus reus and the application of general defences.  Kilcommins and 
Vaughan assert that this narrow focus is a mistake as there is an ever increasing trend 
                                                          
47 Supra n.2 at 138. The issue of double jeopardy has been considered by the Financial Regulator’s 
office. It is permitted to impose civil administrative sanctions for ‘prescribed contraventions’ of 
relevant legislation. These sanctions include, inter alia, a caution or reprimand, a monetary penalty 
(not exceeding €5,000,000 in the case of a corporate and unincorporated body, and not exceeding 
€500,000 in the case of a person), and a direction disqualifying a person from being concerned in the 
management of a regulated financial service provider (s 33AQ and 33AR of the Central Bank Act 
1942).  The Financial Regulator also has criminal powers of prosecution and enforcement. However, 
and in response to the problem posed by the principle of double jeopardy, no criminal prosecution 
will be brought if the Regulator has pursued the administrative sanctions procedure which has resulted 
in the imposition of a monetary penalty See Connery, N.  and Hodnett, D. (2009)  Regulatory Crime 
in Ireland, Tottel Publishing: Dublin at 140 – 151.   
48 Lacey, N., Wells, C. and Quick, O. (2003) Reconstructing Criminal Law: Texts and Materials, 
LexisNexis: London at 5.  
49 Supra n.2 at 138. 
50 Scott, C. ‘Regulatory Crime: History, Functions, Problems, Solutions’ in Kilcommins, S. and 




to use criminalisation to solve societal concerns.51  The very concept of regulation 
through the criminal law is not new,52 what is novel is the ‘exponential growth in the 
numbers of such [regulatory] agencies in Ireland, many of which have criminal law 
responsibilities.’53 
 
Given such growth the relevant resulting questions, in the current context, centre 
around why such crime is treated differently to traditional crime and where such crime 
now lies in the definitional framework upon which precedent for prosecution in the 
either a criminal or civil setting is based.  Traditional crimes have always been widely 
reported by the media and have the ability to generate fear and panic and, rightly, 
shock and appal society who expect protection from and punishment of the exponents 
of such activities.   Equally the executors of white collar crime do not – in the same 
fear inducing manner at least – tend to upset general society as such crimes are 
‘committed by a person of respectability and high social status in the course of his 
occupation.’54  Indeed it is this social status of those involved that has been credited 
with leading to the situation where the activities they undertake carry the attributes of 
crime but were not traditionally dealt with as a crime.55  There is however evidence of 
this tradition not being followed in particular areas of law and we will now consider 
competition law as an example of one of those particular areas.  In turn this will 
provide further contextualisation for the overall destination of the chapter in 
establishing the modern contours of crime in Ireland.   
 
The issue of both whether and how competition in a marketplace should be regulated 
is not a new concept.56  The freedom of contract approach would suggest that the 
general position should be to leave competition between businesses unregulated as to 
do otherwise could result in the danger of law acting as a barrier in the marketplace.  
In turn such an approach should result in the optimal allocation of scarce resources 
and ensure effective competition through consumer choice and thus both avoid waste 
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and stimulate efficiency.57   In many marketplaces however there has always been a 
fear that certain competitors will seek to distort free completion.  As far back as 1800 
the United States introduced the Sherman Anti-Trust Act58 and it was later stated that:   
“The purpose of the Act is not to protect businesses from the working of 
the market; it is to protect the public from the failure of the market. The law 
directs itself not against conduct which is competitive, even severely so, but 
against conduct which unfairly tends to destroy competition itself”59 
 
Accepting the nonlinear development of law – particular on a global scale – and the 
logical fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc, from this general position it is justifiable 
in this particular instance to take a large chronological jump in order to consider 
modern Irish regulation of competition.  This is possible because what is being 
contended is merely that some marketplaces have long acknowledged the necessity 
for some form of regulation to ensure free competition and that the US legislation 
succinctly demonstrates that position.  The next question is what form that regulation 
ought properly to take in order to ensure compliance.   Ireland’s laws in this respect 
are significantly influenced by our membership of the European Union.60 The Irish 
Competition Act 2002 now provides for what are known as ‘hard-core activities’61 and 
it particular in sections 5 and 6 of the above Act deal with the prevention of cartels 
and other collusive behaviour and abuse of dominant positions respectively. 
Specifically it states:  
 S.6.—(1) An undertaking which— 
(a) enters into, or implements, an agreement, or 
(b) makes or implements a decision, or 
(c) engages in a concerted practice, 
that is prohibited by section 4(1) or by Article 81(1) of the Treaty shall be 
guilty of an offence.  
                                                          
57 Ibid at 90. 
58 The Sherman Antitrust Act 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7. 
59 Spectrum Sports, Inc. v. McQuillan 506 U.S. 447 at 458. 
60 Article 81 and 82 of the EU Treaty deal with competition law.    It has been argued that US 
completion law tends to focus on the protection of completion whereas EU law protects competitors.  
See generally Cseres, J. (2005), Competition law and Consumer Protection, Kluwer Law 
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(2) In proceedings for an offence under subsection (1), it shall be 
presumed that an agreement between competing undertakings, a decision 
made by an association of competing undertakings or a concerted practice 
engaged in by competing undertakings the purpose of which is to— 
(a) directly or indirectly fix prices with respect to the provision of 
goods or services to persons not party to the agreement, decision 
or concerted practice, 
 (b) limit output or sales, or 
(c) share markets or customers, has as its object the prevention, 
restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or 
services in the State or in any part of  the State or within the 
common market,62 
S.7.—(1) An undertaking that acts in a manner prohibited by section5(1) 
or by Article 82 of the Treaty shall be guilty of an offence.63 
 
Additionally section 8(6) of the same Act makes directors of an undertaking, its 
management or anyone acting in a similar capacity liable for criminal wrongdoing.   In 
turn section 8(7) makes a presumption that such a person has consented ‘until the 
contrary is proven’64 to the doing of acts amounting to the prevention, restriction or 
distortion of trade or the abuse of a dominant position. In consideration of the above 
quoted sections it is apparent then that the system in operation here is much more 
                                                          
62 Competition Act 2002 Section 6.  
63 Competition Act 2002 Section 7.  
64 Whilst this marks a radical reversal of normal legal procedure it is mirrored in other modern 
legislation. For example see s. 80 (2) of the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 2005 which 
provides that Where a person is proceeded against as aforesaid for such an offence and it is proved 
that “at the material time, he or she was a director of the undertaking concerned or a person employed 
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management of the undertaking, or a person who purported to act in any such capacity, it shall be 
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the commission by it of the offence concerned under any of the relevant statutory provisions was 
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existence of a reasonable doubt.  Thus the section represents a less severe onus that might prima facia 




‘exculpatory in orientation than its ordinary criminal counterpart.’65 We will now turn 
to how this legislation has been applied by the courts.   
 
In DPP v. Denis Manning66 when dealing with the issue of cartels McKechnie J stated: 
“This type of crime is a crime against all consumers and is not simply 
against one or more individuals. To that extent it is different from other 
types of crime: and while society has an interest in preventing, detecting 
and prosecuting all crimes, those which involve a breach of the 
Competition Act are particularly pernicious. In effect, every individual 
who wished to purchase, for cash, a vehicle from these dealers over the 
period which I have mentioned were liable to be de-frauded, and many 
surely were by the scheme and by the practices which unashamedly this 
cartel operated. These activities in my view have done a shocking 
disservice to the public at large.” 
   
At an earlier juncture in this chapter we made a distinction between crimes that are 
malum prohibitum and those that are malum in se, the same learned judge, as just 
quoted, in the later case of DPP v. Duffy,67 when again dealing with cartels, stated that:  
“They reduce incentives to compete and hamper invention. They cause a 
transfer of consumer’s money to themselves. They are offensive and 
abhorrent, not simply because they are malum prohibitum, but also 
because they are malum in se. They are in every sense anti-social. Cartels 
are conspiracies and carteliers are conspirators.”  
 
Such an approach then would seem to clearly meet the malum in se requirements of 
the Meeling framework.   This is of itself is an interesting development as it highlights 
what might constitute malum in se wrongs in modern society and how that has evolved 
from earlier understandings of the phrase – at least from the perspective of the 
legislature and judiciary.  It is still open to question whether society generally has 
adopted such a position as ‘[s]ociety tends to be more concerned about the potential 
harms caused by drug addicts wielding knives or syringes than by businessmen signing 
dodgy deals.’68  Indeed the facts of the Duffy case clearly highlight the modern 
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challenges that such dodgy deals bring to bear on economic well-being of society and 
also provide a classic example of white collar crime.  
 
Those facts related to an association known Citroen Dealers Association (the 
“C.D.A.”) whose members consisted of the authorised dealers for Citroen motor 
vehicles and operated for almost 10 years. During that time it had in operation scheme 
which had the following as its objects:-  
(i) The setting of maximum discounts from the retail dealers recommended 
price list for new Citroen motor vehicles;  
(ii) The setting of delivery charges in respect of such vehicles;  
(iii) The setting of accessory prices;  
(iv) The setting of prices for metallic paint;  
(v) The setting of prices for trade-ins and for used stock; and,  
(vi) The setting of export prices and parts.69 
 
Following meetings of the association card were issued to members detailing exact 
prices to be charged and independent assessors were hired to ensure all members were 
complying with the agreed pricing and fines were issued for any breach thereof.  Thus 
the association was clearly setting out to distort the market and interfere with and 
moreover prevent free competition. The facts of the case serve to highlight the typical 
nature and operation of white collar crime with none of the traditional violence and 
levels of intimidation often associated with traditionally understood “real crime.”  Yet 
it is clear that such price fixing is effectively a modern form of organised theft as it 
takes more money from purchasers of that car brand that would be the case if the 
association did not exist and dealers were free to negotiate their own pricing structure.  
In judgment on the case McKechnie J cited, with approval, Weldon where he viewed 
that:  
“Cartel activity is properly viewed as a property crime, like burglary or 
larceny, although cartel activity inflicts far greater economic harm. Cartel 
activity robs consumers and other market participants of the tangible 
blessings of competition. Cartel activity is never efficient or otherwise 
                                                          




socially desirable; cartel participants can never gain more than the public 
loses. Cartel activity, therefore, is not like tortious conduct, which is 
redressed with a liability rule focussing on the harm to victims and 
providing the incentive to take due care. Like other property crimes, cartel 
activity should be prohibited rather than merely taxed. As Judge Richard 
Posner explained of criminal sanctions generally, they ‘are not really 
prices designed to ration the activity; the purpose so far as possible is to 
extirpate it.”’70 
 
This in turn raises a further issue in that if we define certain unlawful white collar 
activities as crime, then as a key determinant in our definitional matrix of crime is that 
of punishment and thus should we use the punishment of last resort – imprisonment – 
in relation to white collar crime.  The widely accepted purpose underpinning sanctions 
is that of punishment, incapacitation, deterrence, rehabilitation and reparation.71  Yet 
the effectiveness of imprisonment for the deterrence of recidivism to general crime is 
low in that many of those imprisoned in the main Irish prisons are repeat offenders.  
Indeed O’Mahoney claims that the figure could be high as 90%72 where as other 
authors suggest it may be closer to the 50% mark.73   In any event it is accepted that 
levels of recidivism is highest amongst those with the lowest social standing.74  The 
very nature of white collar crime automatically means that the perpetrators come from 
a high social standing and have to a degree established themselves in a position of 
power with decision making authority.  It is this polar-opposite social status to that of 
the majority of the prison population that might result in imprisonment being a much 
greater deterrence as the white-collar criminal has much more to lose in terms of 
business acceptability and social standing.  However the traditional approach to 
imprisonment in Ireland would suggest that it is ideologically opposed to the use of 
imprisonment for white collar crime.75        
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A central tenant in the establishment of an appropriate sanction is that ‘sentences must 
be proportionate to the crime and also to the personal circumstances of the applicant.’76  
In applying this approach to white collar offences the first element is significantly 
influenced by how the crime is actually viewed and whether the current focus of this 
chapter is meet, namely whether it constitutes a crime and then is it viewed on the 
same mantle as ordinary crime.   As already noted and as will shortly be returned to 
the position here is not an agreed one and they may be some divergence between 
different strata of society.  With regard to the second criteria – the personal 
circumstances of the applicant – it has been noted by O’Malley that the conduct of the 
offender will be an aggravating factor:  
 “(1) if the offence is premeditated or planned, 
(2) the offender procures a weapon in contemplation of committing the 
offence, 
(3) if vulnerable victims are targeted, 
(4) if the victim's home is invaded, 
(5) if the offence has been committed as part of a criminal gang, 
(6) if it involves the abuse of trust or power, 
(7) if the offender has used more violence than necessary to commit the offence 
or degraded the victim in so doing, 
(8) if committing the offence for profit or personal gain, or 
(9) if the offence was motivated by the victim's race, religion, etc.”77 
 
It is clearly evident that the majority of these factors simply do not apply to the white 
collar criminal.   Indeed even the profit element is often consumed by the corporate 
entity rather than for personal gain.   Whilst the white collar crime is usually carefully 
and meticulously planned and may involve an abuse of trust the businessperson 
perpetrator has a mitigating factor that may operate in their favour to dispel the dis-
benefit of meeting two of the above requirements.  This is namely that most white 
collar offenders will not have previous convictions which is ‘a well-recognised 
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mitigating factor.’78   Additionally the courts are usually reluctant to imprison those 
on a first offence who have a good character and employment record.79   These are all 
significant operational factors that could be used to justify not using imprisonment 
against those convicted of white collar crime, notwithstanding the seriousness, of the 
crime and as result skewing our understanding of imprisonment as being a key 
indicator in defining a crime and, moreover, questioning the very essence of whether 
regulatory crime should indeed then be still classified as crime.  
 
Indeed some senior law officers of the State have offered the opinion that it should not 
be so classified.  Speaking in 2010 the then DPP was of the opinion that:               
“ … there is an argument from principle that the statute book should not  
be cluttered up with criminal law provisions in areas which were not 
traditionally the preserve of criminal law and which do not carry the same 
moral stigma as convictions for core criminal offences do.”80 
 
His views were shared at the time by a former Attorney General who stated:  
“…it became increasingly clear to me that fundamental issues as to …  
how Ireland’s laws were complied with and where responsibility for 
enforcement and compliance with the law in Ireland lay, were being 
ignored, or, perhaps more fairly, avoided because of the profound 
difficulties in adapting traditional methods of enforcement and compliance 
with the demands of a complex, regulated market economy. The issue is 
whether Ireland can continue to rely exclusively on criminal sanctions 
enforced by criminal warrants to secure compliance with the huge array of 
regulatory laws which are an essential part of our sophisticated, compliant 
economy.”81 
 
It is trite to acknowledge that there is undoubted merit in this approach.82  However as 
already alluded to the concept of moral stigma may be evolving with modern society 
                                                          
78 Ibid at 141.  
79 Ibid.  
80 Hamilton J: ‘Do We Need a System of Administrative Sanctions in Ireland?’ at 17 in Kilcommins, 
S. and Kilkelly, U. (eds) (2010) Regulatory Crime in Ireland, First Law: Dublin. 
81 McDowell M: ‘Non-Criminal Penalties and Criminal Sanctions in Irish Regulatory Law’ at 129 – 
130 in Kilcommins, S. and Kilkelly, U. (eds) (2010) Regulatory Crime in Ireland, First Law: Dublin. 
82 In 2012 the then DPP also stated that; “……it may be seriously questioned whether a jury trial is 
necessarily the best way to deal with complicated regulatory issues which are criminal in name only. 




and as result of the economic crash in Ireland many in society feel aggrieved towards 
those in the corporate sector that they feel aided in the economic downfall and were 
the sanction of imprisonment to be available following a conviction it might, now, be 
considered by the wider public to be an appropriate sanction.  It should be 
acknowledged that this view may be transient and may alter as we enter a cycle of 
economic growth and it would be regrettable if the over-use of imprisonment was a 
consequence from the demise of the celtic tiger economy.  Of course the existing 
jurisprudence of the court in ensuring fairness and proportionality may operate to 
prevent such a vista occurring.   
 
There is however a more balanced – and it is submitted effective – approach that has 
been identified by Kilcommins and Vaughan.   They argue that there is undoubted 
room for both compliance and civil strategies to operate in the regulatory field, 
however they go on to contend that the State must be willing to use criminal sanction 
where the seriousness of the case dictates.   They assert that this will ensure that white 
collar criminals and potential white collar criminal are keenly aware that their 
wrongdoing will be treated seriously by society and may result in imprisonment in the 
same manner than imprisonment is used for street crimes. 83   They offer a number of 
further compelling arguments to support this view.   Firstly they ground it in the 
historical perspective that the criminal justice system is found on the notion that public 
protection and security are key attributes for a functioning society.   In that society 
people expect to be able to operate without fear from what we have referred to as street 
crime.  They acknowledge,   with some surprise, that society still does not see white 
collar crime as threat to society.   They argue that it clearly is as it has the potential to 
effect large numbers of people in a wide variety of fashions and that a compliance 
model in the regulatory sector must be supported by a sanctioning model that has at 
its disposal the use of imprisonment.84             
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Equally not to have the option of imprisonment for serious white collar crime would 
destroy the notion of citizens being equal before the law and would endorse a two-tier 
system of justice.85  If as a society we accept the use of imprisonment for street crimes 
then by extension we should also accept it for suite crimes. Additionally the proper 
application of criminal law can have a very significant cathartic effect.   It can both 
uphold ‘moral sensibilities and … act[s] as an important safety valve, limiting the 
demoralising effects on society of the consequences of serious misconduct.’86 
 
The current direction of the Irish courts in relation to such assertions may be measured 
from the outcome of the above discussed Duffy cartel case. The learned trial judge 
stated that there was no place in Irish criminal justice system for ‘vengefulness or 
vindictiveness’87 but that there was for the concept of deterrence.  He then went on to 
quote Welden that:    
“Cartel activity materially differs from other property crimes only with 
respect to the purpose of sanctions. Rehabilitation and incapacitation are 
important purposes for most criminal sanctions, but deterrence is the only 
significant function of sanctions for cartel activity, and the specific 
deterrence of convicted offenders clearly is secondary to the general 
deterrence of potential offenders.”88 
 
In acknowledging that normally the courts use a custodial sentence only if it was felt 
that a fine would be ineffective, in this area he stated that the courts should as a general 
rule consider a mixed sanction that involves both imprisonment and fines.  In 
particular, in relation to the use of imprisonment for white collar offences, he stated:  
“…I see no room for any lengthy lead in period before use is commonly 
made of this supporting form of sanction. If previously our society did not 
frown upon this type of conduct, as it did in respect of the more 
conventional crime, that forbearance or tolerance has eroded swiftly, as 
the benefits of competition have become clearer. Every purchaser of goods 
or services now has a strong and definite appreciation of what competition 
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can do for him or her. Therefore it must be realised that serious breaches 
of the code have to attract serious punishment.”89 
 
Of course it should be acknowledged that this is just once case90 but nonetheless it is 
a particularly interesting development as it suggests focusing on the harm caused by 
the offence rather than the character of the offender and thus succinctly bypasses the 
earlier mentioned concerns of mitigating factors91 coming into play for white collar 
offenders.  Additionally it draws a distinction between what might traditionally have 
been seen as malum in se and what modern society might now considered as morally 
reprehensible behaviour.  At a minimum it opens up the possibility of imprisonment 
as a sanction to be considered against the next wave of serious white collar offenders. 
In the current context it also widens our understanding of the concept of crime in 
modern Irish society and further questions whether Meeling is any longer a complete 
precedent for defining crime in Ireland.    
A middle-ground system of justice.   
 
This movement away from the individual and the focus on mental culpability and 
towards a concern with social danger can be seen as a feature of the changing nature 
of criminality.92  Indeed Mann contends that there is an evolving middleground that 
takes its influence from both the criminal and civil arena.   He argues this ‘forms a 
hybrid jurisprudence in which the sanction’s purpose is punishment, but its procedure 
is drawn primarily from the civil law.’93  He contends that the traditional criminal and 
                                                          
89 Supra n.67 at para. 43.  
90 The same judge, now in the Supreme Court, ruled in DPP v Pat Hegarty ([2011] IESC 32) that an 
officer of an undertaking can be found guilty notwithstanding the fact that no judgment was made 
against the employer undertaking. However must make a finding of fact that the undertaking did 
commit an offence.   
91 In relation to the usual mitigating factors that would apply around character for white collar 
offenders McKechnie J stated that “in general have less weight because of the type of individual 
likely to be involved and the type of conduct maintained.” DPP v. Duffy [2009] Supra n.69 at para. 
48.  
92 See generally; Sayre, F. ( 1933) ‘Public Welfare Offence’, 55 Columbia law Review 35; Dubber, M. 
(2001) ‘Policing Possession: The War on Crime and the End of the Criminal Law, 91 Journal of 
Criminal Law and Criminology 1; and  Kilcommins, S.  and Vaughan, B.  (2006) Supra n.42  
93 Supra n.3 at 1799. In the Irish courts there was a question as to whether fraudulent trading in 
company law such rightly be classified as criminal or civil. The Supreme Court declared that it was a 
civil offence but more interestingly in the context of changing approaches Flaherty J stated: “It is true 
that the proof of fraud will be to the civil standard but it is also so that the more serious the allegation 
made in civil proceedings, then the more astute must the judge be to find that the allegation in 




civil processes no longer provide complete coverage of the range of sanctioning 
available.  This is due to the fact that they ‘fail to capture the special combination of 
punitive purposes and civil procedural rules that characterizes (sic) hybrid sanctions’ 
and that these sanctions now occupy a significant middle ground that lies between the 
traditions of criminal law and civil law. Furthermore he contends that:  
“The middleground is not sui generis in the sense that it possesses 
distinctive characteristics found in neither of the paradigms; rather, it 
mixes the characteristics of these paradigms in new ways. Against the 
background of strongly perceived conventional paradigms, the 
middleground represents a truly hybrid sanction.”94 
 
Whilst later chapters in this thesis will consider whether modern civil forfeiture in 
Ireland (by the Criminal Assets Bureau) may rightly be considered as middleground 
justice as criminal administration at this interim juncture it is important to 
acknowledge that there are hybrid enforcement mechanisms at work under current 
Irish legislation.   As previously acknowledged criminal action may be initiated in this 
jurisdiction against a breach of competition law.  However section 8(10) of the 
Competition Act 2002 provides that notwithstanding whether or not a criminal 
prosecution has been brought there is an opportunity for an individual (under section 
14(1) of the same Act) or the competition authority (under section 14(2)) to bring a 
civil enforcement action.95  It has been argued that it is necessary to have the civil 
option available in completion law as the ‘imposition of criminal sanctions may, 
paradoxically, hinder the enforcement of competition law because it sets too high a 
standard which must be met so that effectively only the most serious and most easily 
proven cases are instituted and others are left unprosecuted.’96  In turn the competition 
authority have contended that due to such an approach there is little incentive for 
undertakings to comply with the provisions of competition law that do not relate to 
hard-core activities97 and thus civil sanctions should be employed in the enforcement 
of competition law.  In may also be noted briefly that the Revenue Commissioners 
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in Kilcommins, S. and Kilkelly, U. (eds) (2010) Regulatory Crime in Ireland, First Law: Dublin. 
96 Power, V. (2001) Competition Law and Practice, Butterworths: Dublin at 70.46.  
97 FitzGerald, G. and McFadden, D. (2011) “Filling a gap in Irish competition law enforcement: the 
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may bring both criminal proceedings against defaulters and have civil powers to 
impose fixed penalties.98      
 
Mann contends that if middleground approaches were employed then it would prevent 
both over-enforcement and under-enforcement.  The former would be achieved as 
there would be the opportunity for a non-criminal sanction where the circumstances 
of the cases would normal carry it to the criminal domain.  The latter would be 
achieved by providing sanctions in the event of a breach where the use of criminal law 
would traditional have been deemed excessive.  Importantly,   however he goes on to 
caution against the over use of middleground justice in the absence of clear procedural 
safeguards and protections.99  This point is reinforced by Kilcommins and Vaughan 
who contend that the move away from criminal sanctions and towards operating in the 
civil arena is in reality as a result of the perceived ineffectiveness of criminal law 
mechanisms.  The state that the well-established, and justified, protections of the 
criminal law can neatly be sidestepped by moving to a system of civil justice.  Their 
concern with such movement is that the due process procedures remain steadfastly 
fixed to the contours of criminal law. Furthermore they ‘remain enmeshed in the fixity 
of definition and are incapable of contending with the plasticity and fluidity of the 
flow of power into civil spheres.’100      
Conclusion.  
 
The traditional areas of criminal law are well known and includes homicides, assaults 
and offences against property.  A breach of such law is deemed an offence against 
society the sanction for which is some form of state administered punishment.  Due to 
the serious consequences of a finding of criminal guilt against an individual and the 
significant resources and tools available to the State to pursue a prosecution it is 
necessary to create an equalling balance of arms for the individual citizen.  This is 
achieved by setting in place high standards of proof and protection in the form of due 
                                                          
98 These powers are available under s.1078 and s.1053 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.  For 
further consideration of the powers of the Revenue Commissioners see chapter 6.   Additionally under 
the Consumer Protection Act 2007 there is a range of both criminal and civil enforcement powers, see 
Clark, B. (2013) Supra n.45 at 265 -268. 
99 Supra n.3 at 1862 – 1865.  




process procedures.   It is only when the State has proved all elements of the offence 
in question and when the defendant has no lawful defences available to them that the 
courts will allow the state to take retribution against one of its members.   As a result 
it is essential to be able to identify the boundaries of criminal law in order that law 
may operate as an effective tool in reaching its mantle of supporting and protecting 
society.   
 
In that process of identification we commenced with an acknowledgment that 
operational factors such as detention, charge, penalty and imprisonment were all 
reflective indicators of whether a matter was in the criminal realm.   However this was 
a consideration of where the issue now rested rather than why it rested in that realm.  
In terms of the why question the central indicia were that it was an offence against the 
community at large, with the required mens rea that had available a punitive sanction.  
 
In conjunction with these indicia a further significant contributing factor is the 
phraseology used in a particular piece of legislation.   The Irish Courts are mindful of 
the intention of the legislature in the role as representative law makers.  It is felt that 
this should be a contributing factor in determining the resting place of a particular 
piece of legislation rather than the authoritative or exclusive factor as to do otherwise 
risks a particular legislature at any place in time being overly deterministic – for 
example, because of a societal or media driven backlash – and drifting towards the 
edge of their separation of powers responsibilities.  The use of language is again a 
factor in determining if a matter should rightly fall within the administrative as 
opposed to criminal realm.   This can cause labelling difficulties and moreover move 
us away from a traditional individual guilt consideration of criminal law towards a 
system more focused on social danger.  In turn that leads to a reassessment of the need 
for mens rea at all (for a matter to be considered criminal) and a review of what is 
meant by punishment as an indicia.   In the administrative realm if the sanction is in 
the form of a deterrence then the matter is not one of a criminal nature.  The issue that 
is yet to be fully determined by the Irish Courts is whether a penalty can ever be so 
excessive as to move it from a deterrence to a punishment – that is from administrative 





This is further complicated by the expanding number of administrative and regulatory 
agencies that now have criminal enforcement tools in their armoury and who may use 
penalties as both a deterrence and a sanction.   Taking the regulatory example of 
competition law, breach of certain aspects thereof are firmly placed in the criminal 
realm.  Notwithstanding this in terms of the indicia of punishment there remains 
concerns as to whether the punishment of last resort should rightly be used for such 
white collar crime.  By its very nature it is an activity that deprives members of society, 
in a structured and organised way, of their wealth.  By not using the tool of 
imprisonment it queries where this is somehow a different type of crime and if so why 
is this the case.  In answering such concerns the current jurisprudence has clearly 
indicated that the courts are now willing to use imprisonment as a sanction in the white 
collar arena and thus treat it as any ordinary crime.  
 
The movement of focus from the individual to social danger introduces a further 
feature in that respect – that is the emergence and expansion of what is now termed 
middleground justice.  This is a form of justice that takes elements from the criminal 
realm but does not yet take any of the procedural protections that guarantee fairness 
in the criminal justice system.   Over the course of the following chapters we will 
consider how this represents a paradigm shift in a bid by the state to counteract modern 
criminality. What is clear is that the boundaries of criminal law have altered 
significantly in Ireland in recent times.  It has moved towards the use of civil law – 
and its less expressive nature – in the criminal area.  This more instrumental variegated 
approach may mark a hollowing out of the criminal law.   In the next chapter we will 
now move to consider such elements in a more specific sense- that of the use of 





            
Chapter 3. 
 




It is a reasonable expectation of a modern, open and free democracy that individuals 
should not benefit from the proceeds of criminal activity.  Whilst the traditional 
approach of criminal law enforcement was primarily, and understandably, concerned 
with evidence gathering leading to criminal prosecution it was not overly concerned 
with the actual proceeds that arose from that criminal activity.  However, it may be 
contended, that in recent times, Ireland has moved away, in part at least, from this 
traditional model towards one that is concerned with forfeiture of assets and 
neutralisation of the criminal threat as opposed to the traditional leanings toward 
retribution and potentially rehabilitation. This is evidenced in particular by the work 
of CAB.1  The objective2 of CAB is summarised in the Bureau’s annual reports as 
using ‘all the available remedies and sanctions at its disposal in identifying, depriving 
and denying persons suspected of criminal activity and their associates of the benefit 
of that activity.’3 A key element of its armoury is the ability, under the Proceeds of 
Crime Acts 1996 (as amended), to confiscate assets in the absence of a criminal 
conviction pertaining to those particular assets.   
 
This movement into the civil realm, with its associated lower burden of proof, is a key 
element of the refocus of the Irish criminal justice system.  In 1985 both the Whitaker 
                                                          
1 CAB established on an ad hoc basis for the period August 1st 1996 to October 4th of that year and 
placed on a statutory footing by the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996.   
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s. 14 of the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005. 
3 For example see Criminal Assets Bureau (2001) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2000, 




Report4 and the Select Committee on Crime Lawlessness and Vandalism5 had 
supported the introduction of a scheme of forfeiture for the proceeds of crime.  
However the Law Reform Commission (LRC) in 1991 recommended against the 
introduction of civil forfeiture due to both the possibility of either constitutional 
challenge to such an approach or the ineffective nature of such a system.6  
Notwithstanding these reports, and in the absence of any detailed discussion,7 the 
tipping point for the major changes in the Irish system was the murders of Detective 
Garda Gerry McCabe and crime journalist Veronica Guerin in the summer of 1996.  
These cataclysmic events were undoubtedly shocking for a nation that traditionally 
had a low level of crime8 and thus the emergence, however temporary, of a crisis of 
hegemony was not surprising. However it is contended by O’Donnell and O’Sullivan 
that it was not inevitable that these events would result in a paradigm shift in Irish 
criminal justice policy.9  As such a shift did occur, in attempting to parse the reasons 
behind the underpinning the change it is necessary to consider both the historical and 
immediate factors surrounding the events.   
 
The aforementioned journalist was writing on a weekly basis about the activities of 
the criminal underworld in Ireland, who, it appeared, were operating with impunity 
from any legal consequence.  Whilst it is unquestionable that any such activities are 
an anathema to the rule of law, when considering them from a change perspective, this 
must be balanced with the aforementioned traditional low levels of crime in Ireland.  
The emergence of extensive media reporting of criminal underworld activities may 
lead to a belief, in some sections of society at least, that serious crime is running at a 
much higher level than is actually the reality of the situation.  In turn where such 
                                                          
4 Committee of Inquiry into the Penal System, (1985)Report of the Committee of Inquiry in to the 
Penal System (Whitaker Report) Stationery Office: Dublin 
5 Select Committee on Crime Lawlessness and Vandalism, (1985) Sixth Report of the Select 
Committee on Crime Lawlessness and Vandalism: Confiscation of Assets Illegally Acquired Through 
Drug Trafficking, (1985) Stationery Office: Dublin. 
6 Law Reform Commission, (1991) Report on the Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime (LRC 35 -
1991) at 51. 
7 Indeed it was suggested that there was not a need for an in-depth consideration as during the debate 
on the Proceeds of Crime Bill one member of the Dáil queried ‘[h]ow can anyone seriously suggest 
the Bill is unconstitutional, unless he has an ulterior motive?’ Dáil Debates, 2nd July 1996, Vol. 467, 
Col 2473 per Mr. O’Donoghue.  
8 McCullagh, C. (1996) Crime Control in Ireland: A sociological Introduction   : Cork University 
Press: Cork at 2 – 6.  
9 O’Donnell, I. & O’Sullivan, E.  (2001) Crime Control in Ireland: The Politics of Intolerance, Cork 




beliefs are widespread they may ultimately lead to a level of hysteria that both 
demands authoritative action and concomitantly cause the unthinking acceptance of 
draconian legal positions – that are effectively impossible to repeal from a political 
standpoint as to do so might be termed ‘weak on crime’ – as the only solution to a 
perceived crisis.   This is not to suggest that media organisations were attempting to 
distort the news or present an untrue picture but rather they may, as has been suggested 
be ‘entertaining’ rather than ‘informing’10 the consumers of their respective media 
outlets.  The public in general have a long fascination with crime itself, its aftermath 
and punishments from early models of punishments as a public spectacle of enjoyment 
through to modern true crime novels and television shows11 and thus it is 
understandable that media outlets strive to meet that desire in a commercially 
competitive market place.  The criminological concern is whether such reporting 
causes an exaggerated degree of public alarm with, the aforementioned, support for 
extreme solutions with any alternatives becoming marginalised.12   
 
In the specific Irish sense a survey in 1996 found that 50% of respondents identified 
crime and law and order as the most critical issue facing the government – up from 
only 3% in 1994.13  It is widely accepted that the results of the 1996 survey were 
significantly influenced by the aforementioned killings.  Further the use, by 
journalists, of nicknames (such as The Monk and The Penguin) to protect the identities 
of those suspected to be involved in serious organised crime had made it easy for the 
public at large to associate with such individuals and consequently suffer 
disproportionate fear with a felt need for legal change in order to tackle the issue.  It 
was a reversal of Bentham’s panopticon where the many were now watching the 
activities of the few. If this legal change was to be enacted them the impetus had to 
come from the Oireachtas.  
 
                                                          
10 O’Connell, M. ‘The Portrayal of Crime in the Media – Does it Matter’ in O’Mahoney, P. (ed) 
(2002) Criminal Justice in Ireland IPA: Dublin at 245. 
11 See generally Reiner, R. ‘Media – Made Criminality: The Representation of Crime in the Mass 
Media’ at 304 in McGuire, M. et al (eds) (2007) The Oxford Handbook of Criminality Oxford 
University Press: Oxford at 304   
12 See generally ibid at 326.  




The main political parties in Ireland had not diverged to any significant degree on 
criminal justice issues and there was what may be termed a second order consensus 
on the topic.  In the early part of the 1990s efforts were made to form strategic plans 
for the management of criminal justice policy in Ireland14 and the Management of 
Offenders – A Five Year Plan15 was published in 1994.  It took the type of approach 
that suggested, inter alia, prison should be used to the least extent necessary whilst 
still compatible with ensuring public safety.16  However in the summer of 1996 Fianna 
Fail, in opposition, abandoned any commitments there was to such managed and 
planned reform.  In particular their justice spokesperson, John O’Donoghue lead 
demands for radical reform and within a year he was making comments such as:  
 
“The task of the next government will be to use the human and physical 
resources in this country to confront the malaise of crime and to foster, in the 
Ireland of the twenty first century, an environment n which the traditional Irish 
values of community, compassion and caring can flourish.  That task will not 
be easy.  It is not a task amenable to glib or shallow solutions.  But it is a task 
which cannot be shirked or circumvented.  The social fabric of this country is 
being destroyed.  The next government must wage war on crime.  It must wage 
war on the causes of crime – the social causes, the economic causes, the 
educational causes.  Each must be identified, isolated and eradicated.  This is 
the challenge which faces the next government”17    
 
It is submitted that such an approach is an example of the politicisation of law and 
order and was directly influenced by the ‘mediaisation’ of the law and order debate in 
Ireland.  The aforementioned tragic deaths lead to concerns about the ability of the 
State to effectively counteract organised crime and drug dealers within the existing 
legal mechanism.  As such they are accepted as defining moments in the law and order 
debate in Ireland18 leading to a level of ‘moral panic’19  and a sense of helplessness 
and a desire to do something in the face of concerns expressed about the ability of the 
State to govern itself.  This perfect storm of societal events underpinned the crisis of 
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hegemony as evidenced by political parties grappling to gain the mantle of the party 
of law and order.20  In essence a fear of crime had been established resulting in 
elements of populist punitiveness in an attempt to regain authority.  Within five weeks 
of these aforementioned deaths the normally slow moving legislature had introduced 
a series of measures to deal with the ‘godfathers’21 of organised crime.  
 
In accepting that the deaths were the undoubted tipping point for reform this chapter 
will contend that there were significant other causal factors that resulted in the 
repositioning of elements in the Irish criminal law landscape.  There were many 
degrees of causal contribution that had both long and short histories and impacts on 
the legal framework that ultimately established CAB. These highlight that the legal 
landscape was much more complex than might be considered if the tragic deaths of 
the summer of 1996 were deemed to be the only significant catalyst of change.  Whilst 
accepting that these other factors were operating under entirely different momentums 
it is contended that they contributed to a schema of causal factors that impacted on the 
ultimate outcome of legislative reform.  We will consider these factors of course on 
their own basis as at the time at which they occurred they were simply the standard 
development of common law, however it is this series of individual, but related, events 
that will form the evolutionary matrix that was in place when the above tipping point 
occurred.         
  
In this regard the chapter will now commence with a consideration of forfeiture as it 
evolved in common law.  This will allow us to consider the historical underpinnings 
of the concept, including in rem proceedings, which are still quoted today in support 
of modern day forfeiture of criminal assets as a crime control measure.  Further it will 
demonstrate the emergence, and judicial acceptance, of forfeiture of assets without 
consideration of the guilt or otherwise of the owner of such assets.  The chapter will 
then go on to consider legislative imperatives which existed enshrining forfeiture as a 
concept in this jurisdiction and moreover its use and acceptance by the judicial system.  
In particular anti-drugs legislation made use of the concept and forms a basis for 
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understanding the legislatures changing approach to forfeiture from a very narrow 
concept to an ultimately all-encompassing one.   
 
A further piece of legislation which is often given credence as forming a strong 
statutory and constitutional basis for the emergence of confiscation of criminal assets 
is the Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act 1985.  However this piece of 
legislation was aimed at terrorist groups and as such operated exclusively in the extra-
ordinary arena and further was only ever intended to have a very short lifespan.  Whilst 
this legislation passed constitutional muster it is because of this short-intend life span 
– with an associate specific individual target – and the fact that it operated in the extra-
ordinary realm that it will be contended that the 1985 legislation is not be as highly 
ranked, as might otherwise be the case, on the hierarchy of causal factors that 
contributed to the major legislative reforms of the mid-1990s.  This is not to suggest 
that the Act did not have a role to play and as such must be given due consideration.        
 
In asserting the urgent need to establish stringent laws to deal with the spectre of 
organised crime in Ireland much reference was made to the benefit of United States of 
America (U.S.) anti-mafia type laws.22 However the original raison d’etre of the 
American approach was somewhat different to the Irish one in that the main aim of 
the former was to remove the influence of organised crime from legitimate business 
interests.  Nonetheless the U.S. provisions highlighted the potential for use of 
traditional common law in rem proceedings as modern criminal law techniques.  
Further in sharing a common legal system tradition the U.S. provided an ideal area for 
this jurisdiction to adopt policy from in the forfeiture arena in a time of crisis.   
 
In addition to such precedent and policy adoption for dealing with individuals who 
were putting themselves beyond the reaches of the traditional criminal law, further 
impetus for change came from international covenants and European Union 
initiatives23 all of which will be outlined in this chapter from the perspective of how 
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they influenced the emerging Irish model.  In particular we will consider how the 
Criminal Justice Act 199424 implemented European directives and provided for 
restraint, confiscation and forfeiture orders.  However, and importantly, these latter 
two orders could only operate post criminal conviction.  In outlining this legislation 
we will be in a position to consider the Irish judiciary’s response to emerging forfeiture 
provisions as the legislation was constitutionally challenged.   
 
The legislation reforms of 1996 therefore, whilst undoubtedly reactionary, may not 
arguably have been the complete knee jerk reaction that prima facia might appear to 
be the case. There were significant legal mechanisms already in place and indeed the 
need for co-operation amongst organs of the State in tackling organised crime, and the 
growing drugs problem, had been recognised by the so called rainbow government in 
1995.25 This is not to take away from our suggested tipping point above as the murders 
in 1996 were undoubtedly a definitive and irruptive point in our history which caused 
the major changes – in particular the ability to confiscate assets without a criminal 
conviction – to move at a pace which would otherwise have been unthinkable. 
However for the tipping point to exist it is contended that this significant series of 
historical and immediate factors over long and short time periods  all had varying 
degrees of causal contribution to the milieu and thus are essential contributors in 
understanding the legislative sea change which occurred in Ireland in 1996.  
Furthermore in terms of this causal history it is obvious that there was not a rational 
deliberative model being adopted in promulgating such radical changes.   Whilst a 
whig interpretation of history would suggest that history is progress it is contended 
that the measures enacted in 1996 were more revolutionary than evolutionary while 
also having a grounding in history.   This history did allow for forfeiture but primarily 
in the criminal, as opposed to civil, realm.  A movement to the civil realm was 
defended generally on the basis of the extraordinary nature of the offences occurring 
which in turn called for extra-ordinary legal solutions.  Whilst concurrently arguing 
for such a movement a justification was offered on the basis of similar mechanisms 
already existing (in specialised areas) in our legal history and not to now adopt such 
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measures to responded to the fear generators would be to allow anomalies to operate 
in the legal system.26   
 
Finally legal change only occurs with some form of human intervention and 
notwithstanding the aforementioned possibility of politicisation of law and order it 
must also be offered that the morality27 of politicians may also have had a role to play.  
They may have felt that the activities of criminal gangs were malum in se and that in 
order to effectively deal with the issue it was necessary to implement laws that were 
essential apersonal and concentrated on the non-moral regulatory aspects of law that 
triumphed societal interests over that of the individual.  It would appear however that 
at least a degree of political rhetoric28 was being used in an effort to assure the public 
that political parties were effectively dealing with the issues.  At a political level in 
England and Wales and America phrases such as “tough on crime, tough on the causes 
of crime” and “zero tolerance”29 were seen as very successful from a voter support 
perspective and thus policy adoption from Anglo-American common law was easy to 
offer – without considering the very detailed measures necessary to ensure its success.  
Whilst the success or otherwise of policy adoption is a factor to be considered in later 
chapters we will now consider in detail the varying aforementioned historical factors 
that contributed to such significant – and effectively irreversible – reform in the Irish 
criminal justice system.  In establishing this framework for change we will now 
commence with the concept of forfeiture in the traditional common law.   
Forfeiture the Historical Context.   
 
At common law the term deodand was used to describe the forfeiture of a sum which 
represented the value of a personal chattel that had caused accidental death.30  In the 
                                                          
26 For progress in law see generally; Aldridge, P. (2003) Money Laundering Law: Forfeiture, 
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28 For example see text at n. 7 and n. 17.  
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the Millennium’ in McGuire, M. et al (eds)(2007) The Oxford Handbook of Criminality Oxford: 
Oxford University Press at 204 – 216.  
30 Holmes in 1881 noted that “[I]t has been a rule of criminal pleading in England down into the 
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context of the current work this raises the issue of attributing blame for a wrongful act, 
not to an individual, but rather it is the inanimate object that is accused of the wrong 
doing.  The example that is most often quoted to explain the concept is that of a man 
falling from a horse, where in the subsequent event of forfeiture it is the horse that 
must take the blame and be forfeited irrespective of any potential guilt of its owner.31  
It has been suggested by Blackstone that the former and ‘more superstitious’ origins 
of the concept lie in a passage from Exodus 21:28: 
 
“If an ox gore a man or a woman, and they die, he shall be stoned, and his flesh 
shall not be eaten … but the owner of the ox shall be quit.”32  
 
Whilst this passage is often quoted as the basis upon which forfeiture law is 
structured,33 it is contended by Finkelstein that this is not an accurate description of 
forfeiture as the ox is not ‘offered to God’34 as it would be in the strict concept of the 
doctrine.  Notwithstanding this last contention the point is established that the concepts 
of both forfeiture and of the potential guilt of an object existed in common law.  The 
original rationale of the deodand was that the value could be put towards offering 
masses for the deceased or put to other charitable uses.  However this noble practice 
would appear to have been superseded by a process whereby the deodands simply 
became a source of revenue for the King.35  It has been noted that over time forfeiture 
became ineffective as a source of revenue and the Crown found that taxation was a 
more effective revenue gathering agent.36  
                                                          
Common Law (1881 Boston: Little Brown and Company) 1991 Reprint New York: Dover 
Publications at 7.  
31 “… if a person fell from a horse the horse was forfeited: and if a man fell from a horse into the 
water and was carried down a millrace and killed by the wheel of the mill, the horse and the mill 
wheel were both forfeited.” 77 Hansard 1028 (1885) as quoted in Finkelstein, J. ‘The Goring Ox: 
Some Historical Perspectives on Deodands, Forfeitures, Wrongful Death and the Western Notion of 
Sovereignty’ (1973) 46 Temple Law Quarterly 169 at 185.   
32 Hargrave, J. (ed) Blackstone, Commentaries on the laws of England 21st ed 1844 London: Sweet 
and Maxwell & Son, Stevens & Norton. Vol 1 at 300 – 301.    
33 See for example Calero – Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 416 US 663 (1974) at 681. 
34 Supra n.31 at 180.  It has been noted by Levy that “[T]echnically the forfeiture derived from a 
deodand only when the death resulted from “misadventure” or sheer accident.” See Levy, L. (1996) A 
license to Steal: The forfeiture of Property, University of North Carolina Press: Chapel Hill at 13.  
35 See 3 Law Magazine 198 N.S. (1845) as quoted in Finkelstein supra n. 31 at 182.  On the nature of 
forfeiture see, Finkelstein (1973) supra n.31 generally; Homes (1991) supra n. 30 at 24 -34.  Chitty, J. 
(1820) A Treatise on the Law of Prerogatives of the Crown and the Relative Duties and Rights of the 
Subject J. Butterworth: London at 213 -226. 





The concept of deodands grew in popularity due to the socio-economic conditions 
surrounding the industrial developments of the nineteenth century.  In particular the 
development of the railways caused numerous accidental deaths and resulted in juries 
awarding large sums in lieu of the forfeiture of a locomotive or carriage that had 
caused the death.37  In due course, and in order to develop more suitable remedies,  the 
concept of deodands was abolished in 1846 by the Deodands Abolition Act38 and an 
Act for Compensating Families of Persons Killed by Accidents39 (more commonly 
known as Lord Campbell’s Act) was introduced.  The aim of this later Act was, as the 
title suggests, to provide compensation for the families of those killed by accidents.  
In the context of our current overall scene setting for the concept of modern day 
forfeiture in Ireland it is worth noting the comments of Lord Campbell on the abolition 
of deodands: 
 
“[t]he wonder was that a law so extremely absurd and inconvenient should 
have remained in force down to the middle of the nineteenth century; 
especially as that did not arise from the law having become obsolete or slipped 
from their recollection from never having being in force; for the law of 
deodands was called into force almost weekly.”40 
 
The nature of such comments relating to the whole concept of forfeiting assets as an 
absurd one is an interesting opening gambit in the context of the current work.  Despite 
such agreements in favour of the abolition of deodands this was not the only type of 
forfeiture exercised at common law.  Of the other types, common law forfeiture 
resulted from conviction for a felony or treason41 on the basis that breach of the 
criminal law justified denial of the right to hold property.  The final example that of 
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admiralty forfeiture42 was based on – and indeed existed – for very pragmatic reasons.  
It involved the forfeiture of a ship for breaching maritime laws.  Holmes records that: 
 
“A manuscript of the reign of Henry VI. … discloses the fact that, if a man was 
killed or drowned at sea by the motion of the ship, the vessel was forfeited to 
the admiral …”43 
 
The reason for the development of such provisions may lie in the fact that where an 
accident happened on the high seas the issue of who had jurisdictional control arose.  
The normal courts did not have authority to act and so the courts of admiralty were 
left to deal with the situation.  The forfeiture of the actual vessel was a very pragmatic 
way of ensuring the presence of the owner of the vessel in court.  This type of forfeiture 
is a further example of holding the vessel (or thing) as the guilty party.  This is known 
as an in rem – against a res or thing – proceeding, as opposed to an in persona – against 
the person – proceeding.44  This strange legal fiction of holding the inanimate object 
as the guilty party seems to be a long accepted tradition.  In a noteworthy American 
case, where the owners of a yacht had been exonerated the vessel in question was still 
forfeited as a result of the dicta of Story J., where he quoted Marshall J.: 
 
“This is not a proceedings [sic] against the owner; it is a proceeding against 
the vessel for an offence committed by the vessel; which is not the less an 
offence, and does not the less subject her to forfeiture because it was 
committed without the authority and against the will of the owner. It is true 
that inanimate matter can commit no offence. But this body is animated and 
put in action by the crew, who are guided by the master. The vessel acts and 
speaks by the master. She reports herself by the master. It is therefore not 
unreasonable that the vessel should be affected by this report.”45  
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Whilst very clearly accepting that the inanimate object itself cannot commit a criminal 
offence, the Court, and very many subsequent Courts,46 had no difficulty in accepting 
the guilt of the object or thing whilst effectively ignoring the guilt or otherwise of the 
owner.  The attractiveness of such an approach in the modern setting of dealing with 
international criminals who tend to be a number of levels removed from the actual 
committing of the offence is very understandable.  The opportunities to ignore 
effective due process traditionally inherent in the criminal justice system in favour of 
a results output penchant is also very apparent.  However it would also appear to be 
long recognised that that criminals have no right to benefits accruing from their 
particular crime.47  Notwithstanding the absence of such a legal right it has been 
maintained that the purpose of forfeiture was not to deprive the offender of the benefits 
of crime but rather it was used as a consequence for the violation of societal obligations 
and as an incentive to loyalty and obedience.48  
 
Moreover regardless of the original rationale behind the concept it was enshrined as 
both an accepted and used element of the armoury of law enforcement.  In this respect 
and in terms of considering the actual use and application of forfeiture in Irish 
jurisprudence we will now consider the concept from both the general and the specific 
level.  This will allow us to further consider the contribution of precedent as a causal 
factor in the emergence of civil forfeiture as a crime control mechanism through 
demonstrating of the longevity of forfeiture as an accepted concept in the Irish State.  
Additionally it will ultimately allow a consideration of the related issue of whether 
forfeiture may be considered as an actual punishment in Irish law or an as ancillary to 
a penalty.   
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The concept of forfeiture is available for use in many statutes.49  However, case law 
that is pertinent to consider in the application of the concept of a penalty is that of The 
State (Gettins) v. Judge Fawsitt.50  The facts related to Customs legislation which 
provided that in the case of an offence an offender was liable to forfeit either treble 
the value of the goods in question of the sum of £100.  In this case a question arose as 
to whether proceedings under the legislation were criminal or civil in character.  The 
Court followed a line of reasoning which established that where proceedings are taken 
by the Revenue Commissioners by way of complaint in the District Court then they 
are criminal in nature.  However where proceedings are taken by the Attorney General 
in the High Court then they are civil in nature.  In particular Murnaghan J. stated:  
  
“The information at the suit of the Attorney General is civil because it is a relic 
of mediaeval procedure, while the proceedings before the District Justice have 
all the marks of criminal proceedings for which the punishment is a penalty 
with imprisonment in default of payment.”51 
 
Thus, whilst leaning on the historical acceptance at common law of the concept of 
forfeiture (for example of goods illegally exported under customs law) the rationale 
that a summons at District Court level may constitute a criminal procedure is tenable 
under certain circumstances.  In addressing this issue and in continuing our sketch of 
the evolution in forfeiture to the point of determining whether it constitutes a 
punishment it is worth considering in some detail the case of Attorney General v. 
Southern Industrial Trust Ltd & Simons52 as it raises a number of interesting issues 
concerning both the rationale and raison d’etre of forfeiture.  The facts – which again 
highlighted the application of the concept to innocent parties and the use of in rem 
                                                          
49  For example the following, non-exhaustive, list is outlined in DPP Guidelines for Prosecutors 
(2010) at chapter 15 (available at www.dpp.ie): section 23 Firearms Act, 1925 - certain firearms may 
be forfeit where a person is convicted of a firearms or certain other offences; section 28 Intoxicating 
Liquor Act, 1927 - the licence may be forfeit; section 10 Censorship of Publications Act, 1929 - 
prohibited publications may be confiscated; section 2 Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 
1985 - monies believed to belong to unlawful organisations lodged in a bank may be seized; section 
28 Video Recordings Act, 1989 - tapes may be forfeit; section 13 Firearms and Offensive Weapons 
Act, 1990 - weapons and other articles used in the commission of an offence may be seized; section 6 
Criminal Justice Act, 1993 - a court may order compensation to be paid to victims as well as imposing 
a penalty; sections 38 and 39 Criminal Justice Act, 1994 - cash believed to be imported or exported 
from the State and believed to be associated with drug trafficking may be seized and forfeit; section 
41 Road Traffic Act, 1994, as amended - seizure and disposal of vehicles while driving without 
licence, tax or insurance; section 6 Customs and Excise (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 1988.
 
 
50 [1945] I.R. 183 
51 Supra n. 35 at 183.  




forfeiture – concern the purchase of a motor car by the second defendant, Simons, 
using traditional hire purchase facilities provided by the first defendant.  Simons was 
required to make a down payment and a prescribed number of monthly installments 
before he would be the legal owner of the vehicle.  He wished to export the car 
temporarily to the United Kingdom. However when he did so it was seized and 
returned to this jurisdiction as it was suspected that it had been unlawfully exported 
on the basis that Simons had not been – as was required – resident in this jurisdiction.  
Subsequently the Attorney General sought forfeiture of the vehicle under section 5 
subsection 1 of the Customs (Temporary Provisions) Act 194553  which provides that  
(1) If any goods (being goods the exportation of which is prohibited or 
restricted by any enactment or statutory instrument) have been or are being 
dealt with in any of the following ways, that is to say:— 
( a ) have been exported in contravention of such enactment or statutory 
instrument, 
the goods shall be forfeited.54 
 
 
At the time of forfeiture the second defendant had ceased making the required 
repayments on the vehicle and as he had not completed the required number of 
repayments, ownership was still vested in the first defendant hire purchase provider.  
It was conceded by the plaintiffs that the first named defendants were an innocent 
party and in no way to blame for the illegal export of the vehicle.55  The defendants 
contended, inter alia, that the aforementioned subsection 1 was unconstitutional in 
that it purported to authorise the forfeiture of the goods of an innocent party.  This 
argument was based primarily on Article 40.-3 and Article 43.  Davitt P. in the High 
Court viewed that if the matter were res integra he would be of the view that whilst 
Article 40.3 does protect individual rights to property it is not an absolute guarantee 
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and is qualified in a number of areas and any legislative interference with this right 
could include the Constitutional objective of achieving the common good.  Further 
while Article 43 does recognise the natural right to own property it does not guarantee 
that law will not be passed that may have the effect of depriving an individual of some 
or all of his property.56   
 
However the Supreme Court had already considered Article 43 in Buckley and Others 
v. The Attorney General and Another57 where it had held that the exigencies of the 
common good was not a matter peculiarly for the legislature in order to balance the 
rights  between the plaintiff’s property and the common good.  In attempting to apply 
and distinguish such precedent to the case at hand Davitt P. held that: 
“Forfeiture of the goods concerned, as well, indeed, as of the vehicle used to 
transport them, no matter how valuable, has long been considered by 
successive legislatures to be an appropriate penalty.  I do not think it can be 
reasonably contended that the customs code, severe and unpopular though it 
may seem to those who have most experience of it as transgressors, has not 
been enacted with a view to the promotion of the common good, nor do I think 
that it can be contended that a person who takes the risk of illegally importing 
or exporting his own property has any reasonable cause to complain of 
injustice if it is forfeited in consequence of his offence.”58 
 
He went on to note that the practicalities of the situation would dictate that were the 
property of an innocent 3rd party not subject to forfeiture then all smugglers would 
simply use hire purchase vehicles.  Be this as it may he did highlight that there was a 
power of mitigation exercisable by the revenue commissioners to deal with hardship 
and injustice as a result of seizure.  Furthermore he stated that it was not the fault of 
the legislature if this power was seldom exercised.59 Indeed in this case the Revenue 
Commissioners accepted that had the first defendant requested the return of the car 
they would, most likely, have acceded to that request.  However as it was claimed as 
of right they stood on their right to forfeiture.  In the words of the Lavery, J. in the 
Supreme Court: [T]his attitude may appear rather childish but, as has been said, the 
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parties concurred in agreeing to strip the case of reality in order to present the issues 
to the Court.”60  
 
It would appear that this power to mitigate struck the balance between undue hardship 
and the use of forfeiture as a deterrent in the achievement of the common good.  Whilst 
is has since been stated by the Supreme Court that this case ‘cannot be regarded as 
correctly stating the law … relating to private property guarantee’61 it does 
demonstrate the Irish Courts acceptance of the concept of in rem proceedings and the 
use of forfeiture as a deterrent despite the potential harsh consequences which might 
ensue.    
 
 It is thus worth highlighting a specific use – drug control – of the concept before 
returning to the general rationale of the concept. The original legislation in this area 
was the Dangerous Drugs Act 193462 which provided in section 33 for the forfeiture 
of ‘all articles in respect of which the offence was committed.’  Notwithstanding this, 
the first Irish policy document that related to drug use did not appear until the 1966 
Report of the Commission on Inquiry on Mental Illness.63 To put the early legislation 
and the 1966 report in context it has been noted that in 1965 there were only two 
charges for drug offences in the entire country but by 1970 this had risen to 71 and by 
1973 to 285.64 The issue of illegal drug use may be considered from the perspective 
of being a health issue or criminal justice matter but in practice the responsibility for 
this area is generally shared between the two systems.65  In this regard and following 
on from the 1966 report the Report of the Working Party on Drug Abuse66 was 
published in 1971 and recommended that any anti-drugs legislation should not unduly 
infringe on individual civil liberties and that there should be an option to use treatment 
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facilities rather than imprisonment for convicted offenders.  Butler identifies that the 
report failed to consider the traditional policy divergence – it had diminished 
somewhat by the time of the reports publication – between the United States of 
America (U.S.) and the United Kingdom (U.K.) on this issue of control of illegal drug 
use.  Traditionally the U.S. had let the criminal justice system deal with the issue and 
the U.K. had looked to the medical practitioners.  He suggests that the benefit in 
considering the policy divergences lies not in the advantages of one over the other but 
in acknowledging the ‘need for subtlety and an avoidance of dogmatism.’67  Finally, 
for our current purposes, in terms of policy analysis he claims that the ‘American 
ideals of the need for an all-out ‘War on Drugs’ was taken as self-evidently right and 
sufficient.’68   
 
This last point provides an interesting policy consideration for our analysis on the 
current day use of forfeiture, and its evolutionary process in this jurisdiction.  It also 
establishes the legislative thinking and policy influence on the development of crime 
control mechanisms. Further it is pertinent at the current juncture as the Irish 
legislature’s response to the developing issue of illegal drug abuse in the 1970s lay 
with the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977.  This Act began life as the Misuse of Drugs Bill 
197369 and did not receive its second reading until February 1975 and it was not 
promulgated into law until March 1977. It finally received its commencement order in 
1979.70  The Dáil debates on this legislation seemed to reflect a desire for a balance to 
be struck between the need for punishment on the one hand and the care and 
rehabilitation of drug offenders on the other.71  Indeed one deputy suggested that 
whilst even though drug use was as ‘old as mankind’ and the need to deal with it had 
taken on new urgency  he was still conscious of the fact that:  
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“There is always a danger in this regard that we would allow the urgency of 
some particular problem to allow us to brush aside the fundamentally 
important things in our society. We might, in our anxiety to deal with this 
drug problem, urgent and important and widespread as it is, overlook the 
necessity to protect civil liberty and the legal rights of the individual citizen. 
 
I want to direct the Minister's attention to this danger. We might agree that it 
is right and proper to give the Garda special arbitrary powers where drugs are 
concerned and the community might be prepared to waive certain rights to 
enable this problem to be dealt with, but how can we ensure or how can we 
guarantee that if the Garda are given certain draconian powers to deal with 
the drug situation those powers will not be used in other situations”72 
 
This indicates that there was some realisation of the need for a level of restraint and 
an avoidance of knee jerk policy adoption without due consideration to the wider 
precedents that might be established.  However, in contrast, nine years later the debate 
on the subsequent Misuse of Drugs Act 1984 ‘reflected a pre-occupation with law and 
order and drug control’73  and the concept or use of forfeiture seems to be been 
accepted as a given in the legislation.  This is an interesting change of policy direction 
fuelled presumably by the fact that it was estimated that by 1983 trafficking in drugs 
was worth between IR£20 – IR£25 million.74  This represented a societal sea change 
since the 1970’-s that would continue throughout the 1980’-s and 1990’-s ultimately 
culminating in a legislative sea change in the mid-1990s. 
 
Whilst the introduction of this legislation is important from the perspective of policy 
adoption in relation to the use of forfeiture, it is the application of the legislation in the 
court system that will now be considered in establishing the current framework from 
the perspective of judicial acceptance and interpretation of forfeiture.  In this respect 
the section of primary interest is section 30 which provides: 
(1) Subject to subsection (2) of this section, a court by which a person is 
convicted of an offence under this Act may order anything shown to the 
satisfaction of the court to relate to the offence to be forfeited and either 
destroyed or dealt with in such other manner as the court thinks fit. 
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(2) A court shall not order anything to be forfeited under this section if a 
person claiming to be the owner of or otherwise interested in it applies to be 
heard by the court, unless an opportunity has been given to him to show 
cause why the order should not be made. 
 
This is identical to section 27 of the English and Welsh Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 and 
prior to considering Irish case law on the area we will first consider some relevant 
judgments from that particular jurisdiction.  In Haggard v. Mason75 the defendant was 
convicted of offering to supply a controlled drug and in addition to sentence was 
ordered to forfeit a sum of money in his possession which was the remainder of the 
proceeds of a drug sale.  However on appeal the forfeiture order was quashed as being 
ultra vires as the money did not relate to the offence’ – in this case offering to supply 
– as specifically required under section 27.  A similar situation arose in R v. 
Cuthbertson76 where the defendants pleaded guilty to conspiracy to contravene section 
4 – produce or supply – of the Act.  The trial judge subsequently ordered forfeiture of, 
inter alia, monies and monies held in foreign bank accounts.  On appeal to the House 
of Lords, the defendants did not dispute that the forfeited assets were acquired from 
the manufacture and supply of a particular prohibited drug;77 rather they questioned 
whether the forfeited assets could be shown to ‘relate to the offence’ as required under 
section 27 (1).  The House of Lords stated that they did not so relate as it was not 
appropriate to apply an overly broad interpretation to the section in light of the overall 
Act.  Furthermore in giving a purposive construction of the section in question Lord 
Diplock stated that it was ‘only apt to deal with things that are tangible …[T]o ascribe 
to the section any more extended ambit would involve putting a strained construction 
on the actual language that is used.’78  He went on to state that as it was necessary to 
show that what is forfeited must relate to the offence for which a person has been 
convicted then a conviction of conspiracy does not empower a court to make an order 
of forfeiture.79   
 
Further he noted and rejected the argument which had seemed to influence the court 
of appeal – namely that the intention of parliament in constructing section 27 was to 
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‘strip drug traffickers of the whole of the profits of their crime whatever might be the 
way in which they had invested those profits.’80  Lord Diplock countered that it was 
not possible or plausible or indeed practical to ‘follow the assets’ as no mechanism 
had been provided for effecting charges over real or personal property and ‘orders of 
forfeiture can never have been intended by parliament to serve as a means of stripping 
the drug traffickers of the total profits of their unlawful enterprises.’81   
 
Finally, from the English and Welsh case law interpretation, we may note briefly the 
case of R v. Ribeyre82 where the appellant was convicted of, inter alia, possession with 
intent to supply and was ordered to forfeit drugs and a quantity of money.  The 
appellant accepted that whilst the money in question did relate to the sale of previous 
drugs it did not relate to the particular offence before the court.  Furthermore as the 
offence was ‘intent to supply’ that inferred that he was going to sell the drugs and 
thereby would not have required the money as working capital and this, again, did not 
relate to the offence. The Crown argued that the conviction for possession and the 
provenance of the monies was ‘evidential nexus’ enough to relate to the offence.  The 
Court however ruled that such a wide interpretation of the words ‘relate to the offence’ 
was untenable and reversed the forfeiture order in terms of the monies.83  Whilst the 
sections in both jurisdictions are similar the House of Lords seemed to establish clearly 
defined boundaries on the use of forfeiture as a mechanism to target drug traffickers.  
In accepting the use of the concept they indicated that it was far from a catch all 
mechanism that could be allowed an overly broad interpretation.    
 
In terms of application of section 30 of the Irish Act the defendants in DPP v. 
Christopher Kinehan and Rabah Serier84 (a Circuit Court case) pleaded guilty to 
charges of possession of drugs for supply.  In addition to the drugs a quantity of cash 
in Irish and foreign currency was found at the same location.  The defendants queried 
whether the State was entitled to the forfeit of these monies with the first named 
defendant claiming that the money had come from legitimate business interests.  The 
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State contended that the monies were part of the stock in trade of a drug dealer and 
were, thereby, no different to a weighting scales or other paraphernalia which might 
be legitimately subject to forfeiture.  Moriarty J. accepted this argument and ruled that 
the Irish currency ‘was intrinsically connected with the actual drugs supply operation’ 
and ought therefore to be properly forfeited.  In terms of the (lesser) foreign currency 
he went on to rule that  there was a possibility – but not a probability – that the currency 
came from legitimate business interests and therefore ought not to be forfeited. 
 
The matter was considered, in greater detail, in Bowes v. Devally.85  Here the applicant 
had been convicted, in the District Court, of possession of drugs contrary to the 
legislation.  At the time of her arrest a quantity of money was also found and forensic 
evidence demonstrated that there were trace elements of cannabis resin on the money.  
The applicant claimed she was merely holding the money for her mother but did not 
explain why there might be such traces on the money.  The Court ordered forfeiture 
of the money under section 30.  Following an appeal the applicant took judicial review 
proceedings seeking to have the forfeiture order quashed.  Geoghegan J. in the High 
Court, having reviewed the persuasive case law of Cuthbertson and Ribeyre, 
considered that even if there was an inference that the money in question was to be 
used to acquire further drugs this did not ‘relate to the offence’ (possession) of which 
the applicant had been convicted.  Further he noted that had she been convicted of 
selling then it might have been contended that the money represented the proceeds of 
that sale and thereby under such a hypothesis the money might properly have been 
forfeited.86  In reaching the conclusion that the forfeiture order should be reversed the 
learned justice also stated that ‘forfeiture is part of the penalty and the circumstances 
in which forfeiture can be made must be strictly construed.’87 
 
The Irish High Court adopted a similar viewpoint to the House of Lords establishing 
that is was necessary to establish a direct connection between the item in question and 
the actual offence committed.  However, notwithstanding the narrow interpretation of 
this particular piece of legislation the Court again accepted the use of forfeiture and 
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thus is a contributor to our causal contributions for the ultimate emergence of wider 
civil forfeiture.  Indeed the concept of the forfeiture of assets was, as demonstrated, 
well established in both historical and modern Irish jurisprudence.  From its unique 
development of establishing in rem proceedings against an inanimate object as a 
practical (if semi-illogical) method of deterrence (and indeed potentially a 
punishment) it appears that for a period the use of forfeiture as merely a source of 
revenue developed as the mainstay of the concept.  In more modern Irish history the 
courts seemed willing to accept the concept of forfeiture – where legislation allowed 
–on the basis of achieving a greater good.  
 
Much of the current day thinking on forfeiture cites anti-drug use legislation as the 
touchstone of its applicability.  Whilst Ireland seems to have drifted towards a U.S. 
“war on drugs” type of approach the Irish judiciary, taking heed of their English and 
Welsh brethren, have given relatively narrow interpretations of the Misuse of Drugs 
legislation. In particular strict requirement that the forfeited asset “must relate” in a 
real and substantive sense to the actual offence which was committed.  Of course the 
Dáil debates on the original Misuse of Drugs Act called for balance and the need to 
exercise caution to ensure that the “draconian” powers did not permeate the entire 
legal system.  Indeed where the powers of forfeiture were used under the Misuse of 
Drugs legislation it appears to have been targeted at the ‘physical means employed 
rather than the fruits of the crime.’88 
 
The aforementioned drugs related cases were used to highlight the fact that the only 
constraint that the judiciary appeared to put on the concept of forfeiture was that of 
legislative interpretation and legislative intent.  The prevailing view was that it could 
not be used to target the wider financial accruals of the drug trade merely because such 
a power was not obvious from the drafting of the legislation.  Thus, the restraint on 
the wider use of forfeiture at this juncture appeared to be the intent of the legislature. 
This in turn raises the question of what traditionally forfeiture was trying to achieve 
and whether it is an actual primary punishment or merely a secondary ancillary one.  
We are faced with two primary decisions that are somewhat competing and, thereby, 
                                                          




difficult to reconcile.  The first is that of Kostan v. Ireland89 which concerned an 
offence triable summarily under the Fisheries (Consolidation) Act 1959.  The penalty 
for such an offence was a fine not exceeding £100 and the mandatory forfeiture of the 
fish catch and the fishing gear.  Here, the plaintiff, having contravened the legislation, 
was fined the maximum penalty and his fishing gear, valued at £102,040 was 
confiscated under the forfeiture provision.  In turn he claimed that the forfeiture 
constituted a penalty that was so severe that it could not constitute a minor offence 
triable summarily. 
 
In reaching a decision McWilliams, J. stated that ‘[N]o one can deny that a punishment 
involving the loss of property to the value of anything in the region of £100,000 is 
severe.’90  In so doing he reached a decision that the forfeiture was a direct 
consequence of a conviction and therefore was a penalty.  It could be argued that the 
learned judge seems to have reached his decision in this case based on its own facts 
rather than on a principle of law as it may be submitted that the value, or moreover the 
potential lack of value, of the item in question (fishing gear in this instance) should be 
irrelevant in establishment of the law.91  Indeed there is an inconsistency between this 
case92 and that of Cartmill v. Ireland,93 which despite the fact that it was on a similar 
matter did not even consider the Kostan case.  In Cartmill, the principle that the 
category of the offence was determined by the level of punishment was re-iterated, but 
it was held that forfeiture (in this instance under the Gaming and Lotteries Act 1956) 
of machines worth approximately £120,000 was merely a secondary punishment that 
needed an ‘administrative or executive power to deprive a citizen’94 of the object in 
question.  
 
It has been suggested, by Casey, that an exceptionally narrow distinction between the 
two competing cases is that in Kostan the forfeiture was mandatory but in Cartmill it 
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was discretionary.  The same author goes on to suggest that a more tenable distinction 
may be rooted in the fact that in Kostan the property was lawful in itself but was used 
in the commission of an offence, whereas in Cartmill it was forfeiture of property 
designed for the commission of an offence.95  In considering the inconsistency, 
Hamilton draws attention to the fact that in the earlier case of O’Sullivan v. Hartnett96 
the accused was convicted of being in possession of 900 unlawfully captured salmon 
and the penalty included forfeiture of the catch.  McWilliam, J.  held that the offence 
itself was not a minor one, but, more importantly in the current context, ruled that as 
the accused was never actually lawfully in possession of the fish then forfeiture could 
not in reality constitute a penalty.  Hamilton goes on to contend that the clarification 
by the Supreme Court – that the High Court decision related to the specific facts of the 
case rather than a general principle of law97 – was ‘unsatisfactory’ on the basis that it 
seemed to give credence to the actual value of the item (fish) without giving any 
reasons for such an approach.98   
 
In this respect the Courts seem to be drawing a distinction between property that is not 
lawfully in the defendant’s possession and property lawfully held but actually used for 
unlawful purposes. In the current context these cases are important in that they have 
assisted in establishing and providing authority for the development of forfeiture as 
modern crime control mechanism.  Further they demonstrate that forfeiture was also 
used in the mainstream areas of law and was not always given the narrow 
interpretation highlighted in the misuse of drugs cases.  Moreover they highlight the 
possibility for forfeiture to be used a secondary or ancillary element which widens 
considerably its scope as a mechanism for dealing with modern criminality.  
Notwithstanding, for the interim only, the divergence on whether forfeiture was a 
primary or secondary punishment it was widely used as a concept in both the civil and 
criminal realm.  Indeed as it had been used in the civil arena for prosecutions in 
contravention of customs, fishing and revenue law its acceptance and use – in the 
broad sense – for much more serious criminal issues could hardly be denied.  
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The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1985. 
 
In terms of outlining the position of forfeiture prior to the 1996 reforms and prior to 
considering some international influences on the development of Irish forfeiture we 
will now turn to what is sometimes referred to as a key piece of legislation which was 
already in place in this jurisdiction.  In introducing the Proceeds of Crime Bill in 1996 
its proposer stated that a clear precedent already existed for such legislation in this 
jurisdiction.  Indeed he went as far as stating that:  
“The suggestion that this Bill is in some unspecified way unconstitutional is ... 
unsustainable. A clear and direct precedent exists for legislation of this type. 
The Offences Against the State (Amendment) Act, 1985, permits the freezing 
of assets of illegal organisations. The constitutionality of that Act was tested 
in the High Court in the case of Clancy v Ireland …”99 
 
In terms of establishing the context for the introduction of one of the significant 
reforms of the mid 1990s, namely – the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 – it is worth 
considering this ‘clear and direct precedent.’  The 1985 Act was underpinned by the 
Offences Against the State Act 1939.  This latter Act provided that where a particular 
organisation was deemed to be an unlawful organisation100 the government could 
make a suppression order101 where upon, under section 22, ‘all the property (whether 
real, chattel, real or personal and whether in possession or in action) of such 
organisation shall become forfeited to and vested in the Minister for Justice.’  This 
was supplemented by section 2 of the Offences Against the Sate (Amendment) Act 
1985 which provided the Minister for Justice with the authority to freeze monies held 
by a bank which he believed – but for the operation of section 22 of the 1939 Act – to 
be the property of an unlawful organisation and cause them to be paid into the High 
Court.  Further after a period of six months the Minister may make an ex parte 
application for the money to be paid out to him and into the exchequer.   An individual 
claiming to be the owner of the monies may also make an application within six 
months to have that money paid to him.102  However, the caveat in this legislative 
approach is that the traditional onus of proof is reversed and placed on the individual 
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to establish ownership.  It was felt that the 1985 Act was necessary because the original 
1939 Act did ‘not contain a significantly precise formula or mechanism by which the 
Minister can seize the property while at the same time giving anybody who may claim 
to be the legitimate and bona fide owners of it the right to have their claims determined 
by the Courts.’103  Interestingly, in terms of its remit, the legislation was introduced to 
deal with a very specific circumstance which it was felt had ‘serious implications for 
the maintenance of public order’104 in the State.  In particular the movement of a 
specific sum of money, which it was claimed had already moved across ‘international 
frontiers and may, to an extent at least, have been “laundered”’105  
 
In addition to both enshrining the concept of forfeiture in legislation and indicating a 
willingness to deal with one off extraordinary issues – through enshrining procedures 
in the ordinary realm – this is also an example of the early approaches of the Irish 
legislature to deal with internationally laundered money, albeit limited to the extent of 
monies controlled, or for the use of, unlawful suppressed organisations under the 1939 
Act.  Indeed during the Dáil debates on the legislation concern was expressed with 
regard to the need for such legislation in the ordinary criminal realm.  In particular the 
concerns of Deputy Prendergast are noteworthy:  
 
“What provision, if any, is there for extending the provisions of this Bill to 
money which might have been robbed from banks by other than organisations 
mentioned in the Act and which might be the proceeds of illicit operations in 
this country by people involved in international crime? There are disconcerting 
rumours that there are agencies and outlets being used here to launder that kind 
of money.”106 
 
The proposer of the bill, the then Minister for Justice Michael Noonan, confirmed that 
the bill was directed solely at organisations suppressed under the 1939 Act.107  In terms 
of the overall approach to crime control this is an interesting individualistic approach.  
As noted above, the 1985 Act was introduced to deal with an individual specific issue 
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and the relevant section 2 of the Act would only be in operation for 3 months.108  It 
was felt that this limited time span would be an ‘important limitation on the power of 
the Minister and [would] … act as a safeguard.’109  It appears that whilst there was a 
felt need for such so-called ‘draconian legislation’110 it was not believed that there was 
a need for such legislation to continue in force on a permanent basis, even in the extra-
ordinary realm.  The proposing Minister did note that whilst the Act provided a method 
for dealing with a particular issue it might also provide a framework for future issues 
of a similar nature, thereby holding open the door to potential expansion of this form 
of crime control.111   
 
Indeed in terms of using such – or more importantly similar – legislation as a 
framework for civil forfeiture it is essential to note that the 1985 Act is what may be 
referred to as an extra-ordinary measure.  That is a measure specifically designed to 
deal with a terrorist threat to the safety or security of the State.112  However as further 
noted by Kilcommins and Vaughan, such extraordinary measures were used as a 
justification for the introduction of measures into the ordinary realm without any 
detailed consideration given to their potential effects.  Indeed in referencing the above 
quote from 1996 regarding suggestions as to whether the Proceeds of Crime Bill was 
in some way unconstitutional the authors offer a detailed contribution as to the 
potential effects of such an approach.  They contend that there is an “obfuscation” of 
the divide between ordinary and extraordinary provisions with an associated reduction 
in due process ideals and constitutional values.  They suggest that it is unacceptable 
to legitimise a Bill by reference to extraordinary powers designed to combat a 
subversive threat to the State and that it is only by resulting necessity of being an 
extraordinary measure that the ‘draconian’ powers in the 1985 legislation passed 
constitutional muster.113   
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Thereby the emphasis that is sometimes placed on the 1985 Act as ‘a clear precedent’ 
is, at a minimum, a questionable approach.  Whilst the Act is undoubtedly a causal 
factor in our framework it was only ever intended as a short term approach to a specific 
issue in a specific realm as opposed to a century of tradition and ongoing use in other 
areas where forfeiture was applied.  Notwithstanding this short term rationale it 
appears to have had a long term effect as, inter alia, it provided the legislature with a 
platform upon which to construct a more long term structure on the road to 
normalisation of an originally extra ordinary provision.  This somewhat shaky 
foundation was strengthened, to a degree, by the fact that the importance of the 1985 
Act in establishing a modern framework and legislative precedent for forfeiture in 
Ireland does not stop at the introduction of the Act.  As just alluded to, its 
constitutionality was subsequently tested in the High Court in Alan Clancy and David 
McCarthy v. Ireland and the Attorney General.114   
 
The day following the enactment of the legislation115 the Minister for Justice directed 
the Bank of Ireland branch in Navan Co. Meath to pay to the High Court the sum of 
£1,750,816.27 that was standing to the credit of the plaintiffs in a joint account.  In 
seeking to reclaim the money the plaintiffs sought declarations that certain section of 
both the 1939 Act and the 1985 Act were unconstitutional.  In reaching its decision 
the Court made a number of interesting distinctions in terms of the effect of the Act.  
Despite the fact that section 2116 specifically mentions the word ‘forfeited’ the Court 
held that ‘[T]he effect of s. 2 is not therefore to confiscate monies standing in the name 
of an account holder in a bank but to require those monies to be paid into the High 
Court.’117 In the same vein they went on to declare that:  
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“The Act of 1985 admittedly provides for the freezing (my emphasis) of a bank 
account and the payment of the funds in it into the High Court without notice 
to the account holder but it does not confiscate (my emphasis) his property or 
deprive him of a fair hearing.”118 
 
The Court seemed to put considerable weight on the fact that a claimant was entitled 
to regain the money if, with the reversed onus of proof, he could prove bona fide 
ownership.  This would appear to be the rationale for holding that section 2 does not 
confiscate the property in question but merely freezes it for a period of time until true 
ownership, or indeed actual forfeiture, can be established by the courts.119  In 
determining that the Act did not offend the traditional due process guarantees the Court 
looked to the case referred to earlier – in considering the development of forfeiture 
provisions – of Calero – Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.  The relevant section 
considered in the Irish Court was that:  
 
“First, seizure under the Puerto Rican statutes serves significant governmental 
purposes: Seizure permits Puerto Rico to assert in rem jurisdiction over the 
property in order to conduct forfeiture proceedings, thereby fostering the 
public interest in preventing continued illicit use of the property and in 
enforcing criminal sanctions. Second, pre seizure notice and hearing might 
frustrate the interests served by the statutes, since the property seized - as here, 
a yacht - will often be of a sort that could be removed to another jurisdiction, 
destroyed, or concealed, if advance warning of confiscation were given.”120  
 
In seeing the inherent advantages of establishing in rem jurisdiction and the parallels 
with the risk of the property moving to a different jurisdiction the Court was 
referencing case law that clearly established both the concept and the potential unique 
application of forfeiture as a crime control measure.  As a result the Court was of the 
opinion that the Act simply allowed a temporary freezing of funds and that the matter 
could subsequently be resolved with the due process of law and was not therefore 
unconstitutional but rather a permissible delimitation of property rights in the interests 
of the common good.  Finally in terms of providing a framework for forfeiture 
provisions in Ireland, as the Act provided for the payment of compensation the Court 
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reasoned that this was enough to rebut any suggestions of an unjust attack on private 
property.121  Thereby both the legislation itself and its subsequent passing of 
constitutional muster provided solid foundations upon which forfeiture provisions 
might, at an appropriate future time, be introduced as a crime control strategy, 
although this was not contemplated at the time.  
 
Thus whilst an exemplar of forfeiture of criminal assets did exist in Ireland it was 
designed to deal exclusively with the extraordinary realm.  The Act highlighted both 
the willingness of the legislature to deal with serious crime issues (albeit extraordinary 
crime) in a flexible manner122 and the willingness of the Irish courts to accept 
forfeiture, albeit in this instance in very limited circumstances restricted to certain 
unlawful organizations, as an acceptable strategy to deprive, in the absence of any 
criminal convictions, those benefiting from criminal activity.  When the later 1996 
reforms relied on this template it moved the notion into the ordinary realm – or 
normalised the activity – without any detailed consideration as to its constitutional 
appropriateness   
 
Permitting a precedent from the extraordinary realm to act as a justification for a much 
wider refocus of the mechanism and framework to target modern criminality in the 
ordinary realm represents, reflected to a degree at least, both  a re-ordering of the 
relationship between the citizen and the State and a break from the past.  Combined 
such a thesis represents a broad reflective position on the long term outcomes of this 
one particular and unique case.  The actual case report itself has been referred to by a 
Supreme Court Justice as ‘laconic and unsatisfactory’123 in that it did not deal with the 
arguments advanced at trial.  Such a comment and the fact that the legislation was 
intended as a short term mechanism to deal with issues of a very specific nature in the 
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extraordinary realm – and passed constitutional muster on that basis – makes it 
somewhat surprising that it is considered a central tenet in the evolution of Irish 
forfeiture provisions.  Its importance as template for forfeiture is accepted, but the 
almost automatic unquestioned adoption into the ordinary realm represents a blurring 
of the – necessary – line between ordinary and extraordinary provisions.  The whole 
basis of extraordinary provisions is that they are a proportionate, if draconian, response 
to an emergency threat.124   
 
Despite these short-giving’s both the legislation itself and the judicial acceptance 
thereof are important causal factors in our framework as they indicate that the State 
had used forfeiture as a mechanism for dealing with criminality in circumstances 
where a crime is not proven.  As a short term measure targeted at the extraordinary 
realm however it is submitted that the long term effect on current Irish forfeiture is 
often overstated when juxtaposed with the reality of other immediate and long term 
historical factors that contributed to the milieu.  The State had used – as opposed to 
was using – forfeiture and this fact combined with the brief High Court judgment 
would not, it is submitted, have been significant enough to justify the emergence of a 
wider concept of forfeiture were it not for the long history of forfeiture already 
outlined and a number of international factors which we will now consider.             
The Influence of United States Legislation on Irish Forfeiture Provisions.  
 
In the Dáil debates prior to the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996 United 
States (U.S.) “RICO” provisions were cited as an approach to organised crime that 
should be adopted in this jurisdiction.125  As mentioned previously RICO126 is the 
acronym for the Racketeering and Influenced Corrupt Organisation provision of the 
U.S. legislation which introduced a new penalty of forfeiture allowing the State to 
confiscate the property of those convicted of crimes under the Act.  The rationale for 
the introduction of such law may be gleaned from a Senate Report on what would later 
become RICO.  It stated that the aim of the legislation was the ‘elimination of the 
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infiltration of organised crime and racketeering into legitimate organisations operated 
in interstate commerce.’127  Whilst the targets of this legislation and the later Irish 
model may be similar it would appear that the original rationale was couched in very 
different terms.  The US legislation allowed for both the forfeiture of property used in 
RICO crimes and any proceeds acquired from that activity.  In addition to such 
provisions in 1970 the congress also passed the Continuing Criminal Enterprise Act128 
(CCE) which provided for imprisonment and the imposition of large fines and the 
forfeiture of the profits of the criminal enterprise.  Importantly in terms of the 
development of forfeiture as a mechanism to remove the profits from crime both of 
these pieces of aforementioned legislation required a criminal conviction prior to any 
forfeiture of property.   
 
However the possibility of civil forfeiture did exist in relation to the seizure of 
narcotics and raw materials or equipment used in their production, handling or 
transportation.  This was essentially the forfeiture of ‘instruments’ of drug related 
offences.  In addition the later Psychotropic Substances Act 1978129 allowed for in rem 
proceedings and as such it effectively ignored the innocence or otherwise of the owner 
of the property in question as it did not require a pre-existing conviction.  This Act 
thereby allowed for the civil forfeiture of all proprietary proceeds of illegal drug 
activity.  The legislation was amended again with the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act 
1984130 which, in addition to allowing for application for a warrant, authorised seizure 
of real property for the first time.  Such seizure was permitted where the real property 
in question was used or intended to be used to commit, or facilitate, the commission 
of a relevant offence.  In justifying such an approach it was noted in the U.S. congress 
that: 
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“If law enforcement efforts to combat racketeering and drug trafficking are to 
be successful, they must include an attack on the economic aspects of these 
crimes.  Forfeiture is the mechanism through which such an attack may be 
made.”131 
 
It would thus appear that the U.S. approach to dealing with such activity had graduated 
from an approach based on the offence itself to one focussed on the outputs of such 
offences in an attempt to reduce – with the ultimate aim presumably of elimination – 
such offences by removing their profit element.  This aim of eliminating profit and 
thereby eliminating, or deterring in the first instance would-be, offenders, was also a 
clear motivation of the Irish legislature.  Thereby it is apparent that the modern 
development and application of forfeiture provisions in the US was incremental in 
nature progressing from forfeiture of instruments used in the offence; to forfeiture of 
profit following conviction; and finally to in rem forfeiture which did not need a prior 
conviction.  As already outlined, in this jurisdiction there already existed the concept 
of in rem forfeiture and forfeiture of items ‘related to the offence’ under misuse of 
drugs legislation and thus a wider policy adoption from the U.S. would not have been 
a wholly unexpected evolutionary development.   
 
 In addition a system of administrative forfeiture that does not require any judicial 
intervention has also developed in the US.  This allows for forfeiture of property 
valued at less than $500,000, (excluding real property) money in any amount and any 
conveyance used to import, export, transport, or store any illicit drugs.132  Following 
seizure of any such property the seizing agency must notify the owners133 and any 
other interest parties of the intent to forfeit that asset.  Such parties may submit a claim 
of interest – accompanied by a cost bond – in the asset.  This essentially ends the 
administrative procedure as the claimant has effectively requested judicial 
intervention.134   The use of such an administrative system might encounter difficulties 
in this jurisdiction due to our separation of powers.  However, it may be noted that 
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penalty points for driving offences, some public order offences and potential 
application of the aforementioned gaming and lotteries legislation do not need any 
judicial intervention and thus, potentially at least, forfeiture could be exercised in this 
manner in Ireland.      
 
In terms of looking to the U.S. for approaches to specific elements of crime control it 
must be noted that there has been much criticism of the U.S. system of forfeiture.135 
In the US, historically, forfeiture has been a much more divisive issue as it was used 
in the past as an instrument by the government to obtain, without trial, property 
belonging to Southern rebels136 and may therefore have negative historical 
connotations not evident in the Irish system.  An often expressed general criticism is 
that the proceeds of assets forfeited are often redistributed to the law enforcement 
agency responsible for initiating the forfeiture mechanism and thus there is a concern 
that forfeiture might be used a simply a revenue enhancement mechanism and might 
lead to selectivity on the part of some agencies.137  In the more specific sense there 
have been many instances whereby it is questionable whether the use of forfeiture is 
being used to remove the economic power base of criminals.  In Bennis v. Michigan138 
the plaintiff was joint owner with her husband of a Pontiac car.  The vehicle was 
forfeited as it was the site of an act of prostitution involving the plaintiff’s husband.  
Despite her pleas of innocence that whilst she was obviously aware that her husband 
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law enforcement’ (2001) 29 Journal of Criminal Justice 171 – 187.  




used the family car, she had no knowledge of her husband’s infidelity the Supreme 
Court of the United States held that the car facilitated and was used in criminal activity 
and should, therefore, be forfeited.139  The approach of the Court is perhaps best 
summed up by the quote that: 
“It is not unknown or indeed uncommon for the law to visit upon the owner of 
property the unpleasant consequences of the unauthorized action of one to 
whom he has entrusted it.  Much of the jurisdiction in admiralty, so much of 
the statute and common law of liens as enables a mere bailee to subject the 
bailed property to a lien, the power of a vendor of chattels in possession to sell 
and convey good title to a stranger, are familiar examples . . . . [T]hey suggest 
that certain uses of property may be regarded as so undesirable that the owner 
surrenders his control at his peril . . . .  [I]t has long been settled that statutory 
forfeitures of property entrusted by the innocent owner or lienor to another 
who uses it in violation of the revenue laws of the United States is not a 
violation of the due process clause of the Fifth Amendment.”140 
 
A similar justification was used in affirming the forfeiture of a vehicle in United States 
v. 1990 Toyota 4Runner where it was reasoned that: 
“In order to import the heroin into the United States and place it in Oloko’s 
[the conspirator’s] possession, someone had to go to Manila, get it, and bring 
it back.  In order for someone to go to Manila for this purpose, arrangements 
for the trip had to be made … In order to make these arrangements, the 
conspirators had to meet, and Oloko’s presence at the meeting was “facilitated” 
by the Toyota, his mode and conveyance to and from the meeting.” 141 
 
These cases serve to highlight the extent to which the use of forfeiture has developed 
in the U.S. and moreover the tangential extremes to which the courts seem willing to 
travel in order to justify forfeiture of assets many significant steps detached from the 
criminal act and without which the criminal act could still have continued and of 
course the wide options open to a jurisdiction that might adopt such forfeiture 
practices. 142    
                                                          
139 Ibid at 453.  
140 Ibid at 448 citing Van Oster 272 U.S. at 467 – 68.  There was however a dissenting judgment 
noting that the car did not fit any of the traditional items that would be seized – contraband, proceeds 
of criminal activity, or tools of the trade – and that the Court was granting too much power to forfeit 
property that had only a tangential relationship to the crime.   
141 9. F. 3d 651 (7th Cir. 1993) at 652.  
142Some changes did occur as a result of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act 2000, (Pub. L. No. 106 
– 85 (H.R. 1658) 114 Stat.) but as this was post 1996 it is not directly relevant to the current 
framework.  See generally: Worall, J. (2004) ‘The Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000: A 





The concept of forfeiture, and indeed civil forfeiture, was well established in the 
common law tradition of the US and policy adoption from that jurisdiction is another 
significant and important causal factor in the development of the concept in this 
jurisdiction.  This is due to the fact that there was a general prima facia understanding 
that the concept was getting results in the US and in the crisis of hegemony that 
surrounded the Irish political establishment in the summer of 1996 there was a desire 
to rapidly implement methods that could offer reassurance and had a resonance of 
authority.  The US system – notwithstanding that it was receiving some criticism in 
that country – appeared to do just that.  As established, the concept of in rem  
proceedings were already established in Irish jurisprudence and the US system 
appeared to give an indication of the possibilities for the growth of such proceedings 
to deal with a new era of criminal actors.  Thus the US forfeiture laws had a 
concomitant historical and immediate influence in the hierarchy of factors that shape 
the Irish 1996 reforms.   
International Influence on the Development of Irish Forfeiture.  
 
The rationale for noting the US concept of forfeiture was due to the fact that there was 
a felt need by the Irish legislature to implement RICO like provisions notwithstanding 
the fact that the original RICO itself had no actual civil forfeiture components.  The 
US provisions were not, of course, the only international influences on the 
development of forfeiture in Ireland.  The State’s requirements under International and 
European Conventions provided the immediate backdrop to the introduction of, for 
example, the Criminal Justice Act 1994.   
 
Whilst it is sometimes asserted that Ireland was a driving force in the development of 
civil forfeiture it is imperative not to overlook the significance of the multi-layer and 
multi-actor international arena in respect of the rational development of forfeiture laws 
in this particular State.  The nature of political debate in 1990s’ Ireland, fuelled by a 
number of competing paradigms, might have left citizens with the impression that 
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international organised crime was a relatively recent phenomenon.  This was not the 
case and it had long been accepted that organised crime was no longer a national 
problem and had gone beyond the competencies of any individual state and this in turn 
resulted in multi-lateral and multi bi-lateral agreements.  Indeed as far back as 1909 
thirteen states met to consider narcotics problems in what was the genesis of the 
signing of the International Opium Convention at The Hague 1912.143  Following a 
raft of conventions and agreements the 1961 Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs – 
amended by protocol in 1971 – consolidated earlier instruments into a simpler and 
more streamlined approach.   
 
There was a growing consensus at an international level that in order to tackle 
organised crime effectively it would be necessary to deprive those involved of the 
pecuniary benefits of that activity.  Thus  in addition to adopting mechanisms designed 
to combat money laundering it was felt necessary to facilitate the actual confiscation 
of the proceeds of crime.  The rationale for the introduction of such agreements and 
conventions was multifaceted.  The free movement of capital at a European level had 
increased the opportunities for the channelling of illegal money and indeed made cross 
border crime more difficult to detect144 and deter.  It may also be premised that the 
increasing adoption of emerging technologies made the international movement and 
moreover control of money significantly easier for the end – in this instance criminal 
– user. In international commerce and governmental sectors there was increasing 
concern at the volume of money laundering and the necessity to take the profit out of 
crime.  Further it was recognised that many money laundering schemes by their nature 
would involve several jurisdictions and thus a single state approach would not be 
sufficient to effectively apprehend the proponents of such activities.145  The concern 
with taking the pecuniary profit out of crime was also a new approach as traditionally 
financial information uncovered during the course of a criminal investigation was used 
                                                          
143 Convention of Jan 23, 1912 relating to the Suppression of the Abuse of Opium and Other Drugs, 
38 Stat. 1912, T.S. No. 612, I Bevans 855, 8 L.N.T.S. 187. 
144 Mohamed, S, (1999) European Community Law on the Free Movement of Capital and EMU 
(1999) Martinus Nijhoff: The Hague at 151 -152.  
145 Reid, P. (1994) ‘Cleaning up the Financial System: Money Laundering and the Criminal Justice 




only to substantiate the allegations.146  Of course allied to this emerging approach was 
the fact that the volume of revenue that was now being generated by illegal activities 
was now also a serious concern as it had the potential to have a destabilising effect on 
some financial institutions147 and could possibly engender a lack of confidence in the 
banking system by the public at large.148  
 
By the 1980’s a clear approach was identifiable at an international level.  Firstly, it 
had been accepted that following the actual money trail, or profit, from crime was an 
effective mechanism for dealing with organised crime.  According to Nadelmann:  
...[I]nsofar as criminals, and particularly organized criminals, act as they do 
for the money, the best deterrent and punishment is to confiscate their 
incentive. A second rationale is that, while the higher-level and more 
powerful criminals rarely come into contact with the illicit goods, such as 
drugs, from which they derive their profits, they do come into contact with 
the proceeds from the sale of those goods. That contact often provides a 
"paper trail," or other evidence, which constitutes the only connection with a 
violation of the law.149 
 
Secondly, the United Nations General Assembly supported the formulation of efforts 
to complement early conventions with a comprehensive and long-term approach to 
be used at an international level.  A major exemplar of such an approach is the UN 
Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 
1988.  The aim of this convention was to criminalise the laundering of the proceeds 
of drug trafficking and to provide for the confiscation of monies arising from such 
activities.  In particular the convention provides for: 
(a) The taking of appropriate measures by a state to facilitate the confiscation 
of assets which represent the proceeds of crime.150  
                                                          
146 It has been noted that in the Irish sense the possible exception to this was the Offences Against the 
State (Amendment) Act 1985.  See Murphy, F. and Galvin, B. (1999) ‘Targeting the Financial Wealth 
of Criminals in Ireland: The Law and Practice’ (1999) 9 Irish Criminal Law Journal 133 at 135.  
147 McCormack, G. (1994) ‘Money Laundering and Banking Secrecy in the UK’ (1 (4) Commercial 
Law Practitioner 117 at 117.  
148 Supra n.129. 
149 Nadelmann, E. (1986) ‘Unlaundering Dirty Money Abroad: US Foreign Policy Abroad and 
Financial Secrecy Jurisdictions’ 18 Inter-American Law Review 33 at 34.   




(b)  The setting aside of the traditional banker/customer secrecy during 
criminal investigations.151 
(c) Extradition between countries party to the Convention for the purposes of 
the Convention.152 
(d) Mutual legal Assistance153 
(e) The transfer of criminal prosecutions from one signatory state to 
another.154 
 
Further, in addition to the Basle Statement of Principles 1988155 and the Financial 
Action Task Force156 there were two significant European Initiatives.  These were, 
firstly; the Council of Europe Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and 
Confiscation of the Proceeds of Crime 1990 which required signatories to adopt 
legislative measures to make international money laundering a criminal offence under 
domestic law and to prevent banks using confidentiality as a ground for refusing to 
co-operate with investigating authorities.  Secondly, the E.C. Directive on Money 
Laundering,157 that was a significant influence on later Irish legislation in the area.  
The directive defines money laundering in a wide sense to include not only the 
proceeds of drug trafficking but also of other types of criminal activity.  The preamble 
to the directive notes that where institutions are used for money laundering it has the 
potential to undermine confidence in the financial sector as a whole.  Further, taking 
action at community level ensured that any one member state would not become a 
haven for the proceeds of money laundering activities.  In Ireland much of the directive 
was given effect by the Criminal Justice Act 1994 and it is to this Act that we now 
turn. 
                                                          
151 Articles 5 & 7 of the Convention. 
152 Article 6 of the Convention.  
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requirements for clear identification of customers and greater co-operation between banks and law 
enforcement authorities.  
156 The financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering 1989 contained over 40 recommendations 
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Criminal Justice Act 1994.  
 
In addition to Ireland’s requirements under the aforementioned directive, the 1994 Act 
was a key component in reform of Irish law as it allowed for the confiscation and 
seizure of the proceeds of drug trafficking – going further than the existing Misuse of 
Drugs legislation158 – created an offence of money laundering and also facilitated 
Ireland’s participation in international co-operation in these areas.159  In the Dáil 
debates on the legislation the then Minister for Justice claimed that the bill provided 
the ‘opportunity to strike at the very heart of drug trafficking and other serious crime. 
By enabling criminals to be deprived of their ill-gotten gains we will help remove, to 
a significant extent, the incentive which draws people into this type of crime and, in 
addition, ensure that money which might otherwise have been used for criminal 
purposes is no longer available for such purposes.’160  The legislation was considered 
to be both ‘radical’ and ‘draconian’ but still required in order to deal effectively with 
the ‘aristocrats of crime.’161  Furthermore it was considered necessary as pre-existing 
forfeiture provisions, such as those in the aforementioned Misuse of Dugs Act, had 
been considered by the LRC to be too limited in nature to deal effectively with the 
issues162 and indeed the Commission had suggested that penalties imposed should 
remove the profit element associated with the offence in question if they were to be an 
effective crime control measure.  In terms of the actual legislation the pertinent 
sections for our current purposes deal primarily with the post trial stage of the criminal 
process.  In particular it allows for restraint orders and subsequent confiscation and 
forfeiture orders following conviction for drug trafficking and other serious offences.  
 
Restraint Orders.  
 
The LRC had recognised that where an accused becomes aware that they are the 
subject of a criminal investigation there is a likelihood that the assets of the suspect 
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will ‘disappear.’163  Notwithstanding the use of both Mareva164 and Anton Piller165 
orders to prevent the disposal of assets during ongoing legal proceedings the 
commission felt that legislation was necessary in order to avoid ‘the vagaries of the 
law on injunctions’166 when seeking to effectively “freeze” assets which were believed 
to be the proceeds of crime.  Under section 23 of the Act the High Court may issue a 
restraint order to prohibit any person dealing with any realisable property.  Such an 
order seeks to prevent the disposal or dispersal of assets which would have the intent 
of frustrating any potential future confiscation orders.  An order may be granted where 
proceedings against a defendant are already ongoing but not concluded; or are due to 
be instigated for a drug trafficking or other indictable offence; or where it appears to 
the Court that there are reasonable grounds to believe a subsequent confiscation order 
may be made or indeed of course where such a confiscation order has already been 
made.167  The Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) may bring an application for such 
an order to the High Court on both an ex parte and in camera basis.  However there is 
a requirement to give notice to any person affected by such an order.168  
 
Whilst such an approach is clearly designed to prevent an accused usurping any 
potential future direction of the Court the legislation is balanced to a degree by 
providing that any restraint orders granted shall be discharged where proceedings for 
the offence in question are not actual instituted or where the relevant application is not 
made within such time as the Court considers reasonable.169  In order to make such 
restraint orders ultimately effective it was also necessary to provide for confiscation 
orders.  Prior to considering these it may be noted that restraint orders represent an 
interesting juxtaposition with the enactment of the Offences Against the State Act 1985 
which170 was enacted in just one day and almost under a level of secrecy to ensure that 
certain suspects would not be alerted to the possibility of their property becoming the 
subject of legal restraint.  The use of in camera, ex parte restraint orders would appear 
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to be a much more effective mechanism for dealing with such proceeds whilst still 
maintaining somewhat of a proper balance having regard to due process.  Of course 
whilst the 1985 Act did represent a willingness to deal with certain threats it was of a 
specific nature and enacted to deal with a single specific issue.  
 
Confiscation Orders.   
 
The use of these orders is provided for by section 4171 which, subsequent to conviction, 
requires the court to countenance whether an individual, convicted on indictment for 
a drug trafficking offence, has benefited from that offence and if so to what extent.  
The court must then make a confiscation order for the value of the proceeds.  In 
considering the benefits the court may take into account any payment or other reward 
received  at any time in connection with the drug trafficking.172  There is effectively a 
mandatory requirement to consider such an order where the accused has benefited 
from drug trafficking.  The task of calculating such benefits is made significantly 
easier by a number of statutory presumptions.  First, that in assessing any benefit the 
required standard of proof is that of civil proceedings.173  Secondly, that any property 
held by the defendant within the previous six years was held as a result of drug 
trafficking.  Thirdly, that any expenditure in that period was met by payments from 
drug trafficking and finally, for valuing any property under these assumptions that 
property shall be assumed to have been received free of any other interest.174  However 
these latter three presumptions shall not be made if the court is satisfied that the 
presumption is incorrect in a particular case or that serious injustice would result if the 
presumptions were made.175  Further where the amount that can be realised is less than 
the full amount that the court had assessed as the value from the proceeds of drug 
trafficking then the order is to be for the realisable amount.176   
 
                                                          
171 As amended by section 5 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999.  
172 Section 5 (1).  In dealing with the equivalent English legislation in R. v. Banks [1997] 2 Cr. Appeal 
R. (s.) 10 at 113 Lord Bingham C.J. noted that proceeds were to be equated with gross payments 
rather than profits. 
173 Section 4 (6) 
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175 Section 5 (2) 




In a similar manner section 9 provides that a confiscation order may be made requiring 
a convicted individual, who has benefited from an offence other than drug trafficking, 
to pay the value of that benefit.  This is a discretionary requirement that may be 
imposed following application by the DPP and in assessing the benefit the court in this 
instance is limited to the particular offence for which that individual has been 
convicted.  Once a confiscation order has been made it may be enforced by the DPP 
as if it were a judgement debt for the payment to the State of the amount specified in 
the order.  In the event that the order is not complied with (not paid) the DPP may then 
apply to the High Court to have the individual imprisoned.  The Act provides a 
schedule of penalties which must be served and they are relative to the amount 
outstanding on the order.177  The term of imprisonment (for default) is to be served 
consecutive to any term imposed for the offence itself but shall be reduced in 
proportion to any sum actually recovered under the order.   
Forfeiture Orders. 
 
In conjunction with confiscation orders the Act provides that a forfeiture order may be 
made in respect of any property used for the purpose of committing or facilitating the 
commission of an offence, or for the purpose of enabling another person to avoid 
apprehension or detection.178  Further the narrowness of section 30(1) of the Misuse 
of Drugs Act 1977 has been replaced by section 62 of the 1994 Act which provides 
that where a person is convicted of an offence under the 1977 Act (or a drug trafficking 
                                                          
177 Section 19 provides the following schedule:  
Amount outstanding under confiscation order Period of imprisonment 
Not exceeding £500  45 days 
Exceeding £500 but not exceeding £1,000 3 months 
Exceeding £1,000 but not exceeding £2,500 4 months 
Exceeding £2,500 but not exceeding £5,000 6 months 
Exceeding £5,000 but not exceeding £10,000 9 months 
Exceeding £10,000 but not exceeding £20,000 12 months 
Exceeding £20,000 but not exceeding £50,000 18 months 
Exceeding £50,000 but not exceeding £100,000 2 years 
Exceeding £100,000 but not exceeding £250,000 3 years 
Exceeding £250,000 but not exceeding £1 million 5 years 
Exceeding £1 million 10 years 
 
178 Section 61.  This provision is modelled on the Powers of Criminal Courts Act 1973 in England and 
Wales, which has now been replaced by the Powers of the Criminal Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000 s.s. 




offence under the 1994 Act) the court may order anything which relates to the offence 
to be forfeited and either destroyed or dealt with in such a manner as the court 
determines.  An order may also be made if the offence, or an offence taken into 
consideration in determining sentence, consists of unlawful possession of property 
which had been lawfully seized or was in possession or control of the offender at the 
time of apprehension or summons.179  In considering whether to make a forfeiture 
order in the first instance the court shall have regard to the value of the property in 
question and the likely financial and other effects on the offender of making the 
order.180  The overall effect of a forfeiture order is to deprive the offender of his rights 
in the property.  In terms of the actual use of the legislation as the subsequent Proceeds 
of Crime Act 1996 provided for forfeiture in the absence of a criminal conviction it 
was a more attractive crime control measure.  Further because of this need for a 
conviction under the 1994 Act the 1996 Act cannot be said to be an example of direct 
causal progression.   However in terms of the 1994 Act a number of pertinent issues, 
for current purposes, were raised when the constitutionality of the legislation was 
tested. 
Challenges to the Legislation. 
 
The challenge arose in the case of Gilligan v. Special Criminal Court181 where the 
plaintiff, following conviction, was served with a confiscation order to the tune of 
€17,679,833.182  He challenged that order, not by way of appeal, but rather by 
challenging a number of the provisions of the legislation.  Specifically he contended 
that the order constituted a criminal procedure and was thereby unconstitutional due 
to the fact that the legislation specifically refers to the civil standard of proof in 
providing for confiscation orders.183  Is assessing this issue of whether the provisions 
of the Act constituted a criminal process the High Court noted that issues of ‘due 
process’ and ‘natural justice and human rights’ had arisen in many cases, and in 
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181 John Gilligan v. The Special Criminal Court, The Director of Public Prosecutions, Ireland and the 
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to the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 – 1984 and had been sentenced to 28 years imprisonment.  As will be 
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crime control in Ireland. 
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particular in Attorney General v. Southern Industrial Trust Ltd.184 proceedings to 
forfeit a vehicle that had been used for smuggling were held not to constitute criminal 
proceedings.185  In the case currently under consideration the court concluded that the 
amended section 4 mechanism did not create a criminal charge as it did not require the 
court to make a finding that the person had committed any offence other than that for 
which they were convicted.  Rather the court was required to consider whether the 
individual benefited from drug trafficking and if so then it was clearly constitutionally 
permissible to deny the individual the enjoyment of any such benefits.  Thus the court 
was of the opinion that the Act was not penalising individuals for having committed 
the offence but merely denying any benefits that had accrued from the offence.  
Moreover in establishing that the order did not constitute a criminal procedure the 
Court placed considerable emphasis on the fact that the section 4 order did not in any 
way relieve the defendant from liability for the original offence and thus a court was 
not imposing a punishment or penalty.  Finally the amount of an order is limited to the 
amount of benefit received186 – limited by the individual’s means – and as such is 
unlike financial penalties for offences which are absolute irrespective of the 
defendant’s means.  Thus the Court ruled that the order is not in the nature of a 
punishment and thereby not criminal in nature, 187 it is merely depriving individuals of 
the benefit of crime.  
 
In reaching its decision the Court relied on case law upholding the constitutionality of 
the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996188 and in particular the judgment of O’Higgins J. in 
Murphy v. G.M.189 where in relation to the legislation under review in that case he 
stated: 
 
“Is the sanction punitive and not merely a matter of fiscal reparation?  It is 
clear that if there is not title to the goods, confiscation could not rightly be said 
to be punishment.  In many, if not all, circumstances a person will not have 
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186 Section 6.  
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any right to the proceeds of crime.  A person has no title to stolen goods, and, 
no punishment therefore accrues.”190   
 
In adopting such precedent the Court took the very pragmatic view that section 4 
confiscation orders under the Criminal Justice Act 1994 were designed to enable 
reparation of any benefits from an offence as opposed to applying a further sanction 
for the actual commission of the offence.191  The objective of the legislation may 
thereby be seen to one of reparation by denying the offender the enjoyment of the 
benefit192 derived from the offence (drug trafficking in this instance).  It appears 
logical to suggest that if someone did not actually legally own the property in question 
then mutatīs mutandīs forfeiture could not be a penalty to deprive that individual of 
something their wasn’t legal theirs in the first instance.  However in reaching such 
simplifying conclusions we must also be cognisant of the view of the European Court 
of Human Rights in Welch v. United Kingdom193 in 1995.    
 
This case is pertinent in the current context as it concerns a confiscation order issued, 
following conviction, under the English Drug Trafficking Offences Act 1986.  The 
applicant was not challenging the actual confiscation provisions themselves but rather 
that the retrospective nature of the provisions was in conflict with Article 7 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights.194  This provides that an individual should 
not be held guilty of an offence which was not actually an offence at the time it was 
committed.  In so doing he sought to establish that confiscation orders were punitive 
                                                          
190 Ibid at 62.  In the subsequent Supreme Court Appeal (Murphy v. G.M. [2001] 4 I.R. 113, which 
also heard the appeal from Gilligan v. Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 I.R. 185) despite the 
‘unquestionably draconian’ nature of the legislation it was held not to be unconstitutional. At 136.  
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did not constitute a criminal offence under national or international law at the time when it 
was committed.  Nor shall a heavier penalty be imposed than the one that applicable at the 
time the criminal offence was committed. 
2.  This article shall not prejudice the trial and punishment of any person for any act or omission 
which, at the time when it was committed, was criminal according the general principles of 




in nature and thereby constituted a penalty for the purposes of the convention.  He 
asserted that as an order could not be made in the absence of a criminal conviction and 
that as the degree of culpability was taken into account in deciding the amount of an 
order then these factors suggested that the order was in the form of a punishment.195  
In seeking to deny the application the respondents claimed the purpose of the 
legislation was to both deprive individuals of profits derived from drug trafficking and 
to remove such monies from potential future use in the drugs trade and thereby was a 
preventative measure that was reparative in nature.196  In concluding that the 
confiscation order did indeed constitute a penalty the Court was influenced by a 
number of factors including the ‘sweeping statutory assumptions’ that all property 
passing through the hands of the offender in the six years preceding an order was the 
result of drug trafficking unless the offender could prove the contrary.  Further the fact 
that the order related to proceeds from drug trafficking and not just profit; the ability 
to take into account the culpability of the accused and the opportunity for 
imprisonment in the event of a default all suggested a form of punishment.197  However 
it is important to note that the Court emphasised that its decision specifically and 
exclusively referred to the retrospective nature of the legislation and did not ‘question 
in any respect the powers of confiscation conferred on the courts as a weapon in the 
fight against the scourge of drug trafficking.’198 
 
In setting such a precedent this case presents a number of interesting considerations 
for similar Irish forfeiture provisions in the Criminal Justice Act 1994.  In upholding 
the constitutionality of this legislation the Irish court made reference to later legislation 
which allowed confiscation even in the absence of criminal convictions.  This is a 
considerable step further down the line of limiting the rights of the accused and 
moreover highlights the acceptance of forfeiture in the Irish criminal justice system.  
However at this juncture we may note that the Welch case was concerned with 
confiscation which was post-conviction and indeed the 1994 Act, just mentioned, 
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bears striking similarities with the legislation considered in Welch.  In particular both 
contained statutory presumptions that all property passing through the offenders hands 
in the previous six years could be considered the result of drug trafficking; further both 
provided for imprisonment in the event of default.  The significant element of the 
Welch judgement, from the point of view of protecting the Irish legislation, may be 
that the judgement referred specifically to the retrospective nature of the legislation.  
The court appeared to welcome confiscation type legislation that counteracted drug 
trafficking.  In a similar vein the Irish court in upholding the 1994 Act gave 
considerable credence to the reparation element of the legislation and in so doing – 
and possibly limiting rights, which would otherwise be available, in the name of the 
greater good – concurred with the obiter comments of the European court where it 
welcomed confiscation as tool in modern legal environment. 
 
Thus, as a result of the acceptance that serious crime bosses were a number of steps 
away removed the actual commission of offences the international community had 
adopted measures to counter-act such a position.  Whilst such measures developed 
under a different momentum the presence of these International and EU agreements – 
and specific implementing Irish legislation – provided yet further strong foundations 
for the construction of further civil forfeiture mechanisms in Ireland that would target 
areas heretofore which were exclusively dealt with in the criminal arena.  Furthermore 
both the Irish and European Courts had accepted the need to target the financial 
element in order to deal effectively with modern criminality.  In 1994 in Ireland the 
concept of civil forfeiture of assets following conviction had been enshrined in our 
law.  This combined with a governmental realisation and acceptance of the need for 
multi-organ cooperation199 provided immediate causal factors for the introduction of 
the 1996 reforms.  The legislation of 1994 and Irish and EU judicial acceptance of the 
concept marked a new approach to effective criminal control and an acceptance that 
viewing the pecuniary elements of criminality as an ancillary issue was no longer an 
appropriate response.  It may be submitted that such acceptance was a further 
significant and immediate causal factor in the emergence of Irish civil forfeiture.   
                                                          






Over the past two decades Ireland has witnessed a move, in part, away from the 
traditional criminal law to a model that is concerned with the confiscation of criminal 
assets and thereby the pecuniary neutralisation of threats.  This is evidenced on a 
regular basis by media outlet reports on the activities of CAB through its tri-part 
approach of forfeiture and revenue and social welfare compliance.  Each of these 
activities will form a central element in future of this particular work.  In this respect 
the objective of this chapter was to establish a framework of the position in relation to 
forfeiture prior to the introduction of CAB and to establish how that framework 
facilitated the emergence of an alternative model of criminal justice in Ireland.   
 
Thus whilst the murder of a member of the Gardaí and a crime journalist in 1996 
undoubtedly caused our often mentioned tipping point from which we reached a point 
of no return as a society and demanded swift and decisive action from our regulators, 
it is also important to be cognisant of the fact that law does not operate in a vacuum.  
For law to be effective it needs to be cognisant of its history as the very model of a 
common law system is that it is reactionary in nature.  Whilst the merits of such a 
system remain to be evaluated later in this work this chapter was, as aforementioned, 
concerned with establishing the legal basis that already existed in Ireland for dealing 
with the forfeiture of assets.   
 
The old common law concept of forfeiture was discussed in order to highlight the 
historical acceptance of in rem proceedings where it was the ‘object’ or ‘thing’ that 
was found guilty and thereby subjected to punishment in the form of forfeiture.  Thus 
either the availability, or moreover guilty or otherwise, of the owner of the ‘thing’ was 
effectively irrelevant.  Not only was there this common law support for forfeiture, the 
concept had actual been enshrined in legislation in Ireland.  The most often quoted 
example of such is that of anti-drugs legislation.  However, whilst this did allow for 
forfeiture it was limited to assets that were directly related to the actual offence for 
which a conviction was gained.  It appears that there was a belief that this legislation 




the State (Amendment) Act 1985 provided for the forfeiture of monies believed to 
belong to ‘suppressed organisations.’  It was introduced to deal with one very specific 
instance and moreover it applied exclusively in the terrorist realm as opposed to the 
ordinary criminal justice realm.  Indeed there were concerns expressed at the time as 
to whether the draconian powers in the legislation could ever find their way into the 
ordinary criminal justice realm.  As noted briefly, and as will be revisited 
subsequently, this legislation was still used in support of the introduction of a 
forfeiture mechanism in general legislation.      
 
In respect of targeting modern criminals policy adoption from the U.S. was 
encouraged as an effective mechanism of striping criminals of their economic power 
bases.  In that jurisdiction forfeiture had evolved from a position of forfeiture of assets 
used in an offence following criminal conviction to in rem civil forfeiture of assets 
where a criminal prosecution might not be even contemplated.  Also in the U.S. one 
of the weapons used in targeting organised criminality are the revenue laws.  This 
option was not available in Ireland as a result of a High Court decision that ruled, in 
the absence of express provisions, tax legislation could not be supposed to be 
applicable to activities that were clearly illegal.  This position however was reversed 
by the Finance Act 1983 which allowed for the taxation of criminal activities.  These 
new provisions however do not appear to have been used to any great extent prior to 
the introduction of CAB and this will be considered in the following chapters.  
 
The Criminal Justice Act 1994 had provided for confiscation and forfeiture orders for 
criminal assets.  However this legislation only applies post criminal conviction and 
thus doesn’t ease the burden of having to gain a criminal conviction against offenders 
who inevitably are many levels detached from the actual commission of any offence.  
Thereby whilst being an effective piece of legislation in situations where it could be 
used it was not a significant weapon against modern organised crime.  On the other 
hand however this Act does mark the movement of the mechanism into mainstream 
crime control for use as a much more generalised approach.  In an overall context 
forfeiture, based on historical and judicial development and policy adoption, has 




specific forfeiture or seizure of items – for failure to comply with, for example, 
customs laws or anti drug law – to one that by 1994 is drifting towards general seizure 
of a wider variety of assets.   
 
It has been pointed out by Holmes, in considering in rem proceedings, that: 
“principles of this nature may outgrow their origins in a different historical era 
and would now find justification in considerations of public policy or the 
common good”200 
In the Irish sense it has been demonstrated that forfeiture has a secure place in our 
jurisprudence.  It has evolved from somewhat dubious origins to be enshrined in 
legislation, originally with a somewhat specific remit to a much wider based remit.  
Such evolution combined with international influences results in forfeiture now 
meeting a public policy mantle for dealing with modern criminality.  These causal 
contributors where influenced by a significant tipping point marking somewhat of a 
discontinuity with a resultant rapid movement into the civil realm where forfeiture 
could be used prior to any consideration of criminal prosecution.   
  
  
                                                          







The nature of the Criminal Assets Bureau and its primary options under Proceeds 




In the previous chapter the milieu of casual factors that directly and indirectly resulted 
in the establishment of CAB and the introduction of significant enabling legislation 
for the bureau to carry out its functions were considered.  In the Irish State prior to the 
introduction of CAB there was a marked reluctance of various governmental and state 
bodies to co-operate with each other in the execution of their various functions.  Whilst 
this may not have been to the extent where there was an active distrust between such 
bodies, there did seem to exist, to a degree at least, a culture of guarding of territories 
in various domains without any significant consideration of shared benefits.  Bodies 
such as the Gardaí Síochána, the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of 
Social Protection concentrated on their own traditional lines of enforcement and 
discharge of their respective duties.  Of course in so doing the bodies were meeting 
their various remits and in significant part effectively carrying out their statutory 
functions.   
The aforementioned casual factors and the changing criminal landscape resulted in a 
need to deal with a new type of organised and internationally mobile criminal actor 
and associated activities.  This challenge was met with a refocusing of ideals from 
institutional favoured bias to overall net outputs from combined activity law 
enforcement.  In such respects the establishment of CAB in 1996 marked the coming 
together of An Gardaí Síochána, the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of 
Social Protection1 in a fashion that was, hit heretofore, not considered organisationally 
                                                          
1 At the time of formation of CAB this was the Department of Social Welfare, it was renamed the 
Department of Social and Family Affairs in 2002 and the Department of Employment Affairs and 




feasible or indeed possible.  As will now be demonstrated this coming together was a 
traditionally atypical approach.  In that sense CAB might be regarded as a facilitating 
organisation.  Of course it could not have operated effectively without a significant 
piece of new enabling and supporting legislation (the Proceeds of Crime Act) which 
radically altered the balance between the state and the accused in the Irish judicial 
system.  It will be submitted that this legislation was a key factor that enabled CAB to 
be effective in its operations.  In order to effectively consider this submission in the 
context of the overall remit – of this work – of considering the changing nature, in 
particular areas, of law enforcement in the Irish State this chapter will firstly consider 
the objectives and the establishing legislation of CAB.  Secondly we will consider the 
main powers available to CAB under proceeds of crime legislation which allow CAB 
to carry out its remit.   
Specifically, in asserting that CAB represents a new model of criminal justice in 
Ireland, we will begin by considering the rationale under-pinning this new agency.  
This is a model that is reflective, to a degree at least, of penal modernity in Ireland.  
As a result we will discuss whether CAB is rightly a constituent component of the 
Gardaí or a stand-alone independent law enforcement agency. In continuing the theme, 
of considering the individual specifics of change, we will outline the actual detail of 
the various functions of the bureau as set out in the enabling legislation.  It (CAB) was 
designed to be both pro-active and task orientated in nature by targeting specified 
criminality.  In setting out the precise functions it will allow a later complete 
assessment of both the departure from the pre-existing norm and the intentions of the 
legislature in initiating radical change.   Furthermore, the legislation details not only 
the movement towards civil confiscation as an enhanced crime control mechanism but 
additionally, and importantly, the use of revenue and social welfare powers as equal 
crime control armoury in the arsenal of the new agency.  
This chapter will then consider that the staffing make-up of the bureau, as part of its 
multi-agency approach, is a key factor in the structure of this changing approach of 
targeted enforcement of specific legislative enactments.  In seconding staff from An 
Garda Síochána, the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Employment 
Affairs and Social Protection and then using their combined skills and respective legal 




created a level of co-operation far in advance of anything that previously existed.  
Further, consideration will be given to the model where the manner of staffing allowed 
for a situation whereby seconded staff retained pre-existing powers and duties from 
their respective original positions and now applied them for the benefit of the Bureau.   
As this model of staff utilisation allowed civilians to be involved in targeting assets 
derived from organised criminality (and targeting particular revenue and social 
welfare fraudulent activities) next we will consider the level of anonymity that is 
provided for non-garda CAB officers.  There was a concern that such officers could 
be subjected to intimidation and, potentially, physical violence.  As a result the 
establishing legislation for CAB provides for anonymity for non-garda bureau officers 
in the carrying out of their duties. Indeed a level of anonymity that they would not 
normally receive in the execution of revenue and social welfare functions.  As this 
represents a specific individualised case of departure from the norm consideration will 
be given to the application of this element of the legislation by the courts.  As the 
bureau was designed to target assets as opposed to individuals the establishing 
legislation provides specific rules in relation to the issuing of search warrants and this 
will be duly acknowledged.   
In establishing a new agency, be it either independent or co-dependent a key question 
is how that agency should be funded.  Given the remit of CAB, were it to be successful, 
it is possible that it could be a considerable cash cow. As such options for funding of 
the bureau will be examined, in particular whether it should receive funding from the 
State on an on-going basis or whether it should be self-financing from income 
generated from its activities.   
Finally, in relation to CAB itself, this chapter will then provide an overview of the 
specific revenue and social welfare matters pertinent to its remit.  In particular 
emphasis will be placed on the unique powers such officers receive by virtue of being 
officers of CAB and, again, how this marks a discontinuity from the norm.  The final 
section of this chapter will then consider how the Proceeds of Crime Act is a key piece 
of legislation in facilitating CAB in its functions.  Whilst legislation facilitating the 
confiscation of a convicted offenders property had been in place since 19942 under 
                                                          




this 1996 Act property may be forfeited in the absence of a criminal conviction.  At 
this juncture – of the overall thesis – we will consider the types of court order that 
CAB may seek under this legislation.  Again this facilitates the objective of the chapter 
in critiquing key legislative changes that both provided for the establishment of the 
CAB and facilitated its work.   
Establishment of the Criminal Assets Bureau.   
 
CAB was established on an ad-hoc basis for the period 1st August 1996 to the 14th 
October 1996 before being put on a permanent statutory footing on the 15th October 
1996.3  It was established as a separate legal entity and as such it has perpetual 
succession, an official seal, the power to sue and be sued, and the power to acquire, 
hold and dispose of land or an interest in land or any other property.4   
It is well established at this juncture that CAB is a multi-agency body5  which consists 
of members of An Garda Síochána, officials the Revenue Commissioners (comprising 
both Taxes and Customs officials) and officials from the Department of Employment 
Affairs and Social Protection. These are supported by a bureau legal officer and 
administration and technical staff.  The long title to the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 
1996 refers primarily to making provision for the establishment of the Bureau, 
defining its functions and amending certain finance related legislation.  In establishing 
the Bureau under the Act there was a felt need to deal with emerging and changing 
criminality in a more focussed manner which targeted the assets and profits resulting 
from criminal activity as juxtaposed to targeting the actual criminal.  This desire for 
such an altered approach is best espoused by Deputy O’Donnell who, when 
considering the changing nature of criminality, stated:   
“If traditional methods fail we must devise new ones. If we cannot 
punish, deter or reform these people we must set a new aim, to stop 
them from operating their evil trade. This Bill, which forms the basis of 
that new approach, is long overdue. We have given the courts power to 
                                                          
3 SI 310/1996 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 (Establishment Day) Order, 1996.   
4 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, s. 3.  
5 For consideration of CAB generally see McCutcheon, P. and Walsh, D. (1999) ‘Seizure of Criminal 
Assets: An Overview’ 9 Irish Criminal Law Journal 127; Murphy, F. and Galvin, B. (1999) 
‘Targeting the Financial Wealth of Criminals in Ireland: The Law and Practice’ 9 Irish Criminal Law 
Journal 133; Murphy, S. ‘Tracing the Proceeds of Crime: Legal and Constitutional Implications’ 




seize the assets of those convicted of certain crimes and to restrain the 
assets of those facing certain criminal charges, but given the difficulties 
experienced in getting convictions, or even gathering evidence, a new 
power is needed to restain the use of assets outside the context of 
criminal proceedings. To date we have dealt only with assets which are 
the fruits of past crimes. What we need to do now is prevent assets being 
used as the seeds of future crimes. To put it another way, if we cannot 
arrest the criminals, why not confiscate their assets?”6 
In tandem with the causal factors previously demonstrated and within the perfect storm 
of societal events it was necessary to demonstrate that there was not a crisis of 
hegemony within the Irish criminal justice system.  It appears to have been accepted 
that the traditional model of criminal law enforcement of reactive post event measures 
aimed at punishment of the soul were no longer a catch all panacea for the entire 
spectrum of criminal activity that was now occurring in modern Ireland.   
In introducing the Criminal Assets Bureau Bill before the Dáil the proposing Minister 
acknowledged that the resources of the Gardaí, the Revenue Commissioners and the 
then Department of Social Protection would be channelled in the most effective 
manner to target particular assets through this new agency.7  Indeed in the Seanad it 
was stated that the purpose of bringing forward the Bill was ‘to create a task oriented 
agency which will focus the resources, skills and courageous public service of people 
from a variety of agencies on the task of combating crime, specifically to ensure that 
people who have gained from crime are not allowed to hold those gains.’8  The same 
Minister went on to note in relation to the crime-control issue in Ireland that if ‘ever a 
problem required a task oriented approach to its solution, this is one.’9   
Such an approach by the legislature clearly represents a refocusing, in some areas, 
away from traditional policing methods.  This raises the question of whether CAB is 
an extension of the existing police body in Ireland or something entirely new.  In 
regard to the nature of the Bureau Walsh is of the opinion that CAB is a distinct unit 
                                                          
6 Dáil Debates 2nd July 1996, Vol. 467, Col. 2435 per Ms. O’Donnell.  A similar approach was 
encouraged by Deputy Byrne: “The conventional criminal justice system is simply not equipped to 
bring the so-called crime bosses to justice since they can rarely be directly linked with the execution 
of a crime. They can, however, be linked with the enormous profits generated by their crimes. 
Targeting their financial resources demands a multi-pronged approach, highly intensive policing and 
…” Dáil Debates 2nd July 1996, Vol. 467, Col. 2463 per Mr. Byrne.   
7 Dáil Debates 25th July 1996, Vol. 468, Col. 1025 per Mr. Quinn. 
8 Seanad Debates 9th Oct 1996, vol. 148, Col 1527 per Mr. Quinn. 




but nonetheless is still a unit within An Garda Síochána.  He suggests that bodies such 
as CAB (and Europol) ‘could almost be described as a police force within a police 
force.’10  Further in this regard under section 7(6) of Criminal Assets Bureau Act there 
is a requirement for the head of the Bureau (Chief Bureau Officer) to be a Garda 
Síochána of the rank of Chief Superintendent or above.   In CAB’s own annual report 
of 2010 it highlights its distinctiveness where it states that the Bureau ‘continues to 
co-ordinate its strategy in line with the Policing Plans of An Garda Síochána and the 
strategies of the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Social Protection.’11  
The nature of the Bureau has also been considered by the courts in a number of cases.  
In the context of establishing the actual basis for this new approach to criminal justice 
in Ireland it is worth outlining in some detail the judgment of McCraken J. in Murphy 
v. Flood12 where when considering the nature of the Bureau he stated that: 
“The CAB is a creature of Statute, it is not a branch of An Garda 
Síochána.  It was set up by the Oireachtas as a body corporate primaraly 
for the purpose of ensuring that persons should not benefit from any 
assets acquired by them from any criminal activity. It is given power to 
take all necessary actions in relation to seizing and securing assets 
derived from criminal activity, certain powers to ensure that the 
proceeds of such activity are subject to tax, and also in relation to the 
Social Welfare Acts. However, it is not a prosecuting body, and is not 
a police authority. It is an investigating authority which, having 
investigated and used its not inconsiderable powers of investigation, 
then applies to the Court for assistance in enforcing its functions.  
The Oireachtas, in setting up the CAB, clearly believed that it was 
necessary in the public interest to establish a body which was 
independent of the Garda Siochana, and which would act in an 
investigative manner. However, I do not think it is the same as An Garda 
Siochana, which investigates with an aim to prosecuting persons for 
offences. The CAB investigates for the purpose of securing assets which 
have been acquired as a result of criminal activities and indeed 
ultimately paying those assets over [sic] the State”13 
                                                          
10 Walsh, D. (1998) The Irish Police: A legal and Constitutional Perspective, Roundhall, Sweet and 
Maxwell: Dublin at 9. 
11 Criminal Assets Bureau (2011) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2010, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 6.  
12 [1999] IEHC 9. 





In a similar vein the differing approach of the Bureau from normal policing activities 
was explained by the then Chief Bureau Officer in Gilligan v. CAB14 where he 
accepted that: 
“the activities of the Criminal Assets Bureau were unlike normal police 
work where investigations started from the actual commission of a 
crime and a person was charged with that crime only if sufficient 
evidence was assembled against him. The main function of the Criminal 
Assets Bureau was the identification of assets derived from criminal 
activities and in the course of that activity they decided, on the basis of 
past convictions, police intelligence, and other available information 
that a person was a criminal and they moved to seize his assets.”15 
These points serve to highlight again that CAB itself marks a discontinuity from 
traditional policing activities towards a refocusing of existing powers into a dedicated 
high profile unit focused on criminal administration with significant public, political 
and media expectations of success. Whilst this marks a departure, nonetheless, as 
highlighted by Walsh, the Gardaí have always carried out administrative functions as 
part of their normal duties16 in addition to criminal enforcement.  Importantly however 
the discontinuity is concerned with the new makeup of administrative actions.  CAB 
was an extension of a nationwide body with pre-existing moral authority in the 
criminal and administrative fields.  Such moral authority provided an ideal base in 
which to ground CAB and by linking the Bureau to the Gardaí it both avoided the 
necessity of a stand-alone organisation and ensured acceptability by the public at a 
time when fear of crime was at an all-time high.17   
Whilst the activities of CAB complement18 the general work of the Gardaí it (CAB) 
has, as shall be outlined, an entirely different raison d'être.  By focusing on the seizure 
of criminal assets CAB represents a type of panoptican.  It moves away from 
punishment of the soul and indeed from the criminal actor directly to an outputs based 
                                                          
14 [1998] 3 IR 185 
15 Ibid at 203. 
16 Walsh, op cit at 170. 
17 O’Donnell, I and O’Sullivan, E. (2003) ‘The Politics of Intolerance- Irish Style’ 43 British Journal 
of Criminology 41.  
18 Report of the Committee to Review the Offences Against the State Acts, 1939 – 199 and Related 




focus and approach where the success of the Bureau might be judged primarily on 
high profile seizures and income generated19 more than less criminality in society.  In 
this regard the type of pro-active20 measures that CAB was established to employ 
against organised criminality will, where successful, deprive those involved in such 
activities of the pecuniary benefits of their labours.  However, as noted by Kilcommins 
et al, the ‘substitution effect’21 in criminal trades such as the illegal drugs market, due 
to the high profit margin, means that there will be a ready supply of new actors willing 
to replace those who have been successful targeted by an operation of CAB. 
Such operations and measures of success will be considered later in this work.  In 
critiquing the partial move towards new methods of policing we have established that 
CAB is a distinct body, potentially albeit within the structures of An Garda Síochána.  
As noted, it has its own corporate structure with Gardaí and non-garda personnel, 
albeit with the largest number of personnel coming from the ranks of the Gardaí.  It 
retains the moral authority of the Gardaí and the enforcement functions of the Revenue 
Commissioners and Department of Social Protection whilst operating with a very 
specific focus and employing different methods than, for example, in traditional 
criminal law investigations.   
Functions of CAB.  
In having considered the general nature and structure of CAB as a new organisation 
working in the Irish criminal justice field we will now consider the actual specifics of 
the Bureau.  We will commence with the objectives and functions as provided for in 
the enabling legislation.  In the context of the overall research question it is worth 
restating here the actual detail from that legislation. The objectives are set out in 
section 4 as follows:  
                                                          
19 The balance that the Bureau has sought to achieve in its various areas of activity will be considered 
in future chapters.  The annual reports of CAB outline the value in monetary terms achieved by the 
Bureau in their various actions.  
20 On the nature of pro-active policing see: Jansen, F and Bruinsma, G. (1997) ‘Policing Organised 
Crime: A new Direction’ 5(4) European Journal on Criminal Policy and Research 85.  
21 Kilcommins, S. et al, (2004) Crime, Punishment and the Search for Order in Ireland, Institute of 
Public Administration: Dublin at 227 – 228. On the conflict between outputs (for example value of 
seizures) and outcomes (eg lower use of illegal substances) see Levi, M (2003) ‘Criminal Asset - 
Stripping: Confiscating the Proceeds of Crime in England and Wales’ in Edwards, A. and Gill, P. 





(a) the identification of the assets, wherever situated, of persons which 
derive or are suspected to derive, directly or indirectly, from criminal 
activity,  
(b) the taking of appropriate action under the law to deprive or to deny 
those persons of the assets or the benefit of such assets, in whole or in 
part, as may be appropriate, and 
(c) the pursuit of any investigation or the doing of any other preparatory 
work in relation to any proceedings arising from the objectives 
mentioned in paragraphs (a) and (b).22 
Whilst section 5(1) provides that the functions of the Bureau are the taking of all 
necessary actions  
(a) in accordance with Garda functions, for the purposes of, the 
confiscation, restraint of use, freezing, preservation or seizure of assets 
identified as deriving, or suspected to derive, directly or indirectly, from 
criminal activity, 
(b) under the Revenue Acts or any provision of any other enactment, 
whether passed before or after the passing of this Act, which relates to 
revenue, to ensure that the proceeds of criminal activity or suspected 
criminal activity are subjected to tax and that the Revenue Acts, where 
appropriate, are fully applied in relation to such proceeds or activities, 
as the case may be, 
(c) under the Social Welfare Acts for the investigation and 
determination, as appropriate, of any claim for or in respect of benefit 
(within the meaning of section 204 of the Social Welfare 
(Consolidation) Act, 1993 ) by any person engaged in criminal activity, 
and  
                                                          




(d) at the request of the Minister for Social Welfare, to investigate and 
determine, as appropriate, any claim for or in respect of a benefit, within 
the meaning of section 204 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 
1993 , where the Minister for Social Welfare certifies that there are 
reasonable grounds for believing that, in the case of a particular 
investigation, officers of the Minister for Social Welfare may be subject 
to threats or other forms of intimidation,   
and such actions include, where appropriate, subject to any international 
agreement, cooperation with any police force, or any authority, being a 
tax authority or social security authority, of a territory or state other than 
the State.23 
Additionally there is an opportunity for the Minister for Justice and Equality – after 
consultation with the Minister for Finance – to confer additional functions and 
powers24 on either the Bureau itself or Bureau officers.  The rationale for conferring 
such a strong power on the Minister was justified in the following manner:  
“It is important to have this power to ensure that the bureau can respond 
to new situations or circumstances that may emerge in the conduct of 
its operations. Given the nature of the enemy to society with which we 
are dealing, we should equip ourselves with the necessary powers to 
respond speedily and flexibly.”25 
 
Such a provision prima facie gives significant flexibility to an individual Minister for 
Justice to initiate significant changes.  However, the power is not an unfettered one.  
Any such orders made must be laid before each House of the Oireachtas ‘as soon as 
may be’26 after the order is made.  Furthermore within 21 days sitting days after the 
order is put before either House that House can pass a resolution annulling the order.  
This does not affect anything that was previously carried out under the order.27  Thus 
such power allows the relevant Minister to deal with emergency situations where 
                                                          
23 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, s. 5 (1) 
24 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, s. 6(1) 
25 Dáil Debates 25th July 1996, Vol. 468, Col. 1028 per Mr. Quinn. 
26 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996, s. 6(3) 




immediate action may be required.  In a situation of moral panic28 by the public at 
large it is not an opportunity for an individual Minister to affect knee-jerk change 
without the entire legislature as all orders must, ultimately, be laid before both Houses. 
 
In executing the statutory remit of the Bureau as a pro-active agency targeting the 
assets of particular identified suspects the collection of documentation pertaining to 
such suspects was recognised, at formation stage, as a key component of a successful 
outcome for the Bureau.  It was stated that the gathering of such documentation would 
be ‘complex and painstaking’29 so that sufficient evidence could be amassed ‘to 
support administrative proceedings.’30  In order to facilitate such requirements it was 
felt that the bureau ‘should have adequate powers to investigate reasonable suspicions 
of the existence of criminal assets and to uncover financial trails of evidence leading 
to and from those assets.’31  Such powers were proved by section 1432 of the Act.  
 
Under this section an officer of the Bureau who is a member of An Garda Síochána 
may apply to a district court judge for a search warrant.  The important proviso is that 
there is not a requirement that an offence is suspected.  Rather the judge may grant the 
warrant where ‘there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that evidence of or relating 
to assets or proceeds deriving from criminal activities, or to their identity or 
whereabouts, is to be found in any place.’33  Additionally in emergency situations, 
where it is felt impracticable to apply to the judge for such a warrant then a Garda 
Superintendent may issue a 24 hour warrant based on the same reasonable belief as 
just outlined.34  This again awards significant power to the Bureau vis-à-vis traditional 
warrants and the need for an actual offence to be suspected.  There is, of course, again 
the counter-balance that the district court judge, or superintendent, must be reasonably 
satisfied that evidence may exist in the place in question.  Nonetheless this marks a 
                                                          
28 On the nature of moral panic see: Hamilton, C. (2005) ‘Moral Panic Revisited: Part 1’ Irish 
Criminal Law Journal 15(1) 8-12 and Hamilton, C. (2005) ‘Moral Panic Revisited: Part 2’ Irish 
Criminal Law Journal 15(2) 9-14. 
29 Dáil Debates 25th September 1996, Vol. 469, Col. 616 per Mr. Quinn. 
30 Ibid 
31 Seanad Debates 9th October 1996, Vol. 148 Col. 1523 per Mr. Quinn.  
32 Section 14 was first inserted at report stage in the Dáil. 
33 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 s. 14 (1)  
34 Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 s. 14 (2) (3) & (5).  On the ‘tooling up’ of the Irish State 
generally see Kilcommins, S. and Considine, J. (2007) ‘Rethinking the ‘Equality of Arms’ 




further departure for the existing norm and a significant new power exercisable by the 
Bureau.   
  
The functions of the Bureau, as outlined above, again highlight that the aim of 
establishing the Bureau was to engage in pro-active disruptive type activities in order 
to effectively neutralise any benefits accruing from criminal activities in various 
spheres.  Such objectives were enabled by the nature of the staff of the Bureau and its 
resulting interagency approach.   
  
Staffing of CAB and the Multi-Agency Approach.  
 
 As previously alluded to, the staffing requirements of CAB are filled by staff 
seconded from membership of An Garda Síochána, officers from the Revenue 
Commissioners and officials the Department of Social Protection.  The 2016 annual 
report of the Bureau informs that the total authorised staffing level of the Bureau, as 
at 31st December of that year was 71.35  This is comprised of 36 Gardaí Bureau officers, 
12 Revenue Bureau officers and 6 officers from the Department of social protection.36  
In addition to this compliment the Chief State Solicitor assigns two solicitors, two 
legal executives and two clerical officers.37  In the current context it is worthy of note 
that the individual powers and functions of Bureau officers are those that the person 
obtained by virtue of being a member of the Gardaí, or an officer of the Revenue 
Commissioners or an official of the Department of Social Protection.  That is a Bureau 
officer continues to have all the powers and duties that they held in their respective, 
pre-secondment, positions.  Individual Bureau officers do not receive extra powers by 
virtue of being appointed to the Bureau.38 
 
This approach again supports the overall objectives of establishing a new agency.  
These objectives to be achieved by the focused implementation of new legislation, to 
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be considered shortly, and, as alluded to above, the multi-nature agency of its 
composition targeting the assets of particular individuals using these new and pre-
existing powers in a different manner than hit heretofore.  This was the first time that 
such bodies were required to co-operate in the stated ‘mutually supportive manner.’  
The grounding theory underpinning such an approach was to support and allow the 
three separate organisations ‘transcend old bureaucratic territoriality and displace it 
with a single minded cross agency co-operation at the highest level.’39  In brief the 
Bureau was designed ‘to produce a more effective weapon to combat organised 
crime.’40  By combining elements form the three existing bodies it was possible for 
the combined whole to be a more significant player in the structured fight against 
organised crime than the separate components operating individually.  As, for 
example, prior to the establishment of the Bureau the Revenue Commissioners had 
felt that there was ‘legal constraints’41 on the manner in which they could share 
amassed information with the Gardaí.  
  
Furthermore, were the supporting legislation for CAB to have been implemented 
without the establishment of the Bureau then there could potentially have been a lack 
of specific focus on that particular piece of legislation in the myriad of general laws to 
be enforced.  The establishment of the Bureau gave a unique and particular focus to 
targeting the proceeds of crime, moreover with demonstrable – or lack thereof – 
outputs which could easily be assessed.42  Such developments mark a departure from 
rehabilitation and normalisation ideals to a threat neutralisation system.  Such an 
approach with resultant high profile seizures does, to an extent at least, satisfy the 
public and media demands that something is being done about the issue of crime 
control in Ireland.43  Indeed there may be an element of quid pro quo about such an 
                                                          
39 Seanad Debates 9th Oct 1996, vol. 148, Col 1528 per Mr Roche.  
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41 Seanad Debates 9th Oct 1996, vol. 148, Col 1570 per Mr Quinn. 
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approach in that the annual reports of CAB regularly acknowledge the ‘excellent co-
operation and support from the general public and from commercial and financial 
institutions.’44  In addition to demonstrable outputs the establishment of the Bureau 
seems to have created a heighten sense of awareness of the potential weaponry 
available to the State to seize assets tainted with criminality.  Finally the annual reports 
highlight the success of the multi-agency multi-disciplinary partnership approach 
embodied by the Bureau in tacking organised crime in Ireland and acknowledge that 
the model chosen at inception has proven effective and fruitful.45  
Anonymity of CAB officers.  
 
A direct consequence of the decision to establish the Bureau on a multi-agency footing 
was that ordinary civilians from the ranks of the Revenue Commissioners and the 
Department of Social Protection would, at an administrative level, be investigating 
targeting individuals suspected of being involved in serious organised criminality.  
The safety of such individuals seconded to such roles was a concern to the legislators 
at the pre-establishment phase.  In the Houses of the Oireachtas examples were offered 
of intimidation that had occurred against State officials whilst attempting to carry out 
their official duties.  In the Dáil it was recorded that an officer from the then 
Department of Social and Family Affairs was ‘kidnapped from his home, brought to a 
railway track, shot in both legs and left to die.’46  Whilst in the Seanad an example 
was given of a Revenue investigation that had ceased as a result of ‘an intolerable level 
of intimidation.’47  As a result there was an acceptance that it would be ‘unfair and 
unrealistic’48 to expect non-gardaí officials of the Bureau to engage with potentially 
dangerous individuals without an extra layer of protection from the State.  That 
protection was outlined by Minister Quinn where he stated:  
                                                          
“While maintaining a focus on major criminal targets, the Bureau still continues its policy of also 
targeting lower value assets. It is the Bureau’s view that this policy, while not necessarily returning a 
significant income to the State, does engender public confidence in the criminal justice system as a 
whole and acts as a deterrent in general. The Bureau proposes to continue to effect such an approach 
and deliver active support to local communities.” Supra n.11 at 11.  
44 Supra n.11 at 6.  
45 Supra n.11 at 3.  
46 Dáil Debates 25th  July 1996, Vol. 468, Col. 1033  per Mr McCreevy. 
47 Seanad Debates 26th July1996, vol. 148, Col 1359 per Mr Mulcahy. 




“We cannot expect them to be heroes on behalf of the State.  That is not 
fair.  It is not reasonable or practicable.  One protection we can give 
them is anonymity, and it is essential.’49  
 
Thus anonymity for non-garda personnel is provided for by section 10 of the 
establishing Act.50  In particular it requires that all reasonable care must be taken to 
ensure that the identity of such personnel and staff of the Bureau is not revealed.51  In 
a situation where such personnel would normally be required to identify themselves 
(for example under relevant Revenue or Social Welfare legislation) that requirement 
is effectively waived in respect of the personal details of the individual.   Instead the 
individual in question shall be accompanied by a Garda member of the Bureau who 
shall, upon request, identify themselves as a member of the Gardaí and state that they 
are accompanied by a Bureau officer.52  Additionally where a non-garda bureau officer 
acts in writing this is done in the name of the Bureau as opposed to that of the 
individual officer53 – which would be the normally be the case.   
 
The anonymity provision also extends, in certain circumstances, to court or other 
proceedings.  If an officer is required to give evidence during such proceedings the 
Chief Bureau Officer may apply to the court to preserve the anonymity of that 
individual.  Such a request may be allowed where the court is satisfied that there are 
reasonable grounds in the public interest to grant the application.54  In circumstances 
where the order is granted it may extend to restricting the circulation of affidavits or 
certificates, deleting the name of the person in question from such documentation or 
allowing that persons evidence to be given out of sight of any person.55 
 
To date this chapter has been considering the nature of CAB and its composition in 
order to fully develop its uniqueness as a new model of approach to criminal justice 
in Ireland.  Whilst other provision of the legislation as outlined will be pertinent to the 
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activities of the Bureau to be considering in the remainder of this work the anonymity 
provisions mark a specific departure from the norm thus worthy of individual 
consideration at this juncture.   
 
It is a constitutional requirement that ‘save in special and limited cases’ justice shall 
be administered in public.56  Such special and limited cases may be provided for by 
the legislature and their reasons behind so providing in the Criminal Assets Bureau 
Act were outlined at the commencement of this section.  However such provisions 
arguably place considerable power in the hands of anonymous individuals.  Such 
concerns are counter-balanced by the fact that the provisions do not apply to Garda 
personnel.  Further there is a requirement to apply to the court for any such anonymity 
and significantly the actions of a Bureau officer are not determinative in themselves.  
The provisions of section 10 above have been considered by the courts in a number of 
instances, two of which are of immediate interest.  
 
The first such case is Criminal Assets Bureau v. PMcS,57 which concerned an 
application, by the Chief Bureau Officer, for anonymity for two officials who had 
signed documents in the name of the Bureau.  He offered both general and specific 
reasons as to why the request should be granted.  From the perspective of both the 
current and potential both future bureau staff and investigations he stated:  
“that it was his belief that in the event of the identity of the two officers 
becoming known, it would hinder the work of the Bureau in the general 
sense that other enquiries would be affected if the people in question 
were known. He said it would be difficult to get a suitable applicants 
[sic] to come and work in the Bureau if their identity was not 
protected.”58 
 
In terms of the specific case at hand as the defendant was suspected of being involved 
in the drugs trade the Chief Bureau officer felt that this was ‘an activity which by its 
very nature was likely to pose safety and security risks to Bureau officials if their 
identity became known, although he was not aware of any specific threats in the instant 
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case.’59 His beliefs in this regard were based on information received from drug squad 
officers based in the region in question and from investigations carried out by the 
Bureau since 1996.60 
 
In reaching a decision on the matter Kearns, J. based his ruling on the general ground 
rather than any specific threat from the individual involved in this case.  In particular 
he stated that the ‘efficient functioning’61 of the Bureau’s activities required 
anonymity.  In the circumstances at hand he felt it unnecessary to rely on the specific 
information pertaining to the defendant.  However he did state that as the objectives 
of the Bureau related to suspected criminal activity then hearsay evidence would be 
admissible in establishing reasonable grounds in the public interest were no evidence 
to the contrary was provided.62  This would appear to establish a very wide test where 
applications for grants of anonymity could be based on a general efficient running of 
the Bureau basis as opposed to any specific individual threat to an officer.  Even if 
such a wide test was not satisfied the learned judge did provided for that a defendants 
suspected involvement in criminal activity (prima facia in the absence of specific 
threat) would likely suffice for a successful granting of a request for anonymity.63  He 
held that the provisions of section 10 (7) – discussed above – ‘merely provide an 
additional measure of protection of bureau officers.’64  It would thus appear that where 
a request for anonymity is made it is almost certain to succeed.  Such measures of 
protection are of course understandable when civilians are dealing with those involved 
in serious organised criminality.  However were the Bureau to target other lower level 
suspected criminal activities65 then this might be viewed as an overly strong stance in 
favour of the State and against the individual.   
 
The anonymity provisions also passed constitutional muster in Criminal Assets Bureau 
v. PS66  where the court re-affirmed that there is no constitutional bar to granting 
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anonymity in special and limited cases.  In this particular case the application for 
anonymity was based on specific grounds.  The Chief Bureau Officer was of the 
opinion that as the defendant was suspected of being involved in organised crime and, 
thereby, were he to discover the identity of the bureau officer in question there was a 
risk he would inform others, involved in that trade, of the information.  The trial judge 
stated that intimidation of witnesses was one of the traits of organised crime and 
assented to the application on the basis that there was reasonable grounds in the public 
interest to grant anonymity. Further, he went on to clarify the constitutional basis of 
the provision on the general ground by stating that:  
 
“I am satisfied that the provisions of s. 10 of the Act of 1996 operate in 
special and limited cases within the meaning of the Constitution. There 
is the safeguard of the provisions of s. 10(7) of the Act of 1996 that the 
judge must be satisfied that there were reasonable grounds in the public 
interest before granting anonymity. It is conceivable that in a particular 
case the grant of anonymity might work an injustice: however the fact 
that the operation of the section might work an injustice does not render 
the provision unconstitutional and a defendant has the safeguard that in 
the event that the operation of the section worked an injustice then the 
operation of the section, although not the section itself, would be 
unconstitutional. The court in considering the constitutionality of a 
statutory provision will assume that the same will be operated in a 
constitutional manner.” 67 
 
Thereby it would appear that where the Chief Bureau officer requests a granting of 
anonymity for a Bureau officer on either the general ground of efficient and effective 
running of the Bureau, or on specific grounds pertaining to the circumstances of a 
particular defendant then it is most likely that the order of anonymity will be granted.  
Finally in terms of anonymity, it is an offence to identify non-garda personnel of the 
Bureau or to publish, or cause to be published, the names and addresses of either 
current or former non-garda personnel of the Bureau.68  It is also an offence to threaten, 
intimidate, menace, assault or attempt to assault any level of Bureau staff member or 
any person of that member’s family.69  These latter offences however do not give carte 
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blanche unfettered power to the Bureau as no charge in these areas can be progressed 
without the consent of the Director of Public Prosecutions.  
Funding of the Bureau.  
 
To date this chapter has made numerous references to the multi-agency approach of 
CAB.  Furthermore it has been noted that this new body would be pro-active, targeting 
certain individuals and chasing the paper trail of assets suspected to derive from 
criminal activities.  This leads to the question of how should the Bureau be funded and 
moreover given its narrow and specific remit – compared to general law enforcement 
by the Garda Síochána– should it be self-financing.  As outlined in the previous 
chapter the tipping point for the initial establishment of the bureau was the murders of 
Detective Gerry McCabe and journalist Veronica Guerin.  In the desire to regain the 
public trust at the time and prove that criminal justice problems were not spiraling out 
of control it would have undoubtedly been popular to provide that assets seized from 
‘overlords’70 and ‘drug barons’71 would be used to fund the bureau.   
 
Furthermore there was indeed reflected and detached independent support for such a 
system of funding.  The Select Committee on Crime, Lawlessness and Vandalism had 
previously recommended that were an agency established to examine and trace assets 
of suspected drug dealers (this envisaged agency effectively became CAB) then that 
body should be funded from the proceeds of confiscation orders.72  Additionally, as 
also previously outlined one of the causal factors contributing to the establishment of 
CAB was the experience and success of asset forfeiture in the United States of 
America.  In that jurisdiction both state and federal law permit law enforcement 
agencies to share directly in profits obtained as a result of civil forfeiture.73  This so 
called ‘equitable sharing’74 could, conceivable, incentivise the seizure of assets over 
and above the equitable enforcement of law.  In Ireland under the model being 
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developed the seizure of assets would not be carried out by the police body of the State 
per se, rather through a corporate body of which certain members of the police force 
were to be a constituent part.  Nonetheless once the bureau was established it would 
be a law enforcement agency with significant potential revenue generating powers and 
the temptation ‘to displace concerns of justice with those of revenue flows’75 could 
not be entirely eliminated.   
 
In establishing CAB the Irish legislature took the safer and indeed the preferable route.  
Section 19 of the establishing Act76 allows the Oireachtas to make available monies 
for the purpose of expenditure by the Bureau in the performance of its functions.  The 
amount, or continued provision of the funding, is not dependent on any monies accrued 
by the bureau in pursuit of its statutory remit.  Seven years after the establishment of 
the Bureau the funding issue was again raised.  It was suggested by opposition deputies 
in the Dáil that returns from confiscation of assets should ‘not go into the Exchequer 
and get washed away but [be] specifically ring fenced for those communities who have 
suffered the most at the hands of the drug barons.’77  However the government of the 
day rejected such suggestions78 and continued with the model where the Bureau is 
funded independently of any income generated and that income is ultimately paid to 
the exchequer.   
 
Notwithstanding such an approach, given the high profile nature of the bureau it would 
appear that monetary issues play a role in maintaining the acceptability of the Bureau 
as a unique style law enforcement agency. In its 2010 Annual Report the Bureau 
highlighted that revenue generation is not a key concern for the bureau.  It stated that 
the economic downturn will cause a reduction in the income generated by it actions, 
however ‘the ultimate outcome of the Bureau’s actions remain the same vis-à-vis the 
criminal targeted, namely that any interest they may have held in the proceeds of crime 
is eliminated. This is the primary function of the Bureau.’79 
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Revenue and Social Welfare Matters.  
Whilst much of the focus on CAB is centred on the confiscation elements of its work, 
the rationale for outlining section 5 above in full detail was that CAB also has 
significant Revenue and Social Welfare powers.  Section 5 of the establishing Act 
enhances that ability to apply the tax codes not only to proceeds of criminal activity 
but also to proceeds of suspected criminal activity.80   
As outlined by virtue of being seconded a CAB an officer retains the powers and duties 
that they held in their respective pre-exiting roles and use those to carry out CAB 
functions.  It has been noted that in comparison to the normal Revenue authorities 
CAB has extraordinary powers.81  This is due to the fact that in a normal revenue 
investigation officers would be required to identify themselves whereas with a CAB 
investigation, as outlined, there is no such requirement and all non-garda officers are 
covered by the above anonymity provisions.82  Additionally Bureau officers may 
impart information to other Bureau officers and indeed to the Revenue 
Commissioners.83  In a situation where were officers to fail to so do it has been stated 
in Criminal Assets Bureau v Craft84 that they would be in dereliction of their duty.  
This exchange of information is both a key change in the workings of the Revenue 
Commissioners and a key facilitator in CAB investigations.  In this respect Donnelly 
and Walsh note that ‘[c]ommunication and the exchange of information between 
Revenue and CAB … is an essential precursor to the investigations conducted by 
CAB.’85  Finally the overall Revenue powers of CAB are significant in that that their 
remit is not limited to assessments based on property believed to be the proceeds of 
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crime.86  In AS v. Criminal Assets Bureau87 it has held that an assessment need not 
relate to proceeds of crime where the assessment is based on criminal activity. 
A further important element of the functions set out in section 5 above88 related to the 
ability of CAB to investigate welfare claims by persons involved in criminality and to 
seek the return of any monies so acquired.  An important distinction between the 
revenue powers and the welfare powers of CAB however is that 5(1)(b) above dealing 
with revenue powers specifically mentions “suspected” activity whereas the welfare 
section (5(1)(c)) does not use the word “suspected.”  In McGinley v. Deciding Officer 
Criminal Assets Bureau89 it was held that the absence of the word “suspected” from 
the relevant paragraph clearly indicated that that part of the section was not intended 
to apply to persons merely suspected of criminal activity.  Nonetheless as with Garda 
members and Revenue members any members seconded from the Department of 
Social Protection retain all their existing powers and may carry them out in the name 
of the Bureau and for the Bureau’s benefit.  These include the power to enter any 
premises, at a reasonable time, without notice to make any enquires to ensure 
compliance with relevant welfare legislation.90 
In the context of establishing the altered approach to criminal justice that CAB moved 
Ireland towards it was necessary to consider how that agency differed from what exist 
heretofore.  In considering the main elements of the establishing legislation it was 
possible to provide an overview of the agency that is central to this thesis and moreover 
to highlight and consider the main changes introduced by the Act.  Whilst 
consideration will be given in due course to the combined implications of such changes 
we will first outline the primary tools that are part of the armoury of the Bureau as a 
result of a significant piece of legislation – namely the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, 
as amended. The immediately following chapter will consider the application of 
confiscation, by CAB, under this later Act and various challenges to the legislation 
and whether it should rightly be considered in the criminal or civil realm.  In this 
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section we will now outline the primary options available under the Act which are key 
facilitation tools in the fulfilment of CAB’s statutory remit.  When CAB and the 
Proceeds of Crime Act are considered in unison they represent, it has been suggested, 
‘Ireland’s adaption to the phenomenon of organised and global crime.’91  Indeed the 
same authors go on to state:  
“This model of policing that inspires CAB is different from the typical 
methods of reactive enforcement where police are called to a crime 
scene, and gather evidence with the aim of detecting, prosecuting and 
convicting a guilty party.  CAB represents a form of proactive policing 
more often used by commercial security entities, intended to 
permanently disable the capacity of designated persons to participate in 
criminal enterprises.  This technique of disruption may be the equivalent 
of the incapacitation paradigm within the ‘new penology’ through 
which crime is reduced without altering the behavioural tendencies of 
individuals to any great extent.”92 
 
At the time of creation of the Bureau and enactment of the original Proceeds of 
Crime Act there were suggestions that the measures were necessary in order to 
protect democracy.93  Additionally it was offered that the innocent would have 
nothing to fear from such tough measures.94  The espousal of such an approach 
highlights the dichotomy between “us” and “them” in modern political 
ideologies.  Furthermore it accentuates the notion that the (respectable) 
majority must be protected at all costs, including the erosion of liberties, against 
the “other” vicious criminal.  The approach subsequent taken by CAB has been 
deemed ‘moral policing’95 that guards between the ordinary decent citizen and 
the criminal “other.” 
The Proceeds of Crime Act.  
 
Taken together the establishment of CAB and the Proceeds of Crime Act reflect the 
employing of new and existing methods in a different arena to target specific 
criminality.  However, they may also operate without some of the procedural 
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safeguards operating in the traditional model of justice.  The Proceeds of Crime 
legislation is concerned with property that constitutes, either directly or indirectly, 
the proceeds of crime.  Importantly there is no necessity for an individual to be 
convicted of an offence prior to CAB taking action under the legislation.  This is 
because of the fact that the Proceeds of Crime Act operates in the civil sphere – the 
aforementioned different arena.  Specifically the Act allows for the making of an 
order against property deemed to be the proceeds of crime, essentially any property 
obtained as a result of or in connection with the commission of an offence.96 
 
The phrase ‘proceeds of crime’ has been given a wide literal interpretation by the 
courts.  In particular is has been held that the act applies to proceeds of crimes that 
were committed prior to the act coming into force.97  In the same vein there is no 
requirement that particular proceeds be related to a particular crime.  It was stated 
that such a requirement would make the act ‘useless and unworkable.’98  This is 
predicated on the fact that the legislation specifically does not use a definite or 
indefinite article prior to the word ‘crime’ in ‘proceeds of crime.’  Such drafting was 
seen to indicate an intention on behalf of the legislature that the act should apply in 
the absence of a nexus between individual proceeds and a particular crime.99   
Orders under the Proceeds of Crime Act.  
 
Under the legislation CAB may apply to the High Court to impose confiscation or 
forfeiture orders on the assets of an individual.   In particular under section 2 any 
application may be made for an interim order which prohibits the respondent, or 
another specified person, from disposing of or dealing with property that is worth at 
least €5,000100 for 21 days.  In order to ensure that assets cannot be dissipated in 
advance of an order the order may be issued on an ex-parte basis where the court is 
satisfied that an individual is in possession or control of property which either 
constitutes the proceeds of crime or was acquired with or in connection with such 
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proceeds.101  The nature of such orders was accepted to be onerous but nonetheless 
justifiable in the context of the remit of the Act in FMck v. D.S., S.T. and B.H. Ltd. 
where it was ruled that: 
“The nature of such orders is undoubtedly onerous.  It will be made 
without giving the defendant an opportunity to be heard. The 
jurisdiction to make such an order without notice is undoubtedly 
justified by reference to the risk that may well arise in such cases that 
assets which may be the proceeds of crime might disappear prior to the 
hearing of an application on notice.”102 
 
The only balancing right is that a notice of any such order granted must be given to 
the respondent or any other person who appears to be affect by it.103  This does not, 
however, swing the balance back to the respondent as the Act introduces a reversal 
of the traditional onus on the respondent.  Any such respondent – or indeed any 
person claiming ownership of the property that is subject to an interim order – may 
apply to the court to have the order discharged or varied on the grounds that the 
property is not the proceeds of crime or that the value is actually less than the required 
€5,000.104  Importantly before the granting of any such application the court must be 
satisfied that the property concerned – or part of it – does not represent the proceeds 
of crime.  Whilst this does place an onus on the respondent as noted prior to the 
granting of the original interim order the court must be satisfied that the property 
represents the proceeds of crime.  There is a requirement that there must be sufficient 
objective evidence to support the application.105  The act does allow for opinion 
evidence of a member of An Garda Síochána not below the rank of Chief 
Superintendent or an authorised officer of the Revenue Commissioners. However 
such evidence alone may not lead the court to be satisfied.106 
 
Where an interim order is granted it will lapse after 21 days unless an application for 
an interlocutory order is made under section 3107 of the Act.  A section 3 interlocutory 
order operates under similar requirements as a section 2 order save that there is no 
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discretionary element available to the court.  Additionally where the court may grant 
a section 2 interim order where it is ‘satisfied’ that the property constitutes directly 
or indirectly the proceeds of crime for a section 3 interlocutory order it may be 
granted if “appears to the court” to be such property.  This establishes a lower 
standard than that required for an interim order. The distinction would appear to be 
based on the fact that a section 3 application is done with notice to the respondent.  
Where the requirements for a section 3 interlocutory order are met then the court must 
make the order unless the respondent refutes the contention that the property 
represents the proceeds of crime or if the court is satisfied that there would be a 
serious risk of injustice.  The effect of an interlocutory order is to prohibit the 
disposing, dealing with or diminishing the value of the property concerned.108 
   
In terms of such orders a section 3 order has been ruled not to be an interlocutory 
order as one would be normally be defined due to the fact that proceedings for a later 
disposal order is not the trial of the action.  An interlocutory order under this Act is 
deemed to be a substantive remedy as it is a free standing measure which is not 
ancillary to a later disposal order.109  In effect an interlocutory hearing in this instance 
constitutes the actual trial of the issue.110  A further significant power available to 
CAB under the Act is the ability during either a section 2 order or section 3 order to 
apply to the court to compel the respondent to file an affidavit specifying all property 
in his control or possession and all sources of income.111  
 
The interim and interlocutory orders are key tools in achieving the ultimate aim of 
permanent confiscation of property which is the proceeds of crime.112  That aim is 
achieved through section 4 of the Act which originally provided for the making of a 
disposal order by the court where an interlocutory order had been in place for a period 
of not less than seven years.  Such an order may now be made after a shorter period 
provided that the application for same is made with the consent of all parties.113  
                                                          
108 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, s.3 (1). 
109 McK v AF and JF [2002] 1 IR 242 at 256 – 257.  
110 McK v. FC and McK v MJG [2001] 4 IR 521 at 523.  
111 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, section (9).  
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Where a disposal order is made the respondent is permanently deprived of all right in 
the property114 and the property may be sold or disposed of with any financial return 
to be paid to the exchequer.115  Any person claiming rightful ownership of the 
property has a right to heard and show cause why the property should not be the 
subject of a disposal order.116  Further the court will not grant the order where there 
is a serious risk of injustice.117  In cognisance of the possibility of detrimental effects 
from such orders the courts have clarified the rights of respondents.   
 
In Murphy v. GM, PB, pc Ltd118 the court held that whilst the structure of section 4 
does not provided for a rehearing of the grounds on which the interlocutory order was 
made that does not mean that a respondent ‘is precluded from presenting to the Court 
such evidence as may be relevant.’119  Additionally, in that case, the respondent had 
argued that seven years was an excessive delay between an interlocutory order and a 
disposal order in which to wait for an opportunity to assert his rights.  The court 
clarified that this was not the position and that the respondent could have taken action 
at any time.  As noted by O’Higgins, J:  
“In fact, the seven year period is intended to be in ease of the 
Respondents. It provides a period of a full seven years in which the 
Respondent can seek to demonstrate that the assets frozen are not the 
proceeds of crime, or that it would be otherwise unjust to continue the 
Section 3 Order. That is the only case they can make on an application 
for a Disposal Order under Section 4. They are not deprived or prevented 
or delayed from making their case because it is open to them, any time 
after the Section 3 Order is made, to make the same case that they could 
make on the Disposal Order.  
The contention of the Respondent is based on the misconception as to 
the structure of the Act, as explained. The misconception is that the 
hearing under Section 4 will be akin to the usual form of trial in a civil 
action. However, the structure of the Act, as has been pointed out, is 
different.”120 
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Where a respondent is successful in his application to prevent an order then section 
16 provides that he is entitled to compensation.  It has been suggested that the level 
of protection offer by this section is actually greater than that normally associated 
with an undertaking to damages in mareva injunctions.121 
 
In addition to these orders the power of the State in the fight against organised 
criminality was further strengthened by the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 
2005.  This provides, inter alia, that property shall include property that is situated 
outside the State where the respondent is domiciled, resident or present in Ireland or 
where any part of the criminal conduct occurs within the State.  Further criminal 
conduct is now deemed to include any conduct which occurred outside Ireland which 
would be an offence if it occurred within Ireland, if it was an offence under the law 
of the state concerned, and if, at the time an application for an order is made, any 
property obtained or received in connection with the conduct is situated in Ireland.122  
This amendment effectively reverses the decision in McK v. D123 which had 
concluded that the original Act only had effect within the State.  A further change 
was introduced by the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2016.  This provides for 
administrative seizure and detention where if a bureau officer has reasonable grounds 
to do so he may seize non land assets for 24 hours.124  Further if the Chief Bureau 
officer is satisfied that that there is reasonable grounds for suspecting that the asset 
may be the proceeds of crime, that the bureau is investigating whether it has the 
grounds to apply for a court order and he has reasonable grounds to believe that the 
asset may be disposed of or reduced somehow in value then he may extend the 
detention of the asset for a further 21 days.  This new power may offer considerable 
practical value to the bureau in its future endeavours.  Any individual affected by 
such a seizure of assets does have the right to apply to the High Court to revoke or 
vary the decision of the Chief Bureau Officer.125  In the event that an order is not 
                                                          
121 Supra n.40 at 154.  
122 Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act 2005, s. 3. 
123 [2004] 2 IR 470 
124 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, s. 1(a) as amended. 




ultimately obtained against the asset the affected owner has the right to apply for 
compensation.126      
 
It is clear that the changes introduced by the Proceeds of Crime Acts marked a new 
departure for the Irish criminal justice system.  Prior to concluding it is worth 
considering, firstly, how the legislation differs vis-à-vis the powers available under 
the Criminal Justice Act 1994 that were outlined in the previous chapter.  Secondly 
the manner in which the courts have accepted, in a general sense, the new approach 
to criminal justice. 
 
The primary difference between the Criminal Justice Act of 1994 and the Proceeds 
of Crime legislation is that the former required a conviction prior to operation and 
proceedings arise from a criminal conviction whilst the later operates in the civil 
realm in the absence of any conviction.  All that is now required is that the court be 
satisfied, on a civil balance of probabilities scale, that particular property constitutes 
the proceeds of crime in order for a forfeiture procedure to commence.  Additionally 
whilst the 1994 Act operated in personam the 1996 Act operates against property, or 
as an in rem procedure.  Where a respondent is subject to an application under both 
Acts then the 1994 effectively takes precedence.127   
 
However in different circumstances it is possible for CAB to take concurrent actions.  
In CAB v. Kelly128 the respondent claimed that he was unable to make a tax return 
under CAB’s assessment as his monies were subject to an interim order under section 
2 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996.  The court rejected such claims on the basis 
that section 6 of that Act129 allowed for “necessary expenses” which could include a 
tax assessment.  Thus it would appear that the imposition of an order under the 996 
Act does not preclude CAB taking other action or exclude respondents from making 
tax returns.   
 
                                                          
126 Proceeds of Crime Act 1996, s. 1(c) as amended.  The introduction of these new powers and the 
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At this juncture it is worth recording the responses, of a general nature, of the Irish 
Courts to this new model of justice.  The views of McGuinness J in Gilligan v. 
Criminal Assets Bureau130 are worth outlining in some detail.  She stated that the 
legislature was justified in restricting certain rights under Proceeds of Crime Act and 
that there was a certain amount of balance achieved by the safeguards in the 
legislation.131  Further, based on evidence from senior members of the Gardaí she 
accepted that there now existed: 
 
  “an entirely new type of professional criminal who organises, rather than 
commits, crime and who thereby renders himself virtually immune to the 
ordinary procedures of criminal investigation and prosecution. Such 
persons are able to operate a reign of terror so as to effectively prevent the 
passing on of information to the gardaí. At the same time their obvious 
wealth and power causes them to be respected by lesser criminals or would 
be criminals.  
It emerged during the cross-examination of these witnesses by counsel for 
the plaintiff that the number of such leading criminals is small by 
international standards and that the sums of money involved in their 
operations are very much smaller than similar sums in such jurisdictions as 
the United Kingdom, Holland and the United States. I would accept that 
certain elements of the media, both written and broadcast, tend to 
exaggerate the comparative level of this and other types of crime in this 
country and to create in regard to crime an undesirable form of hysteria 
which has its own dangers. Nevertheless, in the context of a relatively small 
community, the operations carried out by major criminals have a serious 
and worsening effect. This is particularly so in regard to their importation 
and distribution of illegal drugs, which in its turn leads to a striking increase 
in lesser crimes carried out by addicts seeking to finance their addiction. 
In theory this type of threat to public order and the community at large may 
seem less serious than the threat posed to this State by the operation of 
politically motivated illegal organisations. In practice major and minor 
drug-related crime is probably perceived by ordinary members of the 
community as more threatening and more likely to affect the everyday lives 
of themselves and their children.”132 
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It is interesting that in clarifying the position the learned justice acknowledged 
the difficulty in apprehending modern sophisticated criminals who are able to 
operate many levels distant from the actual commission of offence and the 
problems that can arise as a result of moral panic.  Further the court’s acceptance 
of the legislation would seem to be ground in an acceptance that it is a 
proportional response to the challenges that modern Irish society faces,133 and, 
media exaggerations accepted, the increasing levels of crime at various different 
strata of Irish society.   Indeed a similar approach was espoused by Moriarty J. 
in an earlier case where he stated: 
 
“It seems to me that I am clearly entitled to take notice of the 
international phenomenon, far from peculiar to Ireland, that significant 
numbers of persons who engage as principals in lucrative professional 
crime, particularly that referable to the illicit supply of controlled drugs, 
are alert and effectively able to insulate themselves against the risk of 
successful criminal prosecution through deployment of intermediaries, 
and that the Act of 1996 is designed to enable the lower probative 
requirements of civil law to be utilised in appropriate cases, not to 
achieve penal sanctions, but to effectively deprive such persons of such 
illicit financial fruits of their labours as can be shown to be proceeds of 
crime.”134 
 
Thus the enactment of the Proceeds of Crime Act marked a significant departure 
from the tools available to the State heretofore.  The ability to permanently 
confiscate assets in the absence of any criminal conviction and the reversal of 
the onus of innocence to the respondent marks a significant ‘tooling up’ by the 
Irish State.  It gives to CAB135 significant new powers not traditionally available 
to law enforcement agencies prior to its establishment.   
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It is asserted that the nature of law enforcement and criminal justice in Ireland has, in 
part, moved to a new space.  The establishment of CAB is the key facilitator in that 
move and key representative of the power of the State in that space.  CAB has been 
conferred with considerable powers in the areas of asset forfeiture, revenue 
compliance and social welfare claims.  A triple-pronged opportunity, such as this, to 
target, where necessary, single issues is central to the ability of the bureau to succeed 
in its remit.   
 
 In that regard the rationale of this chapter was to consider the actual legislative 
underpinnings of CAB and the powers available to the bureau under the Proceeds of 
Crime Act.  Such consideration allowed for an examination of the main changes that 
occurred and the significant departures from the pre-existing model.  As CAB was a 
creation of statue it was essential to view both that statute itself and the expressed 
views of the legislature – accepting that the proposing bills had exceptionally short 
gestation periods.  In particular consideration was given to the establishment of a new 
agency as opposed to extending the powers of the Gardaí.  This approach was based 
on an underlying current of concern towards a crisis of hegemony in the criminal 
justice system.  The expressed belief was that a task orientated agency was the only 
option to solve such a crisis. 
 
In turn it was outlined that the bureau was multi-agency in nature with staff from the 
three aforementioned bodies and in turn would target specified areas from the remit of 
the Revenue Commissioners and Department of Social Protection and the confiscation 
of assets suspected to derive from criminal activity.  This again was a significant 
departure for Irish law enforcement as traditionally such bodies would not have 
considered working in unison.  Such unison however, allows target application of 
relevant legislation at equally targeted issues.  In essence a movement towards pro-





Yet further departures were highlighted by the specific provision of anonymity 
protection for non-garda officers of CAB.  Whilst such protection is understandably 
necessary in certain situations, it nonetheless grants to seconded revenue and social 
welfare officers a protection not available in their previous roles.  As such it marked 
an additional ‘tooling up’ by the Irish State in the fight against organised criminality.   
In highlighting such departures it was necessary to examine how this new law 
enforcement agency should be funded.  As unlike any of its three constituent parts, 
CAB has a specific and relatively narrow remit consideration was given to whether 
the bureau should ultimately aim to be self-funding and self-rewarding.  This was a 
departure that the Irish State did not take and any income accrued by CAB ultimately 
goes to the central fund of the Irish exchequer.  Whilst in some respects it might have 
been opportune to allow CAB to have been self-funding this could only serve to raise 
concerns about the rationale behind the targeting of specified assets of high net worth.  
The current situation of being funded by the State and all income going to the 
exchequer seems to assist in maintaining of popular public support for the bureau. 
 
This chapter finally outlined the various types of orders that are available to CAB 
under the Proceeds of Crime Act.  Whilst the application of these orders and the 
activities of CAB will now be considered in the future chapters, it was essential to 
consider the actual types of order at this juncture.  This was to facilitate a critique of 





























The historical underpinnings and casual factors leading to the establishment of CAB 
have been documented in the earlier chapters of this thesis.  It will be recalled that 
there was a felt societal need to establish mechanisms to target and defeat organised 
criminality which, it was claimed, was beyond the ordinary operational procedures 
and traditional tools of the criminal justice system then in operation.  The entire focus 
of such concerns was directed towards the ‘overlords’ and ‘kingpins’ of crime and 
indeed in the early years of CABs establishment that was its primary focus.1 
However the bureau is now operating at a much wider level and is targeting many and 
varied elements of criminal activity.  In so doing it has both established itself as a key 
player in Irish law enforcement and has been given continuing support from a public 
who were faced with a crisis of hegemony and aspects of moral panic in the immediate 
period preceding the establishment of CAB. There are various examples of the wide 
approach taken by the bureau in its evolutionary expansion into territory which was 
traditional the exclusive domain of An Garda Síochána.   It does this whilst being ever 
cognisant of its own and the latter’s remit2 and, moreover, as a result of challenges to 
its authority has had its operational boundaries clarified and approved by the courts.  
It is that operational approach that is the primary focus of this particular chapter.  
The general nature of the criminal/civil dichotomy, the historical approach to 
forfeiture in Ireland and the nature of both CAB – as an instrument of statute – and the 
main features of the proceeds of crime legislation (as a key tool in CAB’s approach) 
have all been dually considered at this juncture.   This chapter will now depart from 
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the approach in those chapters heretofore and will apply the operational workings of 
CAB to that presented theory.   As such it will adopt a more operational and procedural 
based approach.  A structure such as this allows us to fully address the socio-legal 
applications of the overall research question under consideration – namely, how CAB 
has, in part, moved Ireland to a new model of criminal justice.  This model, it will be 
submitted, reflects a society that is both adopting to the reality of a changed landscape 
and grappling with dexterity, mobility and evasive tools of criminality in a modern 
globally connected world.      
As such CAB’s operational approach is, by resultant necessity, quite wide.  In 2009 it 
was involved in an investigation into corruption and corrupt payments pertaining to 
the rezoning of land.  Whilst the ultimate charge in this instance arose under specific 
corrupt practices legislation3 it is operations using powers under proceeds of crime 
legislation that will be the primary focus of this particular chapter.  Whilst as noted in 
chapter four the staff of the bureau remains relatively low and static it has made use, 
as will be shortly outlined, of training and criminal profilers to ensure it effectively 
carries out its remit at a national level.   
In turn this has allowed the bureau to be cognisant of any developments in criminality 
at both a micro and macro level and to relate and react to the societal needs in the 
community at large.  Gaining the trust and resultant help of the community at all levels 
has been a key part in the bureau’s development and it is evident that it (the bureau) is 
acutely aware of the key role that communication and trust can have in helping to 
achieve success and public – and resultant political – acceptance of its operational 
approach.  Any such success is communicated back to the public (general and 
professional) who are thanked for their assistance and reassured of the authority that 
criminal justice retains in society.  
The Bureau strives to deliver a value for money service reflective somewhat of a 
managerialist approach.  Whilst it does regularly communicate income derived results 
– again assisting in accountability and acceptance in the public psychic – it is not 
formally bound by any financial targets in the form of any requirement to generate 
particular amounts of revenue in any given accounting period.  As a result it has 
                                                          





significant flexibility in its approach and choice of operational direction – given the 
societal needs at any particular time – and its overall financial returns to the exchequer 
are not consistent whilst its actual success would appear to be consistent.  In part this 
is due to targeting criminality at all levels, further placing it at the centre of general 
society who see directly the benefits of neutralisation of low and middle level 
criminality in their communities.  
As a result of the power of civil forfeiture many challenges have been brought against 
the approach of CAB and their use the proceeds of crime legislation.  In this chapter 
due consideration will be given to the operational boundaries that have been 
established by such precedents and how protection against injustice has been achieved.   
The operational approach to the bureau’s activities will continue in the next chapter 
where consideration is given to the revenue and social welfare approach that has been 
adopted and the considerable levels of success in those areas.   This chapter however 
will now continue by considering the use of particular trained personnel by the bureau 
in pursuit of its remit to deny all levels of criminality the opportunity to benefit from 
the fruits of their unlawful activities.      
Divisional Criminal Asset Profilers. 
 
In 2004, in a collaboration with the Garda National Drugs Unit, the concept of 
Divisional Criminal Asset Profilers was created. 4  The establishment of such a unit 
and training of the profilers was, again, originally linked to targeting those involved 
in the illegal drugs trade – however with a refocus to those operating at a middle 
ranking level of such activities. The profilers would be trained in all areas of asset 
forfeiture and relevant revenue and social welfare legislation.  This was to be done in 
order to ‘compliment[s] and enhance[s] the Bureau’s role in relation to the identifying, 
tracing and seizing of criminal assets of persons engaged in criminal conduct.’5  It was 
originally envisaged that a full complement of divisional profilers would amount to 
25 – that being one from each Garda division.  Thus allowing CAB to have, at an 
operational minimum, at least one direct link in each of those divisions.  At once this 
allows CAB to both have a national focus and be cognisant and informed of various 
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aspects, and indeed levels, of criminality when adopting an operational focus plan or 
when reacting to needs in the community.  However the number grew substantial from 
that original full complement in the intervening years since the unit’s establishment as 
is now demonstrated the table below: 6 
Table 1.  Number of Divisional Criminal Asset Profilers per reporting year.  









































At the time of writing the most recent full data available is that for 2016.   This shows 
that the number of trained divisional profilers then stood at 208. The growth pattern 
demonstrated in the above table looks set to extend even further with the expectation 
that another 110 profilers will be trained.7   In the early years of training such profilers 
the annual reports referred to the ‘full complement’ of 25 trained staff.8 Such 
                                                          
6 The table has been complied by the current author from data available in each of the relevant annual 
reports of CAB.  The 2007 increase was that of three revenue customs profilers - the first non-Gardaí 
members to be trained - Criminal Assets Bureau (2008) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2007, 
Stationary Office: Dublin at 9. 
7 Criminal Assets Bureau (2017) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2016, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 5.  
8 Criminal Assets Bureau (2007) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2006, Stationary Office: 




expansionary developments allow CAB to be ‘more visible’9 in local communities.   
An early evidence based example of this being the search of 163 properties on the 
same day in Limerick in 2007.10  The focus on lower value assets and concomitant 
more middle ranking criminals does not have the same opportunity to return the high 
level financial benefits to the State (and the associated positive public and media 
support) as targeting higher order criminals.   Nonetheless the Bureau regularly 
reiterates that it still remains an effective and valuable use of its resources. 
Thus, as demonstrated, there has been a clear and significant expansionary 
development of this division even if such development was not formally or specially 
acknowledged, prior to 2016, in the reports from which the data is extracted.  It is 
submitted that the reason for such expansion can be seen from the policy positions of 
the Bureau which indicate a ‘shift towards lower value assets’11 and a reaction to local 
community concerns being acknowledged as an effective use of the resources of the 
Bureau.  Such an approach reflects, not a complete refocusing of CAB but rather an 
evolutionary expansion to the limits of its statutory remit.12    The original purpose of 
divisional asset profilers was ‘enhanced from intelligence gathering to a more 
proactive investigative role’ in 2016.13  In conjunction with this development: 
“Senior Bureau Officers briefed all Divisional and Regional Detective 
Superintendents who are responsible for the tasking of the Divisional Asset 
Profilers Network in targeting local Tier 2 and Tier 3 criminals.”14 
This expansionary development has allowed such profilers to ‘develop and progress 
investigations that have significant financial impact on local criminals and, in turn, 
provide positive feedback within local communities that suffer from the activitites(sic) 
of these criminals.’15 
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10 Ibid at 3.  
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12 On the nature of CAB remit see generally chapter 4.  
13 Supra n. 7 at 5.  
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CAB and the Community.   
 
The use of regional divisional profilers allows the bureau to react to concerns around 
various criminal activities occurring in the community and subsequently interacts with 
that community through regularly thanking the public for their ongoing support and 
assistance.16  A number of examples may be offered to demonstrate that the bureau 
attempts and, and indeed seems to have been successful, in gaining widespread 
support. In terms of the community and law enforcement, the National Crime Council 
has previously called for greater communication and consultation between the Gardaí 
generally and the public.17  Whilst the bureaus primary objective of targeting the 
proceeds of crime is, by its nature, conducted in private with high levels of secrecy 
and confidentiality it does adopt a post hoc communication – if not consultation – 
strategy with local communities.   In so doing it meets the suggestion by the National 
Crime Council that governmental agencies need to change and develop effective 
interfaces with the community.18  CAB as a developing agency, without historical 
constraints on its direction, appears to have adopted, from an early stage, this approach 
as an element of it organisational structure and communication strategy.  
Further examples of CABs approach in achieving its remit in the context of 
establishing itself as a criminal justice agency in Ireland will shortly be proffered   
from both practical examples and the discovery through the courts of its operational 
boundaries.  The bureau is reflective of the fact that reactive law enforcement is no 
longer the sole method of criminal justice in operation and their approach is reflective 
of paradigmatic shift in policy.   Indeed using coercive law may be part of an ‘acting 
out’ strategy as described by Garland.  He states that: 
“Policymaking becomes a form of acting out that downplays the complexities 
and long term character of effective crime control in favour of the immediate 
gratifications of a more expressive alternative.  Law making becomes a matter 
of retaliatory gestures intended to reassure a worried public and to accord with 
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common sense, however poorly those gestures are adapted to dealing with the 
underlying problem.”19 
Additionally, and importantly in the current context, the same author is of the opinion 
that community safety is becoming the paramount requirement and thus enforcement 
of law is a way of ‘preventing the convergence of factors that precipitate criminal 
events.’20  It is widely asserted that Garland’s culture of control theory does not 
completely fit the Irish criminal justice model.21  However aspects of CABs 
development and approach in the aforementioned communication and entrenchment 
as part of society is noteworthy in the context of Garland’s above summation.  The 
approach of CAB reflects a situation whereby it is no longer the State from which 
individuals must be protected but rather from each other.  Such a drift towards a focus 
on the criminal ‘other’ has been described as a form of moral policing.22 
In terms of the direction of policing it has been asserted that the bureau does not usurp 
the power of the Gardaí but rather operates in parallel with the normal investigative 
procedures of the Gardaí.23  The 2014 annual report of the bureau departs from earlier 
reports that maintained that it was not an investigative body.  It now states that: 
“The strategy of the Bureau to co-ordinate its activities in a manner which takes 
cognisance of the Policing Plans of the Garda Síochána and the strategies of 
the Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Social Protection has been 
continued in 2014. As a result, the Bureau has become involved in the 
investigation of criminal offences. (my emphasis) In all cases involving alleged 
criminal law breached, the Bureau’s role is carefully managed having regard 
to the primary functions of the Garda Síochána and in some instances, the 
Revenue Commissioners in ensuring that the appropriate remedies are pursued 
in respect of criminal conduct.”24 
The immediately preceding report had stated that whilst there was high levels of 
liaison with the relevant bodies ‘the bureau is not (my emphasis) primarily engaged in 
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the investigation of criminal offences.’25  This would appear however to have been a 
then reflection of operational focus rather than requirement as when the status of the 
bureau was first considered, in 1999, McCracken, J. stated that ‘[I]t is an investigative 
authority which, having investigated and used its not inconsiderable powers of 
investigation, then applies to the Court for assistance in enforcing its functions.’26  
Thus CAB’s clear and explicit statement reflects new departure for the agency and 
reinforces the thesis that it has become – and may exponentially develop as – a 
significant part of the legal investigation and enforcement mechanisms in Ireland.  
Furthermore it brings its own unique approach and options for civil forfeiture27 not 
traditionally available to the Gardaí.  
In this respect and as previously noted the Bureau has widened its focus from solely 
targeting the assets of those involved in the illegal drugs trade.  It now deals with issues 
such as fuel laundering28 and arising issues in society at a given time such as travelling 
gangs using the motorway network to engage in multiple and widespread cross-
country burglary and robbery.29  Thus as both a proactive and reactive body30 it is able 
to combine the traditional Garda response with its own expertise and approach as 
exemplified, for example, by the prior established knowledge of the divisional 
regional profilers.  The Bureau receives support and assistance from a number of 
Garda units including:  
- Garda Bureau of Fraud Investigation (GBFI),  
- Garda National Drugs Unit (GNDU),  
- National Bureau of Criminal Investigation (NBCI),  
- Special Detective Unit (SDU) and the  
- Security and Intelligence Section.31 
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Additionally a unit under the control of the Garda National Drugs and Organised 
Crime Bureau was seconded to the bureau in 2016 to assist in the tracing and targeting 
of assets connected to organised crime gangs operating in the Dublin region.32  
Notwithstanding the expansionary developments of the Bureau33 it does clearly state 
that its core focus remains the targeting of assets of serious organised national and 
international criminality.  Key support for such focus lies in its ‘enhanced’ 
communication with both the public and professional bodies through for example the 
use of social media.34  This core priority is also ‘matched by the Bureau’s policy to 
support efforts to combat criminal conduct at local community level’35 – again 
demonstrating an explicit reflection of the widening and pervasive influence that the 
Bureau now holds in the Irish criminal justice landscape.   
That importance is set to expand even further as bureau management felt that there 
was a need for ‘structured and recognised training for specialised financial 
investigators’. 36  As a result a new training programme has commenced, namely: the 
Asset Confiscation and Tracing Investigators Course.37  The stated aim of this course 
is to  
“… ensure all Bureau investigators are skilled to the best international 
practices; will promote a standardisation of work practices across the 
investigation teams; and will increase the overall professionalism of the 
Bureau. It will also give a professional qualification to investigators which will 
assist, in conjunction with other measures, to enable investigators give expert 
evidence in court.”38 
It is evident that this more structured and professional approach – for what is now 
operating as an investigatory body – reflects a very targeted and business-like 
approach to the execution of the bureau’s widening remit.  
  
                                                          
32 Supra n. 7 at 4. 
33 With exceptions of the divisional profilers it continues to operate with the relatively low staff 
numbers and a relatively modest annual budget of in the region of €6.6 million – Supra n.2 at 1.  
34 Supra n.2 at vii.   
35 Supra n.2 at viii.  
36 Ibid at 6.  
37 Bureau members have also taken part in International training courses. 




CAB: the Business Case.  
 
Whilst focusing on low and medium value assets – in addition to its core function high 
value assets – it is evident that there is considerable emphasis placed on developing 
the bureau as an agency that is very conscious of delivering value for money despite 
the fact that it was not established as a self-funding body.39  For instance the bureau 
notes that whilst the number of cases actually commenced by the Bureau in 2013 was 
reduced comparable to the previous year the value of assets frozen – with an ultimate 
intended valued to the exchequer – increased by a margin of 33%.40  Similarly the 
figure for 2014 reflects an increase in value in the region of 140%.41 In some instances 
where the Bureau is able to settle proceedings it is necessary to apportion amounts to 
repay improperly claimed social welfare or discharge tax liabilities and thus are not 
recorded as incoming revenue for the Bureau.  However from a business sense the 
Bureau treats it as a success as ‘such course of action avoids costly High Court 
proceedings both in terms of legal costs incurred by the Bureau but also in costs to the 
State in payments under the Legal Aid scheme.’42  Thus the benefits of not adopting a 
self-financing model allows for a focus on wider markers of success.  
In a similar vein the Bureau has attempted to enhance its moral authority and 
acceptability and popularity in the public physic through the use of various strands of 
the media to promote its success.  It has used a large online auction site to dispose of 
criminal assets, gain a financial return to the exchequer and provide an interesting 
counter-balance to issues of moral panic through asserting its own moral authority.  
The use of the auction site (ebay) for disposal43 of an asset (in this instance a Rolex 
watch) ‘generated a great deal of publicity and highlighted the attention of the public 
to the public disposal of the proceeds of crime.’44  
 
                                                          
39 See Lea, J. (2004) ‘Hitting Criminals Where it Hurts: Organised Crime and Erosion of Due 
Process’, 35 Cambrian Law Review 81.  
40 Supra n.25 at 11.  
41 Supra n.2 at 13.  
42 Ibid at 17.  
43 Disposal is provided for by s.7 of the Proceeds of Crime Act. 




In terms of overall impacts in the period 1996 to 2014 the bureau has achieved the 
following levels of operational success 
- Interim orders45 (freezing orders) amounting to over €79 million, (with an 
additional £18,783,372STG and US$6,633,049); 
- Interlocutory Orders46 (final restraint orders) amount to over €50 million, 
(with an additional £3,080,498 STG and $6,077,710 USD)47 
However as discussed in chapter 4 the final step of the forfeiture process arises under 
sections 4 and 4(a) of the Proceeds of Crime legislation.  These allow for a transfer to 
the relevant Minister (after seven years) – or a consent disposal order (and subsequent 
transfer) – to be made over property which has been deemed to be the proceeds of 
crime.  Since its inception the following amounts have been generated as returns to 
the exchequer in this manner:48 
Table 2: Amounts generated from disposal orders. 
 
Year. 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Amount €275,875.43 €2,002,738.41 €3,221,584.14 €1,435,340.59 
 
Year. 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Amount €2,802,460.37 €1,263,388.69 €2,810,902.52 €3,431,728.26 
 
Year. 2012 2013 2014 
Amount. €4,850,540.17 €1,038,680.52 €467, 152.37 
 
Year. 2015 2016 
Amount. €1,642,962.29 €1,412,920.41 
                                                          
45 On the nature of interim orders see chapter 4 text around n.97.  
46 On the nature of interlocutory orders see chapter 4 at text around n. 107.  
47 See http://www.justice.ie/en/JELR/Pages/PR16000015. (last accessed June 18th 2016.) 
48 Table compiled by current author from data available in the annual reports of the Bureau.   The 
table is presented using the actual figure given in the appropriate report.  The reporting is not 






 As a result of the economic downturn, experienced in Ireland, in the years following 
2007 proceeds of crime that had been invested in the property market have ‘either been 
lost or significantly reduced.’49  However the potential that property might be in 
negative equity did not affect CAB’s overall approach of ensuring ‘that those involved 
in serious organised crime are not put in the advantageous position by being able to 
remain in the property and thereby benefit from the proceeds of crime.’50  Additionally 
as a result of its actions the bureau occasionally obtains assets which result in a major 
success in the fight against criminality but from which a direct monetary gain cannot 
be extracted.  For instance in 2007 two bullet proof BMW vehicles, that had been 
seized, were assigned for use of An Garda Síochána.51  
The aforementioned targeting of lower and middle ranking criminal actors and 
associated also has an impact on the overall monetary return by the bureau.  However 
with such assets – for instance motor vehicles – it is necessary to make early 
applications to ensure that the value of the asset does not depreciate.  Yet again the 
bureau feels that such targeting gives it ‘a higher visibility’ at local levels.   It also 
reflects an efficiency of output approach where matters can be fully concluded in a 
short time period.  In 2007 an order was sought over a vehicle, the applications heard 
and the vehicle subsequent disposed of all within a five month period.52  The beneficial 
effect, in the bureau’s opinion, that such an approach has on society in general can be 
gleamed from the following statement: 
“While maintaining a focus on major criminal targets, the Bureau still 
continues it’s [sic] policy of also targeting lower value asset.  … the effect of 
this policy [is] resulting in less return for a higher number of Orders.  It is the 
Bureau’s view that this policy, whilst not necessarily returning a significant 
income to the State, does engender public confidence in the criminal justice 
system as a whole and acts as a deterrent in general. [my emphasis]  It is for 
this reason that the Bureau proposes to continue to effect such an approach and 
deliver active support to local communities.”53 
                                                          
49 Supra n.9 at 6. 
50 Supra n.25 at 15. 
51 Supra n.16 at 17. 
52Supra n.11 at para 5.1.  





As is discussed below the returning of monies to identifiable victims of crime – and 
the repayment of fraudulent social welfare claims and outstanding tax liabilities - also 
serve to reduce the figures displayed in table 2.  Nonetheless these figures represent 
significant success for the bureau in its operations.  Given that all of such monies were 
accumulated without the need for any criminal finding and the nature of its work it 
was to be expected that the Bureau would face many legal challenges during its early 
years of operation.  These however have helped to establish its operation boundaries 
which have, inter alia, aided in preventing risks of injustice and assisted in ensuring 
fairness towards those tangentially affected by its action.  The courts first considered 
the risk of serious injustice in this area in FJMcK v. GWD54 where McCracken J. set 
out the following seven step approach that a trial judge should take when any such 
question of injustice arise:  
“(1) he should firstly consider the position under s. 8. [pertaining to 
evidence] He should consider the evidence given by the member or 
authorised officer of his belief and at the same time consider any other 
evidence, such as that of the two police officers in the present case, which 
might point to reasonable grounds for that belief; 
(2) if he is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for the belief, he should 
then make a specific finding that the belief of the member or authorised officer 
is evidence; 
(3) only then should he go on to consider the position under s. 3. [pertaining to 
interlocutory orders] He should consider the evidence tendered by the plaintiff, 
which in the present case would be both the evidence of the member or 
authorised officer under s. 8 and indeed the evidence of the other police 
officers; 
(4) he should make a finding whether this evidence constitutes a prima 
facie case under s. 3 and, if he does so find, the onus shifts to the defendant or 
other specified person; 
                                                          




(5) he should then consider the evidence furnished by the defendant or other 
specified person and determine whether he is satisfied that the onus undertaken 
by the defendant or other specified person has been fulfilled; 
(6) if he is satisfied that the defendant or other specified person has satisfied 
his onus of proof then the proceedings should be dismissed; 
(7) if he is not so satisfied he should then consider whether there would be a 
serious risk of injustice. If the steps are followed in that order, there should be 
little risk of the type of confusion … case.”55 
These principle were subsequently applied in CAB v. SR and Christopher Russell.56  
The facts here pertained to a property that the bureau were asserting representing the 
proceeds of crime.  The spouse of the second defendant (whose whereabouts were 
unknown) asserted that her husband was not engaged in criminality and if her belief 
was erroneous it was still a genuinely held belief and she had no knowledge of his 
criminality.   The property in dispute was in fact the family home of the couple which 
had been purchased by a third party and gifted (gift tax had been paid) to the spouse 
of the second defendant.  In relation to the factual matrix the court noted:  
“Notwithstanding the complete absence of significant criminal convictions 
recorded, cogent evidence has been put before the courts of links that are both 
close and extensive between the second named respondent and persons 
involved at the upper levels of serious crime. There has also been evidence 
linking him directly to the seizure of 40kg of cannabis on the 11th June, 2009, 
though it must be appreciated that Mr Russell has never been convicted or even 
charged in relation to that incident.”57 
The court concluded that on the balance of probabilities the second defendant had 
indeed been involved in serious criminality to a degree and extent that would have 
generated significant financial rewards.  Furthermore the lifestyle of the defendants 
was deemed to be inconsistent with the income level within which the couple claimed 
to operate.58  In applying the above seven step approach59 the court concluded upon 
                                                          
55 Ibid at 491 – 492.  
56 Unreported, High Court 16th July 2014.  
57 Ibid.  
58 Ibid.  
59 The principle were reviewed and endorsed in McKenna v. David P. Beltion, Unreported, 14 th 




whether the orders sought by the Bureau would lead to a serious risk of injustice for 
the spouse and the minor children who lived with her at the property. Birmingham J. 
stated that he accepted that the spouse ‘may have made some degree of contribution 
through whatever very limited earnings she had ... and through her child benefit 
payments. I am also prepared to accept that [the spouse] as a stay at home mother, or 
a largely stay at home mother, would have contributed to the upkeep of the household 
indirectly. I also cannot ignore the fact that the property is a modest one in what would 
once have been described as a local authority area. I make that observation because it 
seems to me that quite different considerations would apply if one was looking at so 
called trophy homes.’60  As a result he concluded that the best interests of justice would 
be served by the spouse receiving 12.5% of the equity that existed in the property in 
the question.   
The Bureau now mirrors this approach in its work and is conscious that, as a result of 
it work, criminals may not display their wealth in such an ostentatious manner as may 
have been the case heretofore and prior to the establishment of the bureau. In this 
respect the bureau have reacted to criminals using lower value vehicles in an attempt 
to avoid detection and have continued their policy of targeting all assets (irrespective 
of value) believed to the proceeds of crime.61 
In terms of balancing the dyads between property rights and the actions pursued by 
the bureau the Supreme Court has noted that there is a strong public policy dimension 
to the application of proceeds of crime legislation used by CAB.   That policy ‘is to 
ensure that persons do not benefit from assets which were obtained with the proceeds 
of crime irrespective of whether the person benefiting actually knew how such 
property was obtained with the proceeds of crime but subject to whether or not such 
person may have been a bona fide purchaser for value, where different considerations 
may arise.’62   
 
                                                          
60 Unreported, High Court 16th July 2014. 
61 Supra n.25 at 15. 




Additionally the court approved the reasoning established in CAB v. H.63  In this 
instance the respondents where again married and the female contended that neither 
she nor the children were accused of any criminal wrongdoing and were the bureau to 
be allowed take possession of the property it would render her and her dependent 
children homeless.  However Feeney J did not accept the validity of any such 
argument.  He asserted that: 
“The fact that the notice party and her family need a home cannot of itself 
operate to defeat the public interest requirement identified in the legislation of 
depriving a person of property representing the proceeds of crime. There is no 
basis for treating a person in a position such as the notice party and her family 
on a more favourable basis, than a family who lose their home as a result of a 
possession order following inability to discharge mortgage repayments or as a 
result of an inability to pay rent. The notice party and her family have no 
entitlement to the use of a particular premises. If it were not for the use of the 
premises obtained from the proceeds of crime the notice party would have to 
have provided for herself or have provided for her alternative accommodation. 
The fact that the notice party and her family will be placed in a position if a 
disposal order is made … where she would have to seek alternative 
accommodation is of itself not a basis for discharging … orders or refusing the 
relief sought by the plaintiff herein. A person in possession of premises 
representing the proceeds of crime has no constitutional grievance if deprived 
of their use …”64 
Furthermore he noted that whilst article 8 of the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR) does protect legitimate interest in a family home a delimitation from 
any such interest is permitted in the interests of good governance.  The aforementioned 
public policy underpinning the proceeds of crime was an example of such governance 
in action.65  It is suggested that these cases serve to demonstrate a refocusing and 
hollowing out of aspects of criminal justice in Ireland and a rebalancing in favour of 
the State over its citizens.  A further example may be offered in that of CAB v. John 
Kelly66 which again concerned a family home which was the subject of a forfeiture 
order.  However in this instance the unique factor was that the couple in question had 
instigated family law proceedings for separation as a result of marital breakdown.   
These proceedings were held in-camera and CAB were not put on notice of the 
                                                          
63 Unreported, High Court 3rd Oct 2007.  
64 Ibid.  
65 Ibid.  




proceedings despite the fact that there was an ongoing claim by the bureau over the 
family home.   The Supreme Court stated that the Bureau should indeed have been put 
on notice of the proceedings67 - highlighting again the prevailing influence that the 
bureau now has once it has initiated proceedings against a property believe to be the 
proceeds of crime. Additionally the court reaffirmed the need for such orders over 
property as necessary ‘in the pursuit of a legitimate aim for the prevention of crime 
and for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. In such circumstances, these 
orders may be necessary in a democratic society where the objective pursued in the 
legislation is to ensure that individuals do not benefit from assets obtained from the 
proceeds of crime and are divested of such assets.’68  Furthermore any such orders do 
not breach any constitutional rights as exigencies of the common good would certainly 
include measures designed to prevent the accumulation and use of assets which 
directly or indirectly derive from criminal activities. The right to private ownership 
cannot hold a place so high in the hierarchy of rights that it protects the position of 
assets illegally acquired and held.’69 
In terms of the Bureau’s operational approach in achieving such common good the 
courts have complimented it on the manner in which it conducts its investigations.70 
Again the bureau’s business approach of delivering value for money is evident where 
it conducts is work ‘in a cost effective manner’71 and ‘is conscious of the extreme 
financial pressures on public finances.’72  This credit and approach means that the Irish 
legislature is unlikely to attempt to restrict the bureau in its activities and approach.73 
Furthermore the bureau has on occasion used its powers to return money that was 
defrauded from them to victims.  
 
                                                          
67 Ibid at para 19.  
68 Ibid at para 34.  
69 Gilligan v. Criminal Assets Bureau [1998] 3 IR 185 at 237. 
70 Criminal Assets Bureau 2013, Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2012, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 13.  
71 Ibid at 12.  
72 Ibid at 13. 
73 Indeed there have been calls for the establishment of “mini CABs” (that could potentially make use 
of the divisional criminal asset profilers) to target particular aspects of criminality.  “Fitzgerald seeks 




The case of CAB v. Eamon Kelly74 can be taken to demonstrate an example of the 
Bureau being involved in restitution to victims.75  Here the respondent had been the 
organiser of a ‘ponzi’ scheme where investors bought into what was in fact a non-
existent investment portfolio.  The process of investigation followed by the bureau 
meant that individual investment amounts could be traced and returned to the victims.  
In this regard the bureau have noted that the exercise was conducted in a cost effective 
manner thereby ‘avoiding potential costs which victims may have been exposed to 
using alternative remedies.’76  A similar approach to controlling costs arose from the 
case of CAB v. Routeback Media AB77 where the State was allowed to discharge its 
legal costs from monies the remainder of which was to remain frozen, as normal, for 
a further seven years.   This was the first application under section 3(3a) which was 
introduced under the Proceeds of Crime (Amendment) Act in 2005.78  This has the 
potential to not only recover costs incurred by the State but also to, in the words of the 
bureau, discourage respondents making wasteful applications to the Court.’79  It is 
respectfully suggested however that this may not be the case as respondents may still 
adopt the view that their proceeds will be lost in any event thus the proceeds going to 
cover the State’s cost – as opposed to being ultimately forfeited to the State – may not 
be a huge deterrent.  
 
                                                          
74 [2012] IEHC 595.  
75 The bureau has also being involved in return funds to victims in other jurisdictions.   This serves the 
dual purpose of denying those involved in criminality the opportunity to benefit from the proceeds of 
crime (regardless of whether the ultimate benefactors are the Irish exchequer, victims,  or the 
exchequer of different jurisdictions)  but also ‘enhances the effectiveness of the International Co-
operation between the Bureau and the authorities’ in other jurisdictions.   Criminal Assets Bureau 
2008, Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2007, Stationary Office: Dublin at para 5.6.    
76 Supra n.70 at 13. 
77 Unreported, High Court 20th January 2011.  
78 The section provides that:  
“(3A) Without prejudice to sections 3(7) and 6, where an interim order is in force, the Court may, on 
application to it in that behalf by the applicant or any other person, vary the order to such extent as 
may be necessary to permit— 
(a) the enforcement of any order of a court for the payment by the respondent of any sum, including 
any sum in respect of costs, 
79 Supra n.70 at 13.  The bureau also takes steps to protect assets which may come under its control 




In adopting these types of operational approaches the bureau is, in certain ways, 
mirroring the community safety partnership approach that has been trialled in England 
and Wales.  It has been summarised that this approach: 
- Accepts that there is no single agency solution to crime and disorder 
- Recognises the need for social responses to crime  
- Allows for a holistic approach to crime, community safety and associated 
issues which is ‘problem focussed’ rather than ‘bureaucracy focused’ 
- Affords the potential coordination and pooling of knowledge, capacity and 
resources.80 
It is suggested that the operational approach of CAB as set out to this point reflects 
significant aspects of this approach.  CAB is, as discussed, a multi-agency unit that 
also gains support from other Garda units.  It takes both a proactive and reactive stance 
dealing with actual problems in society in new and novel ways. Finally it regularly 
notes that is success lies, in part, in the fusion of its individual components working 
as a cohesive unit.81  The approach however has potential far reaching consequences 
for the overall criminal justice landscape.  It reflects restructuring of the approach to 
dealing with organised criminality.  A structure whereby the needs of the State triumph 
the individual citizens due process rights.82  Indeed Kilcommins and Vaughan raise 
the question of whether modern criminality is moving from one of individual guilt to 
one of social danger and whether ‘the delicate equilibrium between freedom from 
government and public protection is being unsettled by an anxious State determined 
to show strength by “tooling up” in the fight against crime.’83  
  
                                                          
80 Crawford, A. (2007) ’Crime Prevention and Community Safety’ at 893 -894 in McGuire, M. et al 
(eds) The Oxford Handbook of Criminality, Oxford University Press: Oxford.   
81 It has stated that: ‘[I]n many respects, the level of commitment to co-operation between the staff of 
the various state bodies represented at the Bureau has been the key to the success achieved to date. 
This level of co-operation remains the cornerstone of the Bureau’s effectiveness in facing the 
challenges which lie ahead.’ Criminal Assets Bureau (2011) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 
2010, Stationary Office: Dublin at 7.   
82 See generally Campbell, L. (2007) ‘Theorising Asset Forfeiture in Ireland’, Journal of Criminal 
Law, 71(5), 441-60. 
83 Kilcommins, S. and Vaughan, B. (2006) ‘Reconfiguring State- Accused Relations in Ireland’ Irish 




Giving the overall context of this chapter it is applicable to again consider such 
analysis from a procedural viewpoint.   As reflected elsewhere one of the main tools 
in CAB’s arsenal is the power of forfeiture84 exercised under the Proceeds of Crime 
Act 1996 (as amended).  In chapter two of this particular piece of work due 
consideration was given to the criminal/civil divide as it operates in this jurisdiction. 
It is now appropriate to revisit that concept from the operational standpoint of CAB 
and consider where the Proceeds of Crime Acts lie in within that framework.    
CAB, Proceeds of Crime and the Criminal/Civil Divide.  
 
It has been established, in the aforementioned chapter, that the characteristics of 
criminal law were identified as being, inter alia, punishment of offenders (as opposed 
to restitution or compensation), prevention and deterrence.  Thus the characteristics of 
criminal law, generally, are reflected in its coercive, controlling nature and its function 
as society’s formal method of social control.85  The underpinning reasoning behind 
the divide is considered by Mann, where he states that it is ‘because of the different 
public interests implicated by wrongful conduct and because of the fear of the intrusive 
and punitive use of state power.’86  Thus given the operational approach of CAB, as 
just outlined, and the above concerns pertaining to the rebalancing of the equilibrium 
between the State and the individual questions arose about the ‘Kafkaesque’ nature of 
the legislation. Further it was asserted by those seeking to deny the validity of the 
proceeds of crime legislation –which operates under the civil balance of probabilities 
requirement – that it was in fact ‘an ersatz civil proceeding’ that was merely a disguise 
for ‘an attempt by the Oireachtas to impose a criminal sanction in a civil context.’87 
 
                                                          
84 The approach that CAB takes in the Revenue and Social welfare arena will be considered in the 
next two chapters.  
85 Wilson, W. (2008) Criminal Law: Doctrine and Theory, Pearson: Essex at 4.  
86 Mann, K. (1992) ‘Punitive Civil Sanctions: The Middleground between Criminal Law and Civil 
Law’ 101 (8) Yale Law Journal 1795 at 1811. 




The seminal question for CAB’s future operational direction arose in two cases (which 
later became joined in the Supreme Court).  In Gilligan v. CAB88 the plaintiff 
contended that the Proceeds of Crime Act 2006: 
was “Kafkaesque" in that on the word of a chief superintendent or a revenue 
official an individual can have his assets frozen, put into receivership and 
disposed of on the basis of assumed criminality, without charge, indictment, 
trial or conviction. He emphasised, in regard to this general aspect as well as 
to other particular aspects of the Act, that the Act is in essence a criminal or 
quasi-criminal statute and demanded what he described as strict scrutiny from 
a constitutional point of view. The Act, he said, enabled the Garda Síochána to 
short circuit and circumvent ordinary criminal procedures and to abandon 
normal methods of criminal investigation. As far as the plaintiff himself was 
concerned there was no current charge against him in this jurisdiction.”89   
Amongst its responses the State adopted a real politick argument setting out the factual 
background to the introduction of the act90 and the changing and evolving nature of 
criminal activity in Ireland.  The then acting Chief Bureau Officer stated that during 
the 1980’s and 1990’s major criminal figures had been able to distance themselves 
from any direct involvement in the commission of actual offences and thus only the 
lower level ‘agents’ in the criminal association could be charged and prosecuted91 
despite the fact that the offences in question were having an ‘extremely detrimental 
effect on Irish society.’92 
                                                          
88 [1998] 3 IR 185 
89 Ibid at 197.  
90 For detail on the legislation see chapter 4, text around n.96.  
91 Supra n.69 at 205.  A Deputy Commissioner of the Gardaí stated that:  “During the 1980's there had 
been a rather high level of serious armed robbery and the Gardaí had been reasonably successful in 
dealing with those who were actually committing those crimes. Quite a number of those particular 
criminals served prison sentences. However the Gardaí were not so successful in recovering the 
proceeds of the armed robberies and when the persons who had been convicted of the crimes were 
released from prison they "diversified" and eventually moved into the area of supplying drugs. Over 
time they completely removed themselves from the actual movement of drugs in that they had … "a 
number of runners on the ground, trusted people that would courier the drugs, not alone through 
Ireland but through mainland Europe". The principals in this trade were able to pay cash to various 
international traffickers in drugs and then make very large profits on re-selling the drugs in Ireland. …  
Both the principals and the leading couriers became extremely wealthy and were able in a sense to 
command respect within the criminal community. Supra n.69 at 204 – 205.  





With the benefit of hindsight of the subsequent operation approach taken by the 
Bureau it worth nothing the summation comments of this situation by Garda Deputy 
Commissioner Conroy where the stated that it was ‘an example and an inducement to 
other would-be criminals to embark on a life of crime, as leading to wealth and 
power.’93  Furthermore that ‘it caused frustration and disillusionment among other 
citizens together with a tendency for the criminal justice system as a whole to fall into 
disrepute. He felt that that made ordinary people less likely to co-operate with the 
Gardaí either by coming forward as witnesses or by generally partaking through the 
giving of information.’94  Importantly he was of the opinion that the work of the bureau 
and the application of the Proceeds of Crime Act ‘levelled the playing field a little bit’ 
as between major criminal figures operating in Irish society and that society.95  
In reaching a decision on whether the legislation should be more correctly considered 
under the criminal rather than civil law the importance of the factual situation as just 
outlined was considered by McGuiness J where she noted that the: 
“… court must, as matter of proportionality, consider whether the situation as 
regards major crime in this country described in the evidence of the two garda 
witnesses and referred to in the various submissions, in fact justifies the 
enactment of measures which are, if not draconian, at least out of the ordinary 
run of civil legislation.”96 
In adopting this approach the court went on to apply the facts at bar to the indicia for 
identification of a criminal law – as set out in chapter two of this work – that were 
established in the Melling case.97  However in relation to the proceeds of crime 
legislation McGuiness J. stated that:  
“It is quite clear from the evidence of both the garda witnesses that they 
perceive the procedures under the Act of 1996 as being a method of attacking 
a certain form of criminality. By divesting major criminals of their ill-gotten 
                                                          
93 Ibid. 
94 Ibid. 
95 Ibid at 206 – 207.  
96 Ibid at 214.  
97 Melling v. O ‘Mathghamhna and the Attorney General [1962] IR 1.   See chapter 1, text around n. 




gains, they hope to reduce their power and influence and to render them more 
vulnerable to arrest, trial and conviction. The means used in the procedures 
under the Act of 1996 do not, however, have "all the features of a criminal 
prosecution". The action is strictly speaking an action "in rem"rather than "in 
personam "; … More importantly, there is no question of the arrest of a 
respondent or his remand in custody or on bail and there is no specific 
penalty of fine or imprisonment. It is true that money or property may be 
removed from the possession or control of a respondent, but if this money or 
property can be shown to the satisfaction of the court to be the proceeds of 
crime, its removal could well be viewed in the light of reparation rather than 
punishment or penalty.”98 
The learned justice thus concluded the legislation did not indeed meet the indicia from 
Meelling and the forfeiture procedures – at the heart of cab’s disruptive neutralisation 
approach – were civil matters and not criminal.  This finding was confirmed in the 
Supreme Court, on appeal, where it was held that under the legislation ‘there  is no 
provision for the arrest or detention of any person, for the admission of persons to bail, 
for the imprisonment of a person in default of payment of a penalty, for a form of 
criminal trial initiated by summons or indictment, for the recording of a conviction in 
any form or for the entering of a nolle prosequi at any stage,’99 and thus forfeiture 
orders under the legislation were in fact civil matters.  However Keane J. did go a step 
further than the High Court and acknowledged the unusual nature of the ‘radically 
new’100 type of legislation that the State had adopted in its fight against modern 
criminal methods of operation.  He stated that:  
“this unquestionably draconian legislation was enacted by the Oireachtas 
because professional criminals had developed sophisticated and elaborate 
forms of what had become known as "money laundering" in order to conceal 
from the authorities the proceeds of their criminal activities.”101 
 
                                                          
98 Ibid at 217 – 218.  
99 Murphy v. GM, pb, PC Ltd, GH: Gilligan v. CAB [2001] 4 IR 113 at 147.  
100 Seaned Debates, 27th June 1996, vol 148 col. 420.  
101 Supra n.199 at 136.   He also asserted that had the forfeiture provisions been found to be criminal 
in nature then it ‘is almost beyond argument that … they would be invalid having regard to the 




This approach by CAB – receiving authority under statute and passing Constitutional 
muster – represents an adoption to reality by the Irish State. At the original Gilligan 
trial McGuiness J. had noted that the forfeiture of the proceeds of crime ‘could well 
be viewed in light of reparation rather than punishment or penalty’. 102  Similarly at 
the Dáil debate on the introduction of the legislation the true intent and purpose 
underpinning the legislation was offered, per Deputy O’Donnell, in the following 
terms: 
“If we cannot punish, deter or reform these people we must set a new aim, to 
stop them from operating their evil trade … If we cannot arrest the criminals, 
why not confiscate their assets?”103  
The result of this refocus, and reduction of the burden on the State in its attempts to 
control criminality, and its potential consequential effect on the nature of the Irish 
criminal justice landscape is perhaps best encapsulated by O’Higgins J.   When 
considering the Proceeds of Crime Act he stated that there ‘is no offence, there is no 
finding of guilt or innocence, there is no necessity for mens rea and there is not always, 
and perhaps not even usually, a penalty.’104 There is of course the opportunity to 
neutralise criminality by such civil forfeiture.   
Conclusion. 
 
CAB was established as creature of statute that could have been removed by statute at 
any juncture.  However in this chapter it is contended that the Bureau has been 
successful in proving, through is operations and approach that it is a rational – rather 
than emotional – response to the challenges of modern criminality and that, resultantly, 
its future is secure and its importance is expanding.  Prior to its establishment, the legal 
focus had been on assets arising from previous criminal activity.  However the intent 
underpinning the Bureau and the proceeds of crime legislation was to ‘prevent assets 
being used as the seeds of future crimes.’105  Following such wide assertions CAB has 
now established itself as a significant contributor to criminal control and societal 
wellbeing in Ireland.  It has targeted all levels of criminality in an attempt to reassure 
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a concerned society of the State control that still exists in Ireland.  It is not restrained 
by financial demands and so can be ‘relentless’ in its pursuit regardless of the time 
taken to pursue a matter.  Its current Chief Officer has stated that: 
“One message I would say … is that we are relentless. The time aspect is 
something we’re not particularly concerned with, it’s the relentless pursuit of 
criminal assets that we’re concerned about. Our main focus is never deflected, 
we will pursue cases from beginning to end.”106 
Such a strategy allows it to target low and middle ranking criminal agents in addition 
to the more significant principal agents – which are still one of the main priorities for 
the bureau.  To date it has returned over €26million – in direct funds from forfeiture 
of assets – to the Irish State as well as other assets and significantly more than that 
figure from revenue demands and social welfare repayments and savings.   It also 
claims significant social success in aiding with community safety and deterring would 
be criminality. CAB has also been in a position to return value to individuals where 
they can be directly identified as the victims of financial criminality.  It has achieved 
all of this success with a relatively small staff and small budget but has engaged in 
professional training and now has a team of 215 divisional criminal asset profilers 
operating to support its work.   Such profilers would appear to be key elements in 
CAB’s now accepted role as an investigatory body working in conjunction with An 
Garda Síochána.   
The operational approach of the Bureau and its actions using the proceeds of crime 
legislation have been challenged in the Irish courts.  In this chapter consideration was 
given to the operational implications of those challenges and how operational fairness 
has been achieved.   Whilst balancing fairness the courts have stated that there is a 
strong public policy dimension to the civil forfeiture used by CAB and have asserted 
that persons benefitting from proceeds of crime can have no legal grievance when that 
benefit is removed.  There is a potential for the amount of legal challenges against the 
action of CAB to decreases.  One of the most regular litigants against CAB was one 
of the original ‘targets’ when the Bureau was first established.  However at this 
juncture the High Court have stated that:  
                                                          




“As Dr. Paul McDermott points out in the introductory chapter to Res Judicata 
and Double Jeopardy, the notion that there should be some finality to litigation 
is a fundamental principle of the common law. It is also, as he points out to be 
found in Roman Law, Hindu Law, African Tribal Law, Native American 
Indian Law, Canon Law, and many modern civil codes. I do not doubt that the 
plaintiffs are greatly distressed at what the Criminal Assets Bureau (CAB) has 
been seeking to achieve. That they would seek to resist and indeed frustrate 
CAB in their endeavours is scarcely surprising. In a situation where they 
believe they have identified a point of major significance, that they would wish 
to pursue it and would be reluctant to let go of it is entirely to be expected. 
However, there is a limit to how often and in how many different ways the 
same point can be argued. There is a limit to how long and how often any drum 
can be banged. That limit has now been reached, if indeed not exceeded.”107  
Given the overall approach of CAB using civil forfeiture and its attendant implications 
as set out in this chapter it is axiomatic to suggest that this represents a major 
discontinuity and atypical approach to dealing with criminality in Ireland representing 
an apersonal, non-moral approach to law.  Yet this departure from the golden thread 
of criminal law in not entirely new in the common law world.  As far back as the 1920s 
concerns were being raised (in the US) that ‘[t]he function of securing social interest 
through punitive justice seems to be insensibly slipping away from courts and hence 
from law and in substance, if not in form, to be coming more into the hands of 
administrative agencies.’108  In the specific terms of the context of this chapter this 
new development as it applies to CAB has been considered by Kilcommins and 
Vaughan.   They refer to the use of the proceeds of crime legislation, by CAB, as 
‘criminal administration as opposed to criminal justice where the notion of mens rea 
becomes secondary to the push for the State to assert its authority and neutralise 
criminality’109.  Based on the acceptance by the courts of this new regulatory type 
approach – with a focus on efficient and security over rights – and the legislatures 
broad based support for a hollowing out of criminal law it would appear that the move 
from ‘individual guilt to one of social danger’110 is an approach that is now firmly 
entrenched in the criminal justice landscape of Ireland.  
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This chapter will continue with the framework established in the last chapter vis-à-vis 
the operational and procedural based approach.  In this instance the focus will be on 
the revenue aspects of the Bureau’s work – allowing again for demonstration of how 
Ireland has, in part, moved to a new model of criminal justice and the targeting of 
certain aspects of criminality.  In respect of the multi-disciplinary nature of CAB the 
revenue actions have developed to play a key role in achieving the Bureau’s remit of 
depriving criminality of the proceeds of crime.  The use of revenue powers to target, 
deprive and discombobulate criminals of their ill gains is not a new departure in the 
wider common law world but its use in Ireland as a tool of disruption, discontinuity 
and financial neutralisation was a new departure for the Irish State.  The old adage that 
nothing is certain but death and taxes is a useful axiom to demonstrate the enshrined 
position that taxes have in the general psychic.  It is accepted (by most) that a tax will 
be levied or charged on income generated and must be paid to the relevant taxing 
authority – or risk further sanction.  It is an independent function that is applied to all 
citizens and is administered on behalf of the State.  It is only when questions of fairness 
or default arise that it is necessary to resort to judicial intervention – which is the norm 
with a civil administrative function. 
 
This of course also represents the legal position that is long established, over many 
epoch, for the payment of taxes.  The novel development for the use of revenue powers 
as a tool of criminality in Ireland centres, firstly, on what actually constitutes income.  
This chapter commences with this particular conundrum.  The original position in 
Ireland was that it would be morally unacceptable for the State to in anyway benefit 
from the proceeds of crime and would be akin to condoning crime.  However we have, 
as shall now be outlined, evolved to a more pragmatic position where all income – 





CAB now has the power, inter alia, to act as the tax inspector for an individual and 
resultantly issue tax assessments.   As a result of this power we will continue the 
chapter by specifically viewing CAB’s revenue approach from a results based 
perspective.  This will be considered in terms of actual income generated from such 
tax assessments issued by CAB and the significant power and benefit (in terms of 
remit) that this approach gives to the Bureau.  The chapter will continue with its 
operational focus by considering the limited and narrow appeal options that are 
available to the assessed tax payer.  This will serve to further highlight the very 
significant power that CAB has to operate independent of any specific court direction 
to target specific criminal individuals and thus disrupt criminal enterprise via 
deprivation of a key component. Finally, the chapter will then conclude with a 
consideration of how the Bureau’s activities in this particular area have been subject 
to judicial scrutiny and how that scrutiny has demanded precise compliance with tax 
statutes (from both enforcer and assessed) as opposed to raising any conceptual or 
indeed moral considerations.  
The Taxation of Illegal Assets.  
 
We will now establish how from a position whereby traditionally profits from trading 
which was known to be completely illegal were not taxable as to do so was considered 
to be the State profiting from illegal activities and as being akin to condoning such 
activities to one where taxation is a major power of the authorities in targeting criminal 
activities.  We will trace the development of Irish case law in this regard and consider 
why a similar approach was considered, but not adopted by our nearest common law 
neighbour.  The section will concluded with the introduction of legislation that 
reversed the common law position and made, in the long term, the adoption of revenue 
powers to tackling modern criminality a relatively painless and moreover a legally 
sound transition.    
 
The original position in Ireland in regard to the taxing of illegal assets was established 
in Hayes v. Duggan [1929]1 where the question arose as to whether profits from an 
                                                          




illegal sweepstake were assessable for the purpose of income tax.  It was contended 
by the respondent bookmaker that he could not be assessed for tax on the sweepstake 
because it was, inter alia,   an ‘unlawful’ and ‘criminal’ enterprise and as such the 
state could not gain from such proceeds.2  In arguing this case, in addition to a number 
of very pertinent persuasive precedents, consideration were given to range of factors 
which provide an ideal context for establishing a framework for the traditional 
perspective on the taxation of illegal activities in this jurisdiction.   
 
In considering whether it was appropriate to assess the respondent for tax the Supreme 
Court were primarily concerned with the interpretation of the relevant legislation and 
whether it applied in the circumstances of the case.  This may be distinguished from 
the respondent’s moral arguments concerning the question of whether the state could 
benefit from the proceeds of crime.  In delivering judgment Kennedy C.J. did not 
appear to give credence to such issues of morality but instead felt that ‘[I]t is competent 
for the sovereign Legislature to require crime to yield a quota out of its profits to the 
national revenue.  The question is whether, upon construction of the statute, the 
Legislature has done so.’3  Thus the question was not whether it was acceptable to tax 
criminal activities – the then Chief Justice seemed to accept without question that such 
a proposition was possible – but whether it could be reasonably implied into the 
legislation that it was the intention of the legislature that the relevant act would apply 
to criminal activities. He held that it did not.  This was due to the fact that he felt an 
activity that is prohibited and punishable by the state could not, in the absence of 
express provisions, be supposed to be within the contemplation of the legislation.  He 
went on to reason that such an approach was tenable as it could not be contemplated 
that the legislature expected activities to be carried on in contravention of its own 
criminal code.  If the opposite were the case then the criminal law would be violated 
at every stage of the tax enforcement process.4  Interestingly Fitzgibbon J. whilst 
concurring with the overall view of the Chief Justice admitted that his mind had 
fluctuated on the matter and he was still not free from doubt but still felt that it was 
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not within the contemplation of the legislature to take profits that came ‘exclusively’ 
from criminal acts.5  
 
It is this concept of exclusive criminal trading that provides a limitation on what might 
otherwise be a very wide judgement.  Fitzgibbon J. made a clear distinction between 
trades where a portion of the profits were derived from illegal activities and trades 
where the entire activity was illegal.6  In the latter the entire raison d’etre is to carry 
out criminal activity where as in the former significant elements of the profit made 
arise from legal activities and it may be difficult to distinguish such profit from any 
that is illegally acquired.  However any such problems of distinguishing are resolved 
by the maxim nemo allegans suam turpitudinem est audiendus.  This essentially 
provides that once the revenue have raised a tax assessment against an activity that is 
prima facia legal then the respondent taxpayer may not claim an exception on the basis 
that some of their activities are illegal.7  To do otherwise would be to allow such an 
individual rely on their own illegal activities to avoid paying tax on their legal 
activities.  The important factor here is of course that in order to be assessable for tax 
purposes the enterprise in question must, from the revenue’s perspective, be prima 
facia legal.  Thus whilst the Hayes v. Duggan case did establish a precedent preventing 
the taxation of illegal activities it only applied where the entire enterprise was illegal 
and where the revenue knew that it was illegal.8  Further such an approach was based 
exclusively on statutory interpretation and the court clearly indicated that if such an 
interpretation was inaccurate then the legislature could quite easily clarify the situation 
in any subsequent finance act.9  Thus the Supreme Court did not rule out the taxing of 
illegal assets per se.  Despite this the legislature did not act and when a similar situation 
arose in Collins v. Mulvey [1956]10 the trial court found that profits derived from an 
illegal enterprise (illegal gambling machines) could not be taxed because it had 
                                                          
5 Ibid at 418 
6 Ibid at 419 – 420. See also the judgement of Murnaghan J. where he noted that ‘there is a clear 
distinction between the carrying on of a lawful business in the course of which acts prohibited by a 
statute may or may not be committed and the setting up of an enterprise every act and step of which is 
a criminal offence.’ (Ibid at 421) 
7 See generally Corrigan, K. Revenue Law Volume 1 (2000) Dublin: Roundhall at 1058 – 1059.  
8 Profits that arise from contracts that are illegal due to the fact of being unenforceable are taxable.  
See Partridge v. Malladine (1886) 18 Q.B.D. 276 
9 Supra n.4 at 421. 




become known to the revenue as a result of an earlier assessment that the business was 
an illegal one.11  Thereby the revenue in complying its assessment could not meet the 
second leg of Hayes of presuming that the enterprise was, prima facia, a legal one.   
 
Further consideration was given to the Hayes decision in a number of cases in the 
English courts but the Irish precedent was not followed.  In particular in Mann v. Nash 
[1932],12 the facts of which concerned the use of gaming machines, the court could 
not see a reason for distinguishing between a trade that was entirely illegal and one 
which contained some illegal transactions.13  In establishing this initial schism 
between the positions of the two jurisdictions the court went even further in 
considering and ultimately rejecting the Irish position.  As it was an outright rejection 
of the Irish principle by a common law court it is of value to recount the views of the 
English court.  In considering whether the State should be in a position to take a benefit 
from crime Roulatt J. rejected the argument that the State could not profit from an 
activity that it had itself prohibited.  He raised the query: 
“Does the State keep its revenue eye open and its eye of justice closed?  I must 
say, I do not feel the force of that observation at all.  Would it have made any 
difference, I ventured to ask in the argument, if the State had kept both its eyes 
open and prosecuted the man for the lottery and taxed him for profits at the 
same time?”14 
He continued with the opinion that in raising a tax assessment the revenue was merely 
looking at an accomplished fact and not actually condoning it.  If that fact is a trade 
for the purposes of income tax legislation then it should be subjected to tax.  In 
referring back to the Irish case and again addressing whether the State is to take a share 
of an unlawful gains he concluded that: 
“It is mere rhetoric.  The State is doing nothing of the kind; they are taxing the 
individual with reference to certain facts.  They are not partners; they are not 
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Supra n.7 at 1059 
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principals in the illegality; they are merely taxing a man in respect of those 
resources.  I think it is only rhetoric to say that they are sharing in his profits, 
and a piece of rhetoric which is perfectly useless for the solution of the question 
which I have to decide.”15 
In so asserting the English court emphatically rejected the Irish position on the taxing 
of illegal activities from a number of fronts.  It based its position on the basis that a 
tax assessment can only be raised after the fact, where that fact happens to be illegal 
the State is not condoning it but merely subjecting it to the tax code.  Further they 
ruled that the State is in no way an element of the illegal activity (presumably in much 
the same way as it would not be an element of legal activity) and again is merely 
applying the legislation to an activity which may be considered a trade.   
 
Thus from this 1932 decision it was possible in England and Wales to tax the proceeds 
of illegal activity and the knowledge or otherwise of the revenue authorities as to the 
legal or illegal source of the income was effectively irrelevant.  Despite this 
development and the clear indication by the Irish judiciary in Hayes that their 
judgment was one of statutory interpretation only – as opposed to a moral or legal 
imperative – which could easily be changed, the position of it being unlawful to tax a 
trade or activity where it was entirely illegal and known to the revenue authorities to 
be so remained in Irish law until 1983.  It was altered by section 19 of the Finance Act 
of that year.  The reversal of position was welcomed in Dáil on the grounds that it 
would be a ‘weapon’ of the Revenue Commissioners that would be of assistance in 
‘clearing up some of the big criminal operators’ and ‘putting them out of business 
altogether.’16  There was however some criticism from the opposition of the day who 
suggested that a better approach would be to confiscate all profits from illegal activity 
and punish those engaged in such activities.  Indeed it was stated that ‘[T]he very idea 
of putting such a provision in legislation seems to suggest an acceptance and blessing 
of such illegal activities.’17   
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Notwithstanding such concerns the bill was enacted.  Section 19, which has now been 
replaced by section 58 of the Taxes Consolidation Act 1997, provides that profits or 
gains shall be liable to tax in the following circumstances.  Firstly, where the source 
of such profit is unknown; secondly where it is not known that the profit or gain arose 
from lawfully activity; and finally where it is actually known that the profit arose from 
an unlawful activity.  Thus the legislation completely overrules each of the elements 
that had been established by the Hayes decision and clearly enshrined in Irish law the 
possibility of taxing illegal activities.  Such legislation meant that the foundations had 
been established – in a legal sense – for the subsequent activities of CAB and indeed 
it would not be until some 13 years later when CAB was established that the potential 
of these changes to target criminal activities was utilised.  It now has a statutory power 
under this section 58 to raise assessments and demand the relevant tax18 and it is a 
power which it has extensively used – as will now be outlined – generating 
considerable returns to the Irish exchequer.  
Revenue and CAB – The Monetary Results.  
 
The revenue option for CAB is specifically provided for in section 5 (b) of the 1996 
Act as taking all necessary actions  
“under the Revenue Acts or any provision of any other enactment, whether 
passed before or after the passing of this Act, which relates to revenue, to 
ensure that the proceeds of criminal activity or suspected criminal activity are 
subjected to tax and that the Revenue Acts, where appropriate, are fully 
applied in relation to such proceeds or activities, as the case may be,”19 
This particular section combined with the Disclosure of Information Act 1996 has 
facilitated the use of revenue powers to be a key tool in Ireland’s modern criminal 
justice landscape and, furthermore, a stark departure from the common law principles, 
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outlined, that had existed heretofore.  The departure from the traditional norm and the 
emergence of a new role for revenue officials and application of tax related statutes 
was clearly acknowledge in the Seanad debates on the CAB Act.  In that house it was 
stated that the revenue officers are protected under the anonymity provisions20 of the 
legislation and the sharing of information between the various agencies is a key tool 
and indeed ‘failure to do so would be a dereliction of duty.’21  Thus the targeting of 
financial wealth, as a criminological tool, is clearly enshrined in Irish legislation and 
is ‘recognised by many other countries and agencies as the most appropriate way 
forward.’22  Moreover in the specific Irish sense in now policy with any bureau 
investigation that the tax position will be investigated ‘of all those linked with that 
investigation with a view to assessing their tax liabilities where appropriate.’23 
The application of taxation legislation from this policy will be shortly outlined but 
firstly we will consider the actual operational results that have arisen in this area vis-
à-vis the financial income that has been derived for the benefit of the Irish exchequer 
and concomitantly denied to and deprived from the collective criminal actor. The 
following table sets out the actual income derived as a result of revenue enforcement 
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Table 3 – Tax, Interest and Penalties collected by CAB.24 
 




251,701.13 789,458.79 2,998,207.13 8,595,133.86 23,561,666 
 
 




10,003,816 9,991,022 16,408,649 16,376,598.71 19,192,906.56 
 
 




10,009,459.27 5,891,624.85 5,100,494.72 4,084,498 3,804,867 
 




1,967,925 5,418,000 3,017,000 2,038,000 2,106,000 
 
 
Thus in its operational lifespan to the end of the calendar year 2016 CAB has generated 
tax income (including interest and penalties) of an amount to the figure of €178, 
590,838 and equally, as aforementioned, denied the use of such money to criminality 
generally and in the black economy – thus clearly meeting the original raison d'être 
of the bureau.  This figure is over 7.5 times the income generated25 from forfeiture of 
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assets26 but the revenue powers of the bureau do not always receive the same attention 
and exposure in general discourse as forfeiture.  Furthermore, whilst it is regularly 
asserted by the bureau27 that revenue generation (generally as opposed to the specific 
tax sense) is a secondary function to the primary objective of the deprivation of the 
proceeds of crime it is manifestly clear that these figures demonstrate both significant 
success, or a performance indicator, in the achievement of that primary function.28 
The ability of CAB to achieve such results via the use of revenue is assisted in a 
significant way by virtue of the fact that it can operate ‘simultaneously as the Inspector 
of Taxes, the Collector General, the effective Prosecution Authority and the Authority 
with sweeping powers to confiscate the documents and assets of the taxpayer.’29  The 
cumulative effect of such authority is likely to be a causing factor in the situation that 
developed after a mere decade in existence where many CAB launched revenue 
investigations and assessments do not need to resort to enforcement provisions and are 
‘concluded by agreement providing for the payment of tax, interest and penalties.’30  
A further causing factor influencing the decision to reach such agreements may be 
gleaned from a tax appeal commissioner decision which had reached the conclusion 
that if a person who was the subject of a tax appeal assessment wished to appeal a 
decision then the onus was on that person to demonstrate that the assessment was in 
fact incorrect31 and moreover they were not entitled to notes used in the preparation 
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Bureau (2016) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2014, Stationary Office: Dublin at 19.) 
29 Hunt, P op cit at 576.  
30 Supra n.27 at para 4.20.  




of the assessment32  This approach was subsequently judicially approved in TJ v. 
Criminal Assets Bureau (2008)33 where it was confirmed that there was no 
requirement for a tax inspector to provide notes used by him in the raising of an 
assessment.  This was on the basis that the assessment is based on information that is 
either known, or ought to be know, to the applicant.   In terms of stabling the 
operational boundaries for such tax assessments and its implications for CAB it is 
worth setting out in some detail the judgment from Gilligan J. where he stated that:  
“The whole basis of the Irish taxation system is developed on the premise of 
self-assessment. … the applicant … is the person who is best placed to prepare 
a computation required for self-assessment on the basis of any income and/or 
gains that arose within the relevant tax period. In effect, the applicant is seeking 
discovery of all relevant information available to the respondents against a 
background where he has, by way of self-assessment, set out what he knows 
or ought to know, is the income and gains made by him in the relevant period. 
It is quite clear that the whole basis of self-assessment would be undermined 
if, having made a return which was not accepted by the respondents, the 
applicant was entitled to access all the relevant information that was available 
to the respondents.”34 
In respect of balance and fairness the learned justice continued: 
“There are adequate safeguards in position to protect the applicant in the event 
that he is in some way prejudiced, but in any event it has to be borne in mind 
that since an assessment can only relate to the applicant's own income and gain, 
any materially relevant matter would have to be or have been in the knowledge 
and in the power procurement and control of the applicant. 
I do not accept that the applicant has been put in an impossible situation and 
effectively cannot deal with bare and unexplained assessments. … The 
allegations being made against the applicant by way of the assessments as 
raised are that he earned income and made gains which he has not previously 
declared to the respondent pursuant to the basic self-assessment system that 
pertains in this country. Nobody is better placed to know what income he 
received or what gains were made than the applicant himself. 
… I do not consider that there is anything unfair in the procedure that is 
applicable pursuant to the relevant legislation, and further do not consider that 
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the position adopted by the respondents is in any way obstructive of the 
applicant.”35 
The implications of such an approach – which also explicitly acknowledge the various 
avenues of appeal open to an assessed taxpayer – have been reflected on by the bureau 
and considered as not only a positive step in the application of their own remit but also 
positive for the collection of taxes generally by the revenue commissioners.36   
In the specific context of the current work the latitude which is available to the bureau 
is demonstrated by the case of Criminal Assets Bureau v. H & H (2003).37  It was 
confirmed, inter alia, that under the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 the bureau is 
entitled to apply revenue provisions not only where assets have derived from criminal 
activity but also where they are suspected to derive from such activity.38  Such power 
is enshrined even further following the decision in AS v. Criminal Assets Bureau 
[2005]39 where it was confirmed that an officer of the bureau retained the powers that 
had been vested in him as a result of being an officer of the Revenue Commissioners.  
Thus the revenue powers of CAB could be exercised to enforce an assessment against 
property which was of itself ‘not shown to be the proceeds of crime but where the 
assessment was made on the basis of criminal activity.’40  In the AS case the applicant 
contended that the assessment was arbitrary and ultra vires as there was no evidence 
of criminality for the years forming the basis of the assessment.  In this regard 
Finnegan P. relied on the earlier decision of Deighan v. Hearne & Others (1986).41  
This had ruled that the revenue function is this regard was an administrative one based 
on the application of statutory provisions to information which the taxpayer in 
question is obliged to provide.  In that instance Murray J. had went on to say: 
“Where the taxpayer neglects to make any return the Inspector is forced to 
resort to the default procedure. In that event the Inspector must exercise his 
best judgment on whatever information is available to him and as a 
consequence the task of the Inspector may be more difficult and certainly the 
danger of an error in the assessment is increased immeasurably. However at 
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the end of the day the legal effect of each procedure is the same. The taxpayer 
on being given notice of the assessment made on him either acquiesces to it or 
disputes it in accordance with the statutory procedures … 
… an assessment even where mistaken becomes final and conclusive is not a 
direct consequence of the assessment made by the Inspector but rather of the 
failure of the taxpayer to dispute the assessment”42 
In applying such an approach (to the AS case) Finnegan P. accepted that the assessment 
was in a sense arbitrary but that situation was resultant from the fact that the applicant 
had failed to engage with the revenue officers.  In this particular case the applicant had 
not exercised his right to appeal within the statutory timeframe that is allowed for any 
such appeal.   In respect of the initial appeal process and its functional merit it was 
noted in Criminal Assets Bureau v. McDonnell (2000) that the tax inspector dealing 
with the appeal is ‘invariably the person who made the challenged assessment in the 
first place’ and this could ‘hardly be viewed as a detached and independent 
arbitrator.’43  Where the initial appeal application is unsuccessful, there is then the 
opportunity to appeal the refusal to an appeals commissioner within 15 days of the 
date of issue.     
Tax Assessment and the Appeals Process.  
 
In order to avail of the appeals process there is a number of significant statutory pre-
requisites that must be completed.  
(i) The appeal must be lodged within 30 days of the notice of the 
assessment.44 
(ii) Prior to any appeal occurring the taxpayer must first pay in full the 
amount assessed.45 (ie the amount that they are now seeking to appeal 
on the basis that it is somehow in error)  
(iii) If the amount is not paid within 30 days then the assessment is rendered 
final and conclusive. 46 
                                                          
42 As restated in AS v. Criminal Assets Bureau (Unreported) [2005] IEHC 318. 
43 Criminal Assets Bureau v. McDonnell (Unreported) (2000) IESC 31. 
44 S. 933 (1) (a) Taxes Consolidation Act 1997.  
45 S. 957 (2) (a) Taxes Consolidation Act 1997. 





It has been contended by Smith47 that, prima facia, the time limits and the requirement 
to pay the assessment prior to appeal that very assessment might be seen to be overly 
onerous.  However by taking both a holistic wide lens perspective and a narrower 
specific juridical perspective it is possible that a different perspective may be sketched.   
Smith notes that in both revenue and non-revenue areas it is a matter of public policy 
for the legislature to prescribe statutory limitation periods during which an appeal must 
be lodged. For instance it provides a longer period for appeal when compared to the 
21 day time period to appeal the refusal of a refugee status by a Refugee Appeal 
Commissioner.48  In a similar vien under the rules of the Superior Courts an appeal of 
a judgement or order of the High Court must be brought within 21 days.  
Axiomatically the over-arching and fundamental difference between such time limits 
and the revenue appeal limits is that in the latter the assessment must firstly be paid in 
full.  Moreover, non-payment, as noted, renders the assessment final and conclusive – 
an effective Scylla and Charybdis zero sum game for the assessed individual in that in 
either course of events the assessment must be paid in full.  In terms of those that have 
not made any initial return (the primary focus of CAB), as required by law, it is 
contendable49 that all the relevant dates for submission of tax returns are set out by 
statute and the Revenue Commissioners issue timely reminders to all relevant tax 
payers of these particular deadline dates and thus, whilst difficult to comply with, the 
assessment investigation results from the initial non engagement.    
The requirement to discharge the assessment (and any outstanding returns) prior to an 
appeal was considered in Criminal Assets Bureau v. Kelly [2002].50  In this instance 
the taxpayer in question was contesting, inter alia, the ‘tight 30 day deadline’ period 
in which an appeal had to be lodged.   However the court viewed the issue of tax 
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collection as a quintessentially administrative function the boundaries of which were 
clearly established by the procedural rules.  Moreover these deadline boundaries were 
regularly communicated in advance to all taxpayers.  Murray J. concluded that: 
“the defendant knew, or must have known, at all times that he had tax liabilities 
to the Revenue Commissioners in respect of his earnings over the years 
concerned. He was under a duty to discharge those liabilities and to be in a 
position to discharge those liabilities. …  
… he had 30 days from the raising of the assessments … to appeal the 
inspectors' assessments. He could have made such an application promptly in 
that period. The requirement that he pay the tax due on foot of his own income 
tax return was not something which was sprung upon him at the last moment 
or in the last few days of the period for appealing by the tax inspector. That 
requirement is a statutory one of long standing in the appeals procedure 
concerning assessments to tax.”51 
From a jurisprudential perspective the matter did not end at that juncture.  In turn the 
requirement to pay any amounts assessed due prior to having the right to lodge an 
appeal was considered by the Supreme Court in Keogh v. Criminal Assets Bureau 
[2004].52  The pertinent facts being that the applicant had been the subject of a tax 
assessment raised by CAB (acting as his tax inspector) and he wished to appeal the 
assessment.  He had not paid the amount demanded and contended that as a result of 
not doing so the assessments raised against him were not final and conclusive – a key 
requirement of a  legitimate and valid assessment.  The tortured wording of tax related 
legislation has been variously judicially described as “complex”53 and “fraught with 
difficulty”.54  In this case the applicant was, inter alia, basing his appeal on the 
interpretation of the concluding part section 957 (2) (appeals section) of the Taxes 
Consolidation Act 1997 which provides that:  
“… and the time for bringing an appeal against the assessment shall be treated 
as commencing at the earliest date on which both the return has been delivered 
and that amount of tax has been paid,…” 
It was the applicant’s contention that as a result of this section the time period for 
bringing an appeal did not commence until the tax assessed had actually been paid.  
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Resultantly, on this logic, as the 30 day time period had not yet commenced his notice 
of appeal would remain valid.   The Supreme Court concluded that were such an 
interpretation to be adopted it would mean that an assessed party ‘could ensure that 
the assessment served on him never became final and conclusive simply by refraining 
from delivering ay return and paying any tax.  This would make the whole of section 
957(2) entirely pointless.’55  The Chief Justice concluded that to allow the appellants 
interpretation would result in the enactment being a ‘meaningless absurdity.’56  He 
concluded that the correct approach was the long standing tradition where by the duty 
of the court as ‘to give effect to the intention of the Legislature as that intention is to 
be gathered from the language employed having regard to the context in connection 
with which it is employed.’57 
In this particular instance that intention was to not allow an appeal until the assessment 
had been fully discharged by mean of payment.  We will shortly consider constraints 
that have been placed on the revenue powers exercised by CAB but this statutory 
interpretation might be considered quite wide and accepting of clumsy draftsman-ship.  
Additionally in the calendar year prior to this judgement the Revenue Powers Group 
had called for enhanced protections and safeguards for taxpayers.58  The latitude 
shown in this instance would appear to sway the dyad in favour of the State collection 
agency and against the individual taxpayer.   
The significance of revenue powers to CAB in meeting its remit and achieving, albeit 
semi circuitous, results  may also be gleaned from the aforementioned case of Criminal 
Assets Bureau v. Kelly [2002].59  In this instance the defendant was the subject of a 
freezing order, under section 2(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1996,60 which 
prevented him from disposing, dealing with or diminishing either a Dublin based 
dwelling house or monies to the amount of over €112,000.  He was subsequently 
issued with a tax assessment in excess of €480,000.61  The defendant claimed that he 
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wished to appeal this assessment but could not do so as he was unable to firstly pay 
the amount demanded due to his funds being frozen by the above order.  He asserted 
that the resultant position he found himself occupying meant that the combined 
implications of the Proceeds of Crime Act, the Criminal Assets Bureau Act and the 
Taxes Consolidation Act contrived to deny his constitutional right of appeal.   
The Supreme Court rejected such assertions on a numbers of basis.   Firstly, that from 
a generalist perspective tax assessments are a statutory obligation and any taxpayer 
must take steps to meet such obligations.62  In the specific sense of the instant facts63 
the court viewed that where an applicant can show that the property which is the 
subject of a freezing order is not directly or indirectly the proceeds of a crime he can 
apply, under section 2(3) of the Proceeds of Crime Act, to vary or discharged that 
particular order.   Where he is unable to demonstrate that the frozen assets did not 
represent the proceeds of crime then, mutatis mutandis, he is not in a position to utilise 
those funds for other activities.64  Additionally the court considered section 6 of the 
Proceeds of Crime Act which provides that a section 2 order may be varied in 
circumstances where it is essential for the purpose of discharging ‘reasonable and 
other necessary expenses.’  The litmus test of acceptability of such expenses and the 
interaction of the above mentioned three statutes at issue in this case was provided by 
Murray J:  
“The defendant was restricted by an order of the High Court from dealing with 
or diminishing the assets in question because it had been satisfied that they 
were the proceeds of crime. That order was obtained on the application of an 
agency of the State. At the same time he is under a statutory obligation to 
discharge his tax liabilities to the State and, for the purpose of exercising his 
statutory right of appeal, he was required by statute to pay the amount of tax 
which he had admitted to be due. This section refers to "reasonable living and 
other necessary expenses". Self evidently, "necessary expenses" refers to 
matters other than "reasonable living expenses". Although the phrase 
"necessary expenses" is somewhat ambiguous, it clearly must include, in the 
context of this case, monies due and payable to the State pursuant to a statutory 
obligation. Assuming that the defendant was unable or failed to satisfy the 
court in an application under s. 2(3) of the Act of 1996, that the monies in 
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question were not the proceeds of crime, there is no reason why he should not 
have concurrently with the s. 2(3) application, or as an alternative, sought an 
order under s. 6 of the Act.”65 
Thus the phrase necessary expenses is deemed wide enough to encompass monies 
falling due as a result of a tax assessment.66  The implications of this for CAB are 
significant.  As aforementioned it has become routine practice for a revenue review to 
be launched following freezing orders.  Where that review results in a tax demand 
being issued it is, as noted, considered final and conclusive where it is not paid.   Whilst 
the freezing order of itself does not mean that the prosecuting authority has use or 
control of said assets it does provide for an effective interplay between different 
aspects of CAB’s work and moreover makes the bureau an extremely potent force 
where it combines its enforcement options with its administrative functions.  
Furthermore it has had wider implications than merely its own operational boundaries.   
The use of revenue powers by the bureau has highlighted and distinguished the scope 
of the powers available to the Revenue Commissioners generally.  As aforementioned, 
following an Appeal Commissioners ruling the case of TJ v. Criminal Assets Bureau 
[2008]67 arose.   The applicant was seeking evidence that had lead the revenue officers 
to make their tax assessment.  However the Court noted that the applicant was: 
“…not a person entitled to assert a legitimate expectation to be provided with 
the evidence which the respondent may have access to in respect of the 
applicant’s own personal tax affairs against a background of a self assessment 
system. It is not the situation in the present instance that the respondent has 
made a statement or adopted a position amounting to a promise or 
representation express or implied as to how it will act in respect of furnishing 
all information in its possession which forms the basis of an assessment made 
according to the best of an Inspectors judgment. … no expectation has been 
created by the respondents whereby the applicant could reasonably anticipate 
that he would be provided with the information sought herein. [I] do not 
consider that there is anything unfair in the procedure that is applicable 
pursuant to the relevant legislation, and further do not consider that the position 
adopted by the respondents is in any way obstructive of the applicant.”68 
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Thus in a reversal of much of the traditional evidential burden the onus still remains 
on the taxpayer to prove that the assessment is incorrect.69  CAB holds, as noted, the 
power of the collector general and thus has quite substantial operational approaches 
through which to execute their remit in the pursuit of tax debts.  These include:  
- The issuing of demands.70 
- The power of attachment.71  
- The use of sheriffs.72  
Thus there is substantial procedural avenues for the Bureau to pursue all of which 
serve to highlight the benefits (to the Bureau) of a revenue based approach over just a 
forfeiture simpliciter based approach. Finally there is also the option to instigate High 
Court proceedings in order to receive any debts assessed and not paid – again a 
substantial power where a freezing order is already in existence over assets of the 
assessed individual.  The assessed individual does have the option to seek protection 
under the reasonable case saver which allows the taxpayer up to 12 months to appeal 
where he is unable to give notice ‘owing to absence, sickness or other reasonable 
cause.’73 What might constitute ‘reasonable cause’ was considered in Criminal Assets 
Bureau v. D(K) [2002]74 where the taxpayer had paid the outstanding tax returns but 
had not paid the overdue tax.  He claimed he was unable to do so as he was incarcerated 
and claimed this constituted reasonable cause.  Finnegan J. stated that he was:  
“satisfied that the phrase "other reasonable cause" must be read ejusdem 
generis with the words absence and sickness so that the other cause relied upon 
must be similar in nature to absence or sickness.75 
Whilst the case was decided on other grounds the learned justice viewed that 
incarceration was capable of being ejusdem generis with absence or sickness.  
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Judicial Scrutiny.   
 
As has been demonstrated the Bureau has, and moreover highly utilises, considerable 
administrative revenue functions – with the option to apply for judicial enforcement.   
However it has been subject to judicial scrutiny on its formative years. 76  Such scrutiny 
is primarily in the procedural, functional and operational sphere as opposed to any 
conceptual constraints.  Furthermore such attention has aided in discovering and 
defining the operational boundaries of this significant element of modern criminal 
justice enforcement in Ireland. 
 
The issue of defining what constitutes a chargeable person for the purpose of a tax 
assessment was considered in Geraldine Gilligan v. Criminal Assets Bureau & Others 
[1997].77  In this instance the plaintiff had been the subject of a tax assessment to the 
tune of £1.6million (Irish pounds) and her appeal had been denied by the bureau.  
Subsequently, a substantial amount of property was seized by the Bureau and as a 
result of non-payment of the tax debt that had become final and conclusive.  In the 
High Court Morris J. was conscious that whilst ‘significant consequences may flow 
from my determination of these issues. It is no part of my function to consider any 
such consequences and I confine my judgment entirely to the issues before me which 
are matters of law arising out of a consideration of the income tax code.’78  Resultantly 
the Court upheld the plaintiff’s contention that she was not a chargeable person for the 
period under assessment as she was married and had not elected to be separately 
assessed – as was an option under section 195 of the Income Tax Act 1967.  Whilst it 
has been contended that this reflects an “unease”79 with CABs approach it could 
equally be contended that it was an error by the Bureau in their formative months in 
operation and first foray into acting as Inspector of Taxes and application of tax codes.  
The Court were conducting their normal rule of ensuring compliance with statute.80   
In this instance the actual target of the Bureau was primarily the plaintiff’s husband.  
The tax assessment was issued to the wrong person and the judgement does ‘strictly 
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delineate[s] the procedures to be adhered to by the Bureau’81 in that it does not have 
carte blanche and must, as with all agencies, operate within the normal confines of the 
relevant statute.   
A further restraint on potential overzealous activities by the Bureau may be found in 
the judgement from Criminal Assets Bureau v. McDonnell [2000].82  On this occasion 
CAB had treated an assessment as final and conclusive at a stage where there was still 
an open appeal against the assessment with the Appeal Commissioner. In this respect 
Murray J. held that: 
“The appeal process envisaged by the statute did not terminate until the 
determination and rejection of the Defendant’s appeal … It is as and from that 
date of final determination that the appeal against assessments maybe 
considered to be no longer in being. It is only at that point that the taxpayer 
may be considered to be a person who is in default of appeal …”83 
 
The Bureau was also held to have acting outside the parameters for treating 
assessments as having become final and conclusive in both Criminal Assets Bureau v. 
Craft [2001]84 and Criminal Assets Bureau v. Hunt [2003]85 were proceedings were 
premature as they were instigated prior to a demand being issued to relevant taxpayer.  
The Court adopted a similar approach in the matter of Criminal Assets Bureau v. 
Kieran Byrne [2001]86 where again a tax assessment had been raised by the Bureau 
and following default of payment they had moved to seize assets of the plaintiff.  
Previously, in what had “purported” to be an appeal the defendant’s accountants had 
responded to CAB in writing stating: 
“We are unable to quantify the liability or even an estimate of same as all 
books and records of bank statements, invoices, receipts, till receipts, creditors 
listings, cash on hand, petty cash records, cheque stubs, cheque journals, cash 
books, accounts, nominal ledgers, trial balance, balance sheet, profit and loss 
account etc. are all in your possession”.87 
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The Bureau did not accept this reasoning as a valid excuse not to make the payment 
demanded.   However the High Court held that whilst the defendant did not within the 
relevant time period attempt to obtain copies of the documents at issue, it was 
questionable whether there was sufficient time to do so and to make a return.88  The 
opportunities available to the defendant were further exasperated by the fact that a 
worldwide injunction had been imposed on his assets and there would not have been 
time to have it lifted in order to comply with the assessment.  Thus the Court ruled 
that the defendant had the reasonable possibility of a real and bona fide defence which 
legitimately could only be determined at a plenary hearing.89   
 
Finally in this respect, we can again turn to the matter of Keogh v. Criminal Assets 
Bureau 90 where, on this occasion, the matter of interest is the manner in which the 
Bureau provided information the applicant.   The then operable Taxpayers Charter of 
Rights undertook to provide ‘full, accurate and timely information and [your] 
entitlements and obligations under it.’91   Here, the Bureau, acting as the Inspector of 
Taxes, had not made any reference or given any details as to the appeals procedure 
when they had refused an initial appeal.   The Supreme Court noted that some of the 
undertakings in the charter were ‘no more than praiseworthy statements of an 
aspirational character.’92  Notwithstanding, a taxpayer should still expect to be given 
some information pertaining to ‘the provisions of a notoriously opaque and difficult 
code’93 without having the expectation that such information would constitute advice.  
The response from CAB on this occasion would have left the applicant ‘in the dark as 
to his rights.’94 
“While it is manifestly not the function of the second respondents or their 
inspectors to give gratuitous advice in all circumstances to members of the 
public as to their legal position, it was not asking too much of them in the 
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present case not to respond to a letter such as that from the applicant in a 
manner which they must have known could have left him in the dark as to his 
rights. That would seem to me to be at variance with both the letter and the 
spirit of the undertaking in the charter. In the result, I am satisfied that the fair 
procedures which it was reasonable to suppose the respondents would observe 
were not applied in his case.”95 
 
In practice this has led to an extra procedural step whereby information is now 
included in notices of assessment.96  From this series of judgments it is clear that the 
Courts are ensuring that CABs revenue actions are legitimate by ensuring precise 
adherence to the relevant procedural steps – in essence ensuring a fairness of procedure 
for the assessed taxpayer without, it is contended, usurping the significant operation 
revenue powers now available to CAB. Since 2012 the revenue functions of the 
Bureau have widened and they are now in a position to conduct excise duty 
assessments.  They also continue to pursue investigations pertaining to vehicle 
registration tax irregularities and work closely with ‘their customs colleagues in 
Revenue in order to avail of all investigate opportunities and to use all the States 
resources in the most efficient way on tackling criminals.’97     
Conclusion. 
 
In modern society the nature of criminality has changed and indeed has evolved to a 
level where it is sophisticated, nuanced and somewhat business like with various levels 
of control.  Those that were making the greatest financial gain were not those that were 
physically committing the offences.  In response to a changing environment it was 
incumbent upon the legal mechanism to also evolve and develop to meet these threats 
in society. Targeting the financial wealth of criminals via the tax system was not a new 
approach outside of Ireland.  The infamous Al Capone in the United States had 
successfully evaded a number of prosecutions for racketeering but was successfully 
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convicted of tax evasion and fined $50,00098 (US Dollars) – a considerable sum in 
depression era 1931 America.   
 
In Ireland prior to 1983 it was not possible to tax the proceeds of crime as it was felt 
that the State did not expect activities to be carried on in contravention of its own 
criminal code.  Tax and criminality were essential separate matters as far the legal 
framework was concerned.  They were enforced and applied by different State bodies 
with different remits.  The situation was changed in 1983 where upon it was hoped 
that revenue powers could be used to target and eliminate aspects of criminality 
operating in Ireland.  However the Revenue Commissioners acting alone did not seem 
to pursue such matters – presumably not having the necessary wherewithal to 
implement the new provisions against those operating outside the law in serious 
criminality.  With the arrival of CAB it had the benefit of a skill base from a police 
based investigatory approach and a Revenue Commissioners administration approach 
and the authority to tax income – combined with significant legislative authority.  
Resultantly in the period 1996 – 2016 the Bureau has generated tax income to the tune 
of €178, 590,838.  Whilst the Bureau is not a profit driven organisation and does not 
have financial targets per se this represents a significant disruption to criminality and 
a return for the State of monies which hit heretofore would not have fallen with the 
normal taxation parameters of the Revenue Commissioners acting alone.   
 
The Bureau does not have carte blanche authority to act as it so pleases and the courts 
have ensured that all tax assessments must fall within the procedural requirements of 
the relevant tax legislation.  Nonetheless, as tax is a requirement levied on all income 
a tax assessment resultantly carries in and off itself significant authority.   Once 
assessed it can only be appealed where the amount under dispute has already been 
fully paid.   This has been of significant benefit to the model that is operated by CAB 
as where they are of the belief that criminality is occurring there is the option to raise 
an assessment on the basis of ‘miscellaneous income’99.  This is the terminology used 
to refer to earnings from a source that is unknown to the tax inspector – in essence 
illegal earnings.   Whilst in the past the Revenue Commissioners may not have had the 
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appropriate resources and skill base to target such income it provides a perfect 
operating basis for the Bureau – whilst still, importantly, being able to pursue other 
options such as freezing orders.  In the event that the amount is fully paid the onus 
remains on the assessed individual to demonstrate that the assessment was in fact 
incorrect.  In attempting to do so he is not entitled to any notes used on the compilation 
of the assessment.  Thus the pendulum is swinging very much in favour of the bureau.  
Further they are entitled to raise an assessment where the income is only suspected to 
derive from criminality.  Once an assessment is raised that is either derived or 
suspected to derive from the proceeds of crime then, in the event of non-payment, they 
are entitled to enforce it against any property, including legitimately held property of 
the individual.     It would appear that the combined effect of these measures results in 












The multi-agency structure of CAB and its nature as both a central operating and 
success enabling feature has often been referred to within the context of this work and 
elsewhere.  It is considered a ‘vital ingredient’1 in the assimilation of data on targets 
of the bureau and the subsequent application of relevant legislative enforcement 
remedies to the proceeds of crime.  This chapter will consider the third, and final, 
component of this structure – namely the social welfare approach of the bureau.  The 
approach taken will be consistent with that of the previous two chapters and will 
consider the operational approach and subsequent results arising from the social 
welfare activities of the bureau and thereby seek to demonstrate yet a further 
(collaborative) element that has evolved in the new model of criminal justice in 
Ireland. 
There was not any significant focus or debate time given to the rationale for including 
social welfare as an element of the multi-agency structure at its inception.  Rather as 
there was individuals in society operating without a declared income there were, 
ceteris paribus, entitled to apply for and receive social welfare payments.  It was felt 
however that criminals were using social welfare payments to hide their criminal 
activities2 and income.  Furthermore these said individuals seemed to be living 
lifestyles that could not be funded from the relatively low fixed income social welfare 
                                                          
1 Criminal Assets Bureau (1998) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 1997, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 10. 
2 In one of the very few references – during the establishment debates – to the social welfare element 
of the Act it was stated in the Seanad that: 
“I am glad to see the co-operation between the Revenue Commissioners, the Department of Social 
Welfare and the Garda. We need to deprive these criminals of their assets and to show that crime does 
not pay. …I am glad that much of the Bill is highly technical. The more technical it is the better 
because we do not want to find legal loopholes in it later. We need to close such loopholes now before 
criminals — some of whom draw social welfare payments in order to hide their other activities — 
who live a life of luxury off the misery of others are brought to justice for their crimes. We need to 
combat this in the way the Minister is going about it.” Seanad Debates Oct 9th 1996, No.14 Vol 148 at 




payments that they were receiving from the Irish State.  Thus the structure and 
approach of the bureau was considered to be the ideal vehicle to deal with such 
fraudulent claims, eliminate an income stream from those involved in criminality and 
make financial savings and return fraudulently obtained monies to the Irish exchequer.   
 
As will be outlined the social welfare approach of the bureau is a significant tool for 
the enforcement of statutory social welfare operational entitlement limits and the 
disruption of criminality whereby  people are clearly living outside their means and 
have access to unexplained wealth.  Thus the bureau has moved the enforcement of 
social welfare provisions into a new realm.  It has, to a reasonably significant degree, 
prevented the scare resources of the State being inappropriately used and, as 
mentioned, has reduced an element of cash flow to criminality.  The social welfare 
activities of the bureau do not operate on a standalone basis and are often focused on 
targets that are also of interest to other elements of the bureau.   This approach, both 
singularly and collectively, assist the Bureau in reaching its statutory remit of 
depriving those involved of the fruits of criminal activity.   
 
This chapter will consider the legislative under pinning from which social welfare 
inspectors receive their power to issue determinations.  This power was in turn 
extended to CAB officers to be employed against those engaged in criminal activities 
and further legislative support was given to all those involved in CAB related social 
welfare determinations.  Finally it will be noted that the CAB model seems to have 
influenced and inspired the legislative enactment which provides that members of the 
Garda Síochána may be seconded to the department of social protection for a period 
of time.   
 
Whilst traditionally it was difficult to recover social welfare debt the bureau utilises 
various pieces of legislation to aid with debt recovery.  Indeed the bureau was a 
significant influencer in the enactment of one of the pieces of legislation – both 
demonstrating the influence that it has on the development of criminal justice in 
Ireland and a movement towards more administrative sanctions.   The use to which 
such legislation has been put will be viewed through an operational lens to garnish an 




the bureau. Indeed the approach that has generated such results has necessitated that 
personnel at the appeals stage of determinations are also protected in a similar vein to 
the anonymity provisions available to bureau officers.   Finally the chapter will 
conclude with a brief overview of the individual type of cases that have been the 
subject of recent bureau social welfare determinations.  
The Legislative Underpinnings.  
 
Once appointed to CAB3 a social welfare inspector retains the powers which were 
previously available to him as such an inspector.  In particular the inspector has a wide 
power at his disposal under section 212 (2) of the Social Welfare Consolidation) Act 
1993.  This provides that:  
“Every social welfare inspector shall investigate and report to the Minister 
upon any claim for or in respect of benefit and any question arising on or in 
relation to such benefit which may be referred to him by the Minister…” 
(emphasis added)  
 
The inspector also has a wide power, under this section, to require information and the 
documents within a reasonable timeframe.  Furthermore the inspector may, at all 
reasonable times, enter premises without notice for the purpose of making enquires 
and ensuring compliance with social welfare legislation.4  These functions are in turn 
brought under the auspices of the Bureau, with its associated considerable authority, 
by sections 5 (1) c & d of the Criminal Assets Bureau Act 1996 which provided for 
the taking of all necessary action 
“(c) under the Social Welfare Acts for the investigation and determination, as 
appropriate, of any claim for or in respect of benefit (within the meaning of 
section 204 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1993) by any person 
engaged in criminal activity, and 
(d) at the request of the Minister for Social Welfare, to investigate and 
determine, as appropriate, any claim for or in respect of a benefit, within the 
meaning of section 204 of the Social Welfare (Consolidation) Act, 1993, where 
the Minister for Social Welfare certifies that there are reasonable grounds for 
                                                          
3 On the nature of CAB staff see chapter 4 at text around n.35. 
4 Section 212 (3) and (4) of the Social Welfare Consolidation) Act 1993. (As amended by section 26 




believing that, in the case of a particular investigation, officers of the Minister 
for Social Welfare may be subject to threats or other forms of intimidation,” 
Whilst the revenue powers of CAB under the above section 5 pertain to “suspected” 
criminal offences the same phraseology is not used for the social welfare elements of 
the section.  This anomaly was considered in McGinley v. Deciding Officer and the 
Criminal Assets Bureau [2001]5 whereby by means of a case stated the contention was 
made that the above section 5(1) (c) could only be invoked following a criminal 
conviction or in the alternative ‘in the investigation of a person who is actually 
engaged in criminal activity; in other words, it cannot apply to the investigation of a 
person who is merely suspected of engaging in criminal activity.’6  However Fennelly 
J. rejected such assertions with the conclusion that 
“any reasonable interpretation of the words "engaged in criminal activity" 
envisages investigating persons who have not been convicted. First, the word 
convicted in not used. Further, the whole thrust of the said Act of 1996 is to 
enable the Bureau to investigate persons who have not been subject to a 
criminal conviction, and, that, therefore, this submission should fail.”7 
In relation to the second contention above the learned justice ruled that as the word 
suspected was absent from the provision then it was not apparent that the legislature 
had intended this section to apply to persons merely suspected of being engaged in 
criminal activities.  However on the facts he ruled that in this instance the point was 
‘moot as there was evidence that the appellant most likely (emphasis added) had been 
engaged in such activity.’8  Thus this decision reflects the wide operational boundaries 
of the Bureau whilst operating on the social welfare sphere of its work.  Additionally 
it demonstrates the limited opportunities to challenge the decision to be included in a 
bureau based investigation given the wide operating scope it commands in reaching 
its overall remit of targeting those that have not been the subject of a criminal 
conviction.  
 
Further legislative support was given to both social welfare bureau staff and the nature 
of bureau social welfare investigations by elements of the Social Welfare Act 1999.  
                                                          
5 [2001] IESC 49 
6 Ibid at 10.  
7 Ibid. 




In particular, section 289 provides that civil proceedings arising from the exercise of 
social welfare powers may be brought by or against the bureau.   This section was 
necessary to circumvent an anomaly that could arise in the application of social 
welfare enforcement provisions.  Whilst the identity of bureau officers whose work 
involved the investigation and determination of social welfare entitlements would be 
protected by the standard anonymity provisions,10 civil proceedings could only be 
brought by the relevant Minister or an authorised officer of that Minister.  Accordingly 
such officers would not have been under the protection of the CAB Act.11  Thus whilst 
ostensibly under the auspices of protection and continuity this section 28 does widen 
the scope of the bureau’s activities whilst concomitantly extending the same protection 
to all social welfare officers at all stages of the investigation and prosecution process. 
 
In a similar vein of offering protection but also extending the scope of bureau powers 
section 30 (of the above 1999 Act) empowers social welfare bureau officers to 
investigate and decide claims – made by people involved in criminal activity – to 
supplementary welfare allowance.  Prior to the introduction of this section such claims 
would routinely have been assessed by health board officials who again would not 
have fallen under the anonymity provision of the CAB Act.12  Whilst this section is 
only directly applicable to those involved in criminal activity it does bring a further 
element for potential action under the social welfare arm of the bureau.    
 
The nature of social welfare investigations has been considerably widened with 
introduction of section 15 of the Social Welfare and Pensions Act 2014.  This provides 
that members of the Garda Síochána may be seconded to the department of social 
protection with the powers and duties of social welfare inspectors.  The proposing 
Minister for this section stated that:  
“[S]econdees will undertake the full range of investigative duties in detecting 
and combating social welfare fraud. They will retain the powers of gardaí 
throughout secondment and will work closely and collaboratively with other 
compliance and fraud investigation agencies to ensure social welfare fraud is 
                                                          
9 This inserted a new section 224 into the Social Welfare Consolidation) Act 1993. 
10 See chapter 4, text around n. 46. 
11 Dáil Debates 24th Feb. 1999, Vol. 501 at 91.   




comprehensively deterred and detected. In serious cases of fraud the gardaí 
assigned to my Department will be actively engaged in the detection and 
prosecution of such cases.”13 
 
There was acknowledgment from opposition deputies of the growing importance of 
multi-agency task forces but also a concern that there was the possibility of overlap 
and duplication of work already being conduct by CAB.  In particular Deputy 
O’Snodaigh felt that whilst there was a need for more social welfare inspectors but 
under the existing format. ‘Undercover social welfare inspectors investigate specific 
fraud cases. If social welfare inspectors have that level of evidence that they would 
require to go undercover with members of An Garda Síochána and Customs and 
Excise, they should hand it over to An Garda Síochána because it is a criminal matter 
at that stage.’14 
  
However the Minister stated that under the bureau model ‘social welfare officers work 
with and within the CAB and are seconded to it.’ Whilst under the new model  
“…the gardaí are coming into the Department of Social Protection to beef up 
the capacity of the Department in investigations and detection. It will allow the 
members of the Garda Síochána to exercise the powers and duties of a social 
welfare inspector and it facilitates them being seconded to the Department to 
assist with and undertake fraud investigation work. The gardaí who are 
seconded will be provided with powers. This will enable them to work as and 
with inspectors from the Department’s special investigation unit. They will 
perform relevant social welfare investigation functions but will remain gardaí 
as well. Officers will investigate, collate and assemble suitable evidence to 
enable a deciding or designated officer to review an entitlement to social 
welfare payments and in certain circumstances to use this in legal 
proceedings.” 
 
In essence this would appear to be a style over substance argument and this model is, 
in reality, an extension of the style of work that originated with the bureau and has 
striking similarities to the operational model developed by the bureau.   This 
contention is evidenced by the fact that in ‘serious cases of identity fraud or multiple 
                                                          
13 Select Sub Committee on Social Protection, 11th June 2014 at p. 26.  




claiming of allowances, Gardaí assigned to the Department will be actively engaged 
in the detection and prosecution of such cases.’15 
 
Nonetheless the secondment does allow for the targeting of welfare tourism and the 
engagement with bodies such as the taxi regulator and national employment rights 
agency.16  Whilst a CAB type approach, with its associated anonymity provision, is 
undoubtedly necessary for serious cases the secondment of Gardai, as provided for 
under the above section, may provide more efficient and cost effective measure as – 
following the CAB model – secondees retain their garda powers and duties. 
 
Two other elements of legislation assist in moving social welfare activities further into 
the administrative realm and away from traditional court proceedings.   The first of 
these, which is of significant benefit and widely used by the bureau but is also 
available to social welfare enforcement generally, is section 13 of the Social Welfare 
Act 2012.  This provides that where a social welfare debt exists, a deduction of up to 
15% of the individual’s current social welfare payments can be made in order to 
recover said debt.  This is a development from a situation whereby it was only possible 
to recover €2 a week in arrears from an individual’s basic primary social welfare 
payment.  Thus whilst the bureau could make savings by ceasing payment of 
fraudulent claims it did not have an administrative options to recover debts.   However 
the 15% is an upper limit that may be imposed rather than a standardised figure.   The 
introducing Minister was  
“anxious to send out a message that if people owe money to the social welfare 
system, they will have to repay it at a reasonable rate. I believe that a rate of 
up to 15% of the individual’s primary payment, but not any other payments in 
respect of children, dependent spouses or other adults in the household, is a 
reasonable arrangement. It would max out at about €26. This would send out 
a strong signal. At the moment, the Department of Social Protection is owed, 
according to the recent report from the Comptroller and Auditor General, 
somewhere in the region of €350 million because of fraud, overpayments and 
so forth. I do not think it is realistic to expect that we will be able to recover 
most of that but if we could recover even half of it over a three- to five-year 
                                                          





period, it would take the pressure off other areas of the social welfare 
budget.”17 
Thus this section allows for a greater level of debt recovery than was hit heretofore 
possible and both meets the target of reducing debt owed to the department and 
provides an active discouragement to fraud and a signal to those complying with social 
welfare rules that fraud is being tackled. However in terms of greater powers of social 
welfare debt recovery for larger amounts of money that is owed the bureau has stated 
that it was ‘instrumental in the introduction of additional powers’18 by way of notice 
of attachment proceedings.  The power is now provided by section 15 of the Social 
Welfare and Pensions Act 2013.  The provision was not in the original bill and it was 
introduced, without notice, during committee stage in the Dáil.  The late introduction 
was accredited to the time needed by the attorney generals office to consider the 
implications of the provision.  Whilst the bureau is not specifically mentioned as a 
potential user of the section its potential is that arena is blatantly clear from the 
statements of the then Minister for Social Protection.  She noted that the section 
‘provides for money held by the overpaid person in a financial institution to be 
attached for the purpose of offsetting the overpayment.  This measure will be used in 
circumstances where a person has been actively engaged with by the Department but 
still refuses to co-operate in the repayment of the debt and where there is evidence of 
an ability to repay.  In addition, a final demand must have issued to the person 
concerned and there must be no other or alternative recovery options available.’19            
There was also a stated intention that the section was a measure of last resort and 
would only be invoked against those that have received ‘substantial overpayments’.20  
The Minister also stated that she ‘did not anticipate that this power will be used 
frequently, it is important that the Department is able to avail of it.’21  Of course this 
is merely a statement of intention and the actual level of usage will be an operational 
matter for the department and/or the bureau and given the latter’s instrumental 
influence in the introduction of the measure it is likely to become a normalised part of  
                                                          
17 Dáil Debates 12th Dec. 2012, No. 2 Vol. 786 at 554. 
18 18 Criminal Assets Bureau (2014) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2013, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 24. 
19 Dáil Debates 11th June 2013, Vol. 806 at 48 – 49.  
20 Seanad Debates 25th June 2013, No. 4 Vol 214 at 254 – 256.  




at least the bureau’s social welfare activities.   The Bureau was already using powers 
of attachment to recover revenue debts22 and during the course of their investigations 
were discovering significant levels of social welfare overpayments as demonstrated in 
the following table. 23  
Table 4 – Social Welfare Overpayment Assessed. 
 
Year  1996 1997 1998 1999 
Overpayments 
assessed in € 
42,199.43 235,878.35 356,888.62 416,163 
 
Year  200024 2001 2002 2003 
Overpayments 
assessed in € 
-- 317,404 350,347 518,885 
 
Year  2004 2005 2006 2007 
Overpayments 
assessed in € 
269,049 338,296 439,703.77 531,957.71 
 
Year  2008 2009 2010 2011 
Overpayments 
assessed in € 
358,725.63 790,517 1,765,203.73 439,703.77 
 
Year  2012 2013 2014 2015 
Overpayments 
assessed in € 
531,957.71 358,725.63 790,517 1,765,203.73 
 
Year  2016 
Overpayment 
assessed in € 
1,054,161.27 
 
An overpayment is defined is defined ‘as a payment received by an individual over a 
period(s) for which that person has no entitlement to the claim.  Accordingly the 
payments received in respect of the claim creates a debt to the Department of Social 
                                                          
22 The use of attachment orders is provided for Section 1002 of the Tax Consolidation Act 1997.  
23 Table compiled by current author from data available in the annual reports of the Bureau.   The 
table is presented using the actual figure given in the appropriate report.  The reporting is not 
consistent with respect to rounding. The figures for 1997 – 2000 have been converted from Irish 
pounds  




Protection.’25  Whilst the bureau exercises varies measure such as repayments, 
instalments and deductions to recoup debts due given the high level of overpayments 
that have been assessed in the reference period of the above table the power of 
attachment adds a significant recovery instrument to the bureaus arsenal.  Whilst there 
was some concern expressed around the potential wide authority that powers of 
attachment provides26 the measure was not confined to just CAB and was introduced 
as a general social welfare measure without any reference or connection being made 
to the bureau or its influence or the opportunities that it provided for the bureau to 
recover elements of the overpayments assessed and demonstrated in the above table.    
 
The measure does reflect a further move towards administrative enforcement measures 
and away from traditional legal proceedings.  The Minister noted that the ‘only other 
option available to the Department in these circumstances is civil court proceedings. 
This provision will be used as a more efficient and cost effective alternative to civil 
legal proceedings.’27 Thus the powers of attachment are an additional option to the 
bureau in the discharge of its remit, whilst – as with all debt recover – ‘[u]nderpinning 
these new provisions is the principle of the capacity of the overpaid person to repay.’28   
It is that type of individual that has unexplained wealth and thus the capacity to pay 
that are the subjects of bureau investigations rather than the normal social welfare 
recipient.  Thus, as outlined, the bureau has quite wide and sweeping legislative 
powers of investigation and determination, anonymity and recovery available to it in 
the execution of its social welfare remit. 
Social Welfare and CAB – Results achieved.  
 
It is only in recent years that the bureau has started to disclose the number of 
individuals against whom actions under the social welfare remit have been taken.  The 
following table demonstrates those numbers.  
                                                          
25 Criminal Assets Bureau 2015, Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2014, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 27. 
26 Dáil Debates 11th June 2013, Vol. 806 at 49 – 55. 
27 Ibid at 49. Civil proceedings were also described as ‘expensive, lengthy and onerous.’ Ibid at 51.  




Table 5 – Individual actions under taken the Social Welfare Remit of the Bureau.  
29 
Year  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
No. of 
actions 
85 120 102 102 86 74 70 
 
These figures represent a far great number than those that are subject to revenue 
investigations30 and thus reflect the wider impact that the social welfare function of 
the bureau can have on criminality generally and a reflection of the bureau’s approach 
of targeting all levels of criminality.  In terms of income generated and saved by the 
social welfare actions of the bureau it should be noted that, unlike revenue figures, 
social welfare is a relatively low fixed income payment and thus the figures in the 
following table represent significant social welfare cost savings to the exchequer.  The 
table is presented using both savings achieved and recoveries achieved as both reflect 
the remit of the bureau and cost saving vis-à-vis the situation that existed heretofore 
with the status quo  ante.  
  
                                                          
29 Table compiled by current author from data available in the annual reports of the Bureau.    
30 During the same period the numbers subject to tax assessment by the bureau were as follows:  
Year  2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 
No. of 
actions 
31 35 28 19 33 26 26 




Table 6 - Social Welfare Savings and Recovery.  31 
 








    196,208 
 
Year 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Savings by 
Scheme in € 
155,481 109,654 222,921 216,054 297,743.80 
Recovery of 
Monies in € 
51,910 199,703 273,074 293,948 139,524.42 
 









136,623.59 182,198.30 160,335 181,272 454,037.49 
 








393,797 287,380 335,911 185,354.32 297,430.12 
 
Thus in its operational life span to the end of the calendar year 2016, CAB through its 
social welfare activities has generated savings to the exchequer to the tune of 
€7,808,753.04 and received recovery payments to the tune of €4,066,136.36.   When 
the indirect (savings) and direct (recovery) figures are combined the figure of 
                                                          
31 Table compiled by current author from data available in the annual reports of the Bureau.   The 
table is presented using the actual figure given in the appropriate report.  The reporting is not 






€11,874,889.40 represents a significant measure of success in enforcing the 
deprivation of assets derived from criminality and has been primarily achieved 
through the use of administrative sanctions.32.   Whilst considerably less than the 
financial income generated from forfeiture of assets it nonetheless represents a 
significant denial of cash flow to criminality from an area of the bureau that does not 
receive significant attention in wider academic or media discourse.    
Appeals.  
 
Where an assessed individual is unhappy with a social welfare determination (either 
generally or via the bureau) they are entitled to appeal to an independent agency 
(Social Welfare Appeals Office) which is headed up by a chief appeal officer.   This 
officer in turn has the option to invoke section 253 (a) (1) of the Social Welfare 
Consolidation Act 1993.33  This provides that where the chief appeals officer certifies 
that the ordinary appeals procedures are inadequate to secure the effective process of 
the appeal he can direct that the appeal be submitted to the Circuit Court.  This section 
was introduced to the enabling bill at report stage in the Dáil.  The rationale given for 
the section34 was based on the work of CAB and assurances were given that the section 
would only be invoked where there was a danger of threat or intimidation to appeals 
staff.  Thus the section would give the same level of protection and safeguards to 
appeals staff as existed for social welfare bureau staff.   Furthermore the proposing 
Minister stated that the referral power was also necessary as:  
“The service provided by the social welfare appeals office would not be 
adequate to cope with appeals which might require, for example, special 
arrangements for the anonymity of witnesses, at an appeal hearing; neither 
would it be possible, under existing arrangements, to provide necessary 
safeguards similar to those available to officers of the Criminal Assets Bureau 
for the appeals officer hearing such appeals”35 
 
                                                          
32 The bureau can and does use civil proceedings on occasion.  
33 As inserted by section 34 of the Social Welfare Act 1997. 
34 The rationale was given in the Seanad as the Bill was guillotined in the Dáil before the debate 
reached the amendment dealing with this particular section.  




Using a similar rationale he went on to note that:  
“We are providing that the chief appeals officer can refer an appeal to the 
Circuit Court in certain cases to deal with situations referred to us by the 
Criminal Assets Bureau. Circumstances have arisen where we have allocated 
deciding officers to the Criminal Assets Bureau. They have certain protections 
under legislation, given the nature of the work they are dealing with. We have 
made this provision because there may be cases where the appeals officer 
would not be in a position to decide a case due to the risk of threat or 
intimidation. It is an unfortunate reality; nevertheless, I do not expect it will be 
used widely”36 
Thus whilst the social welfare activities of CAB were the clear rationale underpinning 
the need for the section it is not confined to determinations made by the bureau.  This 
again reflects the impact that the bureau can and does have on general legislative 
powers.  Following this section the chief appeals officer has the power to refer the 
appeal of any determination to the Circuit Court.  Whilst it was not the enacting 
legislatures intention that the power would be widely used such constraints are not 
included in the legislation itself.  The Minister rejected a suggested amendment that 
the appeals should be brought to the District Court and not the Circuit Court.  The 
amendment was rejected on the following ground:  
“The Attorney General looked closely at this proposal and is of the opinion 
that the Circuit Court is a better option than the District Court for a number of 
reasons. First, the Circuit Court is a court of record while a District Court is 
not. In other words, all decisions made in the Circuit Court are recorded 
whereas they are not necessarily recorded in the District Court. In addition, the 
proof required for or against is not as stringent as in the Circuit Court. It may 
well be in the interests of the person who is appealing to have a Circuit Court 
hearing rather than a District Court one.”37 
 
The Minister also reiterated that it was envisaged that the power would only be used 
in exceptional circumstance and that there was no automatic reason why the appeal 
should be any more expensive than if it were processed in the normal way by the 
appeals office.   The nature of the appeals process was further developed – and 
constrained from the appellant’s perspective – by section 29 of the Social Welfare Act 
1999.   This provides that where the above section 253 (a) has been invoked – directing 
                                                          
36 Ibid at 1102.  




that the appellant submit their appeal to Circuit Court – that appeal must be submitted 
within 21 days from receipt of the appeal officer’s decision.  Whilst the rationale for 
the section was given in the context of CABs work it is worth again noting that the 
section is not confined to CAB.38  The Minister justified the necessity for the section 
on the basis that the time limit brings the appeal process in line with other appeals 
procedures in the social welfare system.   
 
In practice all appeals to bureau issued social welfare determinations are deemed not 
suitable for the ordinary appeals process and the applicants are directed to submit their 
appeals to the Circuit Court.  In many instances the appeals are withdrawn, others are 
settled and very few actually reach the court process.  Of those that have proceeded to 
appeal hearing in the period up to 2016 none appear to have been successful from the 
applicant’s perspective.  
Recent Cases.  
 
Traditionally, whilst the general overview data is provided by the bureau, little specific 
individual information has been provided or disclosed pertaining to the social welfare 
cases that have been determined under the auspices of the bureau.  However, in the 
annual report for 2016, for the first time, details of the type of cases that the bureau 
have pursued under its social welfare remit were provided.  The details were not 
individualised by name, but rather to the individual specifics of the case that was 
determined.   In one instance 11 members of one family – of known drug dealers – 
had their social welfare claims reviewed.  As a result of this one investigation:   
 
- The sum of €426,000 was calculated as overpayments. 
- A saving of €270,000 was made via both a reduction and cessation of 
payments. 
                                                          
38 The section has been described as  ‘appalling’ and the Minister’s statement that ‘it is unlikely that a 
person in genuine difficulty would neglect to submit or appeal within the appropriate time’ (Seanad 
Debates 25th March 1997, No. 13 Vol 150 Col 1280) as ‘risible’ given that the majority of social 
welfare claimants would have limited access to professional advice. See Clark, R. (1999) Social 




- Over €23,000 has been recovered from the targets of the investigation and 
further monies were expected to be recovered in due course.39 
 
In a further case an organised crime family, amounting to five people, were the subject 
of an investigation which yielded: 
- Savings of over €54,000 from the cessation of social welfare claim. 
- Overpayment of €350,000 which is now the subject of recovery actions. 
 
Such cases demonstrate the significant use to which the bureau has put the 
aforementioned social welfare powers available to it under statute.  Furthermore it 
demonstrates the level of success of the bureau in targeting criminality and fraud.  
Indeed the nature of the social welfare activities of the bureau may take on an increased 
role given the future further intended focus on level 2 and level 340 targets and the 
significant expansion and importance of divisional asset profilers to the bureau’s 
overall co-ordinated multi-agency approach.  
Conclusion.  
 
The social welfare aspects of CABs work might be considered as the forgotten child 
of the bureau.  However a central tenet in the establishment of the bureau was to target 
those who were clearly living a lifestyle not compatible with their declared means – 
and in many instances those means were social welfare payments.  CAB social welfare 
officers have the power to target persons engaged in criminal activities whilst also 
claiming social welfare entitlements.   To date, as a result of such an approach, the 
bureau has generated savings to the tune of €7,808,753.04 and has recovered 
fraudulent received payments in the amount of €4,066,136.56.  Such direct and 
indirect savings represent, it is submitted, significant success for this model of criminal 
justice in Ireland. 
It is a model that offers protection for all those involved in deciding determinations 
and appeals and further enhances the model of administrative sanctions in Ireland.  
                                                          
39 Criminal Assets Bureau (2017) Criminal Assets Bureau Annual Report 2016, Stationary Office: 
Dublin at 34.  




The bureau utilises and was influential in the introduction of attachment orders for the 
recovery of social welfare debts.  This may prove particularly useful for the bureau 
given the high level of overpayments it has assessed and comments from the Minister 
for Social Protection that the court system is onerous and expensive – a clear indication 
of a preference for an administrative model of justice. Further evidence of the belief 
in the model operated by CAB may be gleaned from the fact that secondment 
opportunities are now available for Gardaí to join the  Department of Social protection 
for a period of time whilst also retain their garda powers.   
 
Whilst, as noted, the social welfare aspects of the bureau’s work does not garner 
significant attention, it is submitted that it is a vital element of the multi-agency 
approach and provides significant linkages and support for other aspects of the 
bureau’s operational activities.  Given the stated intentions of the bureau to target 
criminality at a local and community level,41 the social welfare powers may prove to 
be an ongoing key feature in a model of justice that is not concerned with income 
generation but rather deterrence and neutralisation.   
  
                                                          






The rationale for this work was to examine how the concept and operational outcomes 
achieved by CAB reflect a new model of crime control.  In this respect the thesis has 
clearly shown that a new model of crime control has emerged and developed to a stage 
where it is a significant contributor to crime control in Ireland.  The approach 
conceived and implemented by CAB is not designed to produce a socially engineered 
solution to make the deviant better by correctionalist intervention and normalisation. 
Rather it is an actuarial approach to criminal wrongdoing, one which employs civil, 
administrative and regulatory mechanisms.  The instruments employed by CAB 
attempt to permanently alter the criminogenic networks that exist around the 
individual, thereby neutralising the possibility of future bad choices.  There was a long 
history in terms of the developmental underpinnings of a new agency to deal with 
modern criminality however the establishing of CAB was caused by a serious tipping 
point that resulted in elements of moral panic with an associated demand for 
authoritative legislative action to deal with the felt pervasive influence that criminality 
was having on the functioning of Irish society.  The contention was that the normal 
and well established rules and boundaries of the traditional criminal law matrix were 
no longer appropriate or moreover effective in terms of dealing with sophisticated 
modern criminality and its associated professional and business like structures.  This 
demanded a new framework and new approaches in order for the re-establishment of 
legal authority over criminality.   
That authority came in the form of CAB which is a multi-agency comprised of 
seconded officers from An Garda Síochána and officials from the Revenue 
Commissioners and the Department of Employments Affairs and Social Protection – 
who brought their pre-secondment powers to this new agency.   In the past such bodies 
would have carefully confined themselves to their own unique areas and it might have 
been considered unprofessional to seek assistance from an outside body.  However the 
bureau departed from any such constraints and employed the powers in unison to target 
the financial base of criminality.  This, as mentioned, was a regulatory type approach 
– a model that was well established in other areas in Ireland.  What was novel was the 
multi-agency approach and its operation in the civil sphere.  This was part of a 




national boundaries. Furthermore this networked approach adopts a fluid arrangement 
which ensures that it can penetrate most aspects of everyday life, making resistance 
very difficult. This decentred, at a distance type of approach was made possible by 
operating in the civil sphere with its associated lower standards of proof requirements.  
The focus of the Bureau is not on establishing personal guilt of the individual but 
rather adopts an in rem approach to target the assets of the individual rather than the 
individual themselves.  In following such a framework the bureau is able to engage in 
a business-like approach to target ostentatious unexplained wealth and thereby strive 
to counter any concerns of systemic risk arising from a public concerned with the 
threat of criminality within their society.    
This framework allows the bureau to both build upon and depart from common law 
tradition.  It is a long grounded principal that a criminal actor should not be allowed 
to benefit from the proceeds of their criminal adventures.  This raises two questions.  
First, what constitutes a criminal matter and, secondly; by what procedure should an 
individual be deprived of any ill-gotten gains.  The modern boundaries of criminal law 
can be difficult to define and what has emerged is a middle ground justice.  It is a more 
instrumental variegated approach and one where CAB is housed.  In terms of the actual 
proceeds of crime the concept of forfeiture has a long history in the common law and 
the model of crime control implemented by CAB has again placed it in a central role.  
In Ireland the concept had been used as an extra-ordinary measure a decade before the 
establishment of CAB to deal with a specific and single issue that was occurring where 
application of traditional criminal law was likely to be usurped.  Notwithstanding the 
specificity of that measure it nonetheless formed an important part in the ultimate 
emergence of the forfeiture approach of CAB as it had passed constitutional muster.  
Furthermore forfeiture, following conviction, had been introduced in 1994 and thus 
marked a willingness, by the Irish legislature, to use the concept for crime control in 
a much more generalised way than was possible under the 1985 legislation.   
Its use in the absence of a criminal conviction was originally introduced in 1996 as an 
element of the proceeds of crime legislation.  This was enacted in conjunction with 
the establishment of CAB to be a key support of its activities in reaching its remit of 
target the proceeds of crime.  It allows for seizure of assets and/or orders to be issued 




Where the orders stand the bureau may then apply for a disposal order over the asset 
causing it to be sold.  In this way the proceeds of crime legislation has radically altered 
the balance between the State and accused in favour of the former.  Due to such 
repositioning, the nature of such orders and the type of individual who may be effected 
by them it was foreseen that CAB would need to be a robust agency with due regard 
and protections in place for the safety and security of its staff.  
 
The staff are tasked with depriving those involved from benefiting from the proceeds 
of crime. However where a disposal order is issued any income generated is returned 
to the benefit of the exchequer and not to the bureau.  Thus it is neither constrained 
nor incentivised by any financial targets but rather required to discharge its statutory 
remit.  It has aimed to achieve this my adopting a managerialist approach and has 
engaged in professional training for its staff.  As a result it now has asset profilers in 
each garda division and can operate at both the micro and macro level to target various 
aspects of concern to either local communities or an issue at national or international 
level. It also partakes in joint policing initiatives and co-ordinates its overall strategy 
with that of An Garda Síochána and is now an investigative body in its own right and 
supports and assists garda units and international investigatory agencies.  Thereby it 
is clear that the bureau now plays a key role in overall crime control in Ireland.  From 
an operational perspective it has been involved in returning monies – at a national and 
international level – to those that have been the victims of financial fraud.  In terms of 
achieving its remit it has to date returned in excess of €26m to the Irish exchequer 
arising from the forfeiture of assets.  It is impossible to directly quantify any deterrent 
effect that the activities of the bureau may have had on the criminal community but 
this amount represent a tangible result in terms of monies denied to criminality and 
instead available for the benefit of the exchequer.   
Whilst much of the focus arising from the bureau’s activities is given to forfeiture its 
revenue and social welfare powers are also a significant element.  Furthermore they 
have achieved considerable measures of success and play key roles in the new crime 
control model that has been established.  The use of revenue powers against organised 
criminality was legally possible prior to the establishment of CAB but practically was 




The bureau now has the power to act as the Inspector of Taxes.  In addition once a tax 
assessment has been raised it must be paid in full prior to any appeal against its 
accuracy and in that appeal the onus is on the (criminal) taxpayer to demonstrate that 
the assessment is in fact incorrect.  This disequilibrium in power relations represents 
a significant practical challenge for the assessed individual to discharge. The courts 
can exercise oversight of the bureau’s approach, but, due to the fact that the 
requirement to pay tax on (any) income is an accepted administrative fact much of the 
oversight is concerned with strict adherence to the procedural steps.  Thus the 
operational power available to CAB is quite significant.  By raising assessments on 
income derive or suspected to derive from criminality the bureau has to date generated 
tax income to the tune of €178.5m.  Whilst the primary function of the bureau is 
deprivation this secondary implication of such monies secured and denied to 
criminality and available to the State reflects significant success in reaching its remit.  
As an administrative based approach it highlights the changing nature of crime control 
where traditional policing methods are enhanced and expanded by the use of forensic 
accounting and auditing to focus on the criminal money trail and, in turn, use this as a 
tool of deprivation of the essential food chain in the criminological network.   
 
A similar accounting and data management and analysis approach is employed in 
relation to the social welfare activities of the bureau.  Given that many criminals do 
not have a visible source of income they use the social welfare system to generate 
legitimate income.  In response to this by operating both in conjunction with the 
forfeiture and revenue approaches and independently the bureau denies an income 
stream and source of legitimacy by ceasing any fraudulent claims.  It has the authority 
to enforce social welfare legislation against any person engaged in criminal activity 
and may seek an attachment order to recover any assessed overpayments.  In 
conjunction with the bureau’s recent operational decision to focus on lower level 
criminality (whilst maintaining the focus at higher levels) and the growth and use of 
regional asset profilers the ability to target social welfare fraud is an important function 
in dealing with criminality through illuminating non legitimate income streams and 
the facades of normality and legitimacy attached to such streams.  Through both saving 
and recovering of such overpayments the bureau has returned in excess of €11.8m to 




income stream and again represents a significant measure of success in regard to an 
individual component of the overall remit of the bureau.   
 
Collectively the tri-part approach of using forfeiture with revenue and social welfare 
powers and operating against criminality using civil standards and an in rem approach 
reflects a sea change in the approach to modern crime control in Ireland.  It is a model 
that faced many legal challenges but these have helped to define the boundaries of 
CAB.  Whilst the model may mark a hollowing out of Irish criminal justice the Irish 
courts have, primarily, been accepting of this model – with its penchant for threat 
neutralisation – being implemented on public policy grounds.  The bureau adopts a 
business-like approach that is not focused on profit but rather success whilst being 
conscious of delivering a cost effective approach.  Thus whilst being a creature of 
statute it does not appear that there is any expectation that it will be removed by an act 
of parliament.   Overall it marks a significant departure from the more traditional 
approach and, based on the operational approach demonstrated herein, will continue 
to play a significant and growing role in the modern criminal justice landscape.       
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